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Abstract
This thesis develops a novel, unified, syntactic and semantic analysis for a range
of get constructions including those with adjectival, prepositional and verbal
complements. There are two reasons to believe that such an approach is justi-
fied. First, the relevant get constructions demonstrate similar semantic charac-
teristics across complement types, e.g. the presence of Cause (in the sense of
Pylkka¨nen 2008), leading to an obligatorily resultative change-of-state interpre-
tation. Second, the range of constructions display syntactic similarities: for each
get construction with no external argument there is a corresponding construc-
tion with an external argument; and all of the relevant get constructions take
a predicative small clause complement. The approach defended here utilises a
formal syntactic and semantic framework to propose an analysis in which get
is interpreted as a causative functional head which takes a PredP complement
whose function is to add a Holder argument to the property expression in its
complement (Bowers 1993, Adger and Ramchand 2003). At this point one of
two things may occur. Either (i), the Holder argument raises to the sentential
subject position, or (ii), it remains in-situ and an argument external to the
causative head is introduced, and then raised to subject position. The thesis
shows that, contra Pylkka¨nen 2008, and unlike any other English constructions,
get constructions may project Cause without necessarily ‘bundling’ it together
with Voice in the syntax. The resulting claims impact on topics in theoretical
linguistics as varied as predication, causation, reflexivity and binding, property
theory and passivisation, and hold consequences for the nature of the syntax
semantics interface.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a unified analysis of the
syntax and semantics of a wide range of get constructions. In doing
so, the analysis highlights and often challenges both conventional
and recently established thinking on issues as varied as predication,
causation, reflexivity and binding, property theory and passivisation
in the English language.
The main aim stated, by way of an introduction, this chapter is
set out as follows. I begin by looking at just some of the interesting
data connected with get. These pockets of information serve merely
as an introduction to the complex nature of the verb (particularly
when considered in conjunction with its surrounding material) which
will be revealed in more detail as the narrative advances. This brief
look at some of the relevant data is followed by the syntactic and
semantic proposal I will espouse and defend throughout this thesis
for get and its complement structure. A succinct thesis overview is
then followed by a section consisting of the syntactic and semantic
framework that the proposed analysis is couched in. The thesis’s
limitations are then addressed in terms of which constructions I will
not be able to consider herein. Finally, in the last section, some
time is spent on looking at support for the semantic denotation I
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believe best characterises the meaning of get. Thus, we begin by
assembling various pieces of the puzzle.
1.1 The Puzzle
When we scratch the surface, apparently simple sentences such as
those in (1) and (2), hide rather more complex issues than might be
expected.
(1) a. The ice melted
b. John tickled Mary
(2) a. The ice was melted
b. Mary was tickled
For example, in (1), why is the relationship that exists between
the ice and the verb melt not the same as the relationship that
exists between John and the verb tickle, given that in both cases,
the nominal appears immediately pre-verbally? Instead what we
find is that the ice undergoes the verbal event, a role reserved for
Mary, not John. Why also does the introduction of copula be into
the sentences in (2) appear to reduce the number of overt arguments
associated with tickle but maintain the number of overt arguments
associated with melt? At the same time, its introduction seems to
provide access to a covert second argument in (2-a), the ‘melter’,
not available in (1-a), and allow the ‘tickler’ argument in (1-b) to
be present, but covert, in (2-b)?
Questions such as these have received a great deal of attention in
the literature, and suggested answers to them have revealed much
about the way language is structured. However, when set within the
context of get and its surrounding material, such issues have received
much less attention. They arise frequently during the course of this
thesis, and require attention, and sometimes novel answers, in order
to justify and maintain the analysis to be proposed herein.
As an initial example, consider the get construction in (3) and
its counterpart be construction in (4):
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(3) John got fired (4) John was fired
Although patently similar, both in form and meaning, scratch
the surface and once again, telling observations can reveal major
differences. To begin with, the two verbs operate very differently
under testing for main verb vs auxiliary status: get requires do-
support and pre-verbal modification, (5) and (6), while be rejects
do-support and demonstrates post-verbal modification, (7) and (8):
(5) a. *Got John fired?
b. *John gotn’t fired
c. *John got fired and Mary got
too
d. *John got often fired
(6) a. Did John get fired?
b. John didn’t get fired
c. John got fired and Mary did
too
d. John often got fired
(7) a. Was John fired?
b. John wasn’t fired
c. John was fired and Mary
was too
d. John was often fired
(8) a. *Did John be fired?
b. *John didn’t be fired
c. *John was fired and Mary did
too
d. *John often was fired
A second difference relates to their respective argument struc-
tures, namely that only the example with get can take a second
argument:
(9) John got Mary fired (10) *John was Mary fired
A further difference relates to how their semantics affects which
vocabulary items may or may not appear as their complement:
Nevertheless, within the analysis to be posited here, get and be
constructions will be shown to be justifiably, intimately related. In-
deed, they share at least one, very revealing similarity, specifically,
their strikingly wide distribution, (13) and (14), and one equally re-
vealing fact about their meanings, namely that most of the examples
with get entail the corresponding example with be, (15):
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(11) a. John got dirty
b. *John got female!
(12) a. John was dirty
b. John was female!
(13) a. John got fired
b. John got dirty
c. John got past the barrier
d. John got a doctor
e. John got to fire Mary
f. John got fixing the leak
(14) a. John was fired
b. John was dirty
c. John was past the barrier
d. John was a doctor
e. John was to fire Mary (but didn’t)
f. John was fixing the leak
(15) a. John got fired → John was fired
b. John got dirty → John was dirty
c. John got past the barrier → John was past the barrier
d. John got fixing the leak → John was fixing the leak
Other contrasts will surface during the course of this investigation
which, for space reasons, considers only a subset of the uses of get
shown in (13), more specifically, those set out in (16) and (17).
The data set has been divided here into two broad categories,
A-type constructions and B-type constructions. By way of a ter-
minological clarification, get constructions with AP complements
will often be referred to as adjectival get constructions. Likewise,
those with PP complements will often be called prepositional get
constructions and those with PassP complements as passive get con-
structions.
(16) A-type Get Constructions
Linear structure: DP1 get Predicate
a. John got angry [AP-complementation]
b. John got on the roof [PP-complementation]
c. John got onto the roof [PP-complementation]
d. John got arrested [PassP-complementation]
e. John got washed1 [AP-complementation]
1Washed, both here and in (17-e), is to be thought of as a resultative adjectival participle.
Evidence in support of the existence of this construction is provided in chapter 5
9
(17) B-type Get Constructions
Linear structure: DP2 get DP1 Predicate
a. Mary got John angry [AP-complementation]
b. Mary got John on the roof [PP-complementation]
c. Mary got John onto the roof [PP-complementation]
d. Mary got John arrested [PassP-complementation]
e. Mary got John washed [AP-complementation]
Notice that any particular A-type construction has exactly one less
nominal argument than its counterpart B-type construction. So,
for example, the construction in (16-a), which embeds an adjectival
predicate, has one less argument than the construction in (17-a),
which embeds the same adjectival predicate, and is thus considered
to be its counterpart.
There appears to be a strong relationship between the two types,
namely that the nominal in position DP1 in a B-type construction
plays a similar thematic role in the given sentence to the role played
by the nominal in position DP1 in its A-type counterpart. For
instance, in both (16-d) and (17-d), and despite the discrepancy
that exists between the linear sentential position of the nominal
John relative, in particular, to get, John is the person undergoing
arrest. He is the so-called Theme of the arresting event. This speaks
to an analysis in which the two types are closely related, with one
type deriving from the other.
Another feature of all these get constructions is that they are
resultative. This is shown by the fact that each one denotes a result
state which cannot be contradicted:
(18) a. *John got angry but he wasn’t angry
b. *John got on the roof but he wasn’t on the roof
c. *John got arrested but he wasn’t arrested
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This contrasts with other bi-clausal verbs that clearly do not give
rise to a result state:
(19) a. Mary asked/begged John to help but he didn’t help
b. John asked/begged to help but he didn’t help
It is possible to draw out many more features and properties of
get constructions, both in and of themselves, and in comparison to
similar be constructions but, I will let this occur naturally through
the discussion as it moves forward. The facts and contrasts already
made and drawn above serve as a sufficient window into the com-
plexity of the verb in question, and remind us that any successful
analysis will need to be able to explain all of these nuances.
1.2 The Proposal
In a nutshell, I will argue that despite appearances, the syntax and
semantics of get is consistent across the constructions outlined in
(16) and (17).
Semantically, get ’s function is to let the hearer know that some
unspecified event has caused the state described in its complement
to hold of some particular individual or set of individuals. Thus,
it means something like (but not exactly) the English word ‘cause’
and it signals to the hearer the onset of a new state. Its semantic
value is formally expressed in (20)2.
(20) JgetK = λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′[f(e′) & cause (e,e′)]
In words, (20) says that for some eventuality e, there exists an even-
tuality e′, characterised by the complement of get, such that e causes
e′.
Syntactically, get takes a small clause (SC) complement, and an
2I will explain and defend my reasons for assigning this particular value for get in section
1.6 at the end of this chapter.
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optional external argument may be added (hence the difference be-
tween A-type and B-type get constructions), see (23) and (24). The
small clause complement will necessarily contain both a predicative3
element and a Holder subject introduced by the head of the SC,
namely by Pred (Bowers 1993, Bowers 2001, Adger and Ramchand
2003). The semantic value of Pred is shown in (21).
(21) JPredK = λπ.λx.λe.[holds(π,e) & Holder(e,x)]
(Adger and Ramchand 2003)
The function of Pred is to turn the property expression in its comple-
ment into a propositional function with an unsaturated argument.
It does so by expressing that the property holds of some eventual-
ity and that this eventuality has a Holder argument. Thus, if the
property is, for example, the property of anger, Pred will allow the
grammar to take that property and express that it holds of a partic-
ular eventuality, returning an eventuality of being angry, of which a
particular individual may then be deemed the Holder.
(22) Small clause structure
PredP
Holder
John
Pred′
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
XP
[angry]pi
[on the roof ]pi
It is worth re-emphasising this point. The properties (of being
angry, on the roof etc.) do not hold directly of an individual, but
rather, they hold of an eventuality of which an individual is the
Holder. There is a principled reason, to do with the stage/individual
3The necessity holds because of the semantic ‘lightness’ of get - see section 1.2.1
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level distinction (Carlson 1977), as to why it is desirable to have Pred
work in this way for get constructions, and it will be argued for in
detail, in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.5.
The trees below summarise the analysis, as presented thus far,
for both A-type and B-type get constructions.
(23) Get construction, no external argument (A-type)
VP
get PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,X)]
Holder
X
XP
Π
(24) Get construction with external argument (B-type)
vP
external
argument
v′
v VP
get PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,X)]
Holder
X
XP
Π
In non-agentive structures, (23), the Holder argument is forced to
raise for nominative Case marking. However, for agentive variants,
(24), the Holder argument is Case marked in-situ by little v, while
the external argument raises for nominative Case marking.
Finally, there is one more side to get that is worth highlighting
before moving on, which is the notion of ‘lightness’, or ‘light’ as
opposed to ‘main’ verbs. It is worth mentioning because from time
to time it will crop up, and it relates generally to the semantics
13
of get, (20), and to its pervasiveness in the English language. The
following section is dedicated to a definition of what ‘lightness’ is
taken to mean within the context of this thesis.
1.2.1 The ‘lightness’ of get
For the constructions under consideration, it is clear that get re-
quires a complement of more complexity that just a simple nominal
argument4. The reason for this is now clear. Get, rather than adding
propositional weight to the sentence, merely allows the user to add
in an extra unspecified causing event. This is reflected in its logi-
cal representation in (20), which licenses no arguments and simply
asserts a causal relationship between two eventualities. Of the two,
the caused one’s characterisation is dependent on the phrase in get ’s
complement, while the causing one is underspecified and therefore
unattached to any particular kind of cause.
The following is what I mean by ‘lightness’: get is a ‘light’ verb
in that no logical proposition is put forward by its use, no ‘complete’
concept over which it is possible to form a truth judgement. Get is
verbal in that it may be tensed, but unlike most other verbs in that
it is not predicative. For this reason a more complex complement
is required, namely one that can add propositional weight, i.e., a
predicate of some description.
With this small matter cleared up, and the proposal set out, we
will now take a brief look at an overview of the thesis as a whole.
4This is also true for nominal complement get constructions like John got a present. I
will not be analysing these constructions, except to point out that superficially, they appear
to consist minimally of just a nominal argument. In fact, however, these constructions also
include a possession side to their meanings which indicates that an analysis of them as purely
nominal complements is too simple.
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1.3 Thesis overview
The thesis will take on the following form. In the rest of this in-
troductory chapter, we will first briefly run through some of the
more important syntactic and semantic theoretical assumptions that
I adopt, and then look at some support found elsewhere in the lit-
erature for the meaning of get that I will be defending throughout.
In chapters 2 and 3 the analysis will be used to provide a syn-
tax and semantics for adjectival and prepositional get constructions
respectively, and will be shown to be able to handle difficulties in re-
lation to the stage-level, individual-level contrast, modification with
more, and the distinction between locational and directional prepo-
sitions.
Then, in chapter 4, greater attention will be paid to the impor-
tance of the reflexive anaphor in all of the relevant constructions, and
a novel analysis of reflexive anaphor binding will be attempted as
a way of explaining some of the θ-role assignment patterns we see.
This analysis of reflexive anaphors will play a particularly crucial
role in the evaluation of passive get constructions conducted in the
final analytical chapter of the thesis, of which there are two types,
pure passives and adjectival passives. Finally, a thesis conclusion is
offered in chapter 6.
1.4 Syntactic and semantic assumptions
This thesis assumes Chomsky’s (1995, and subsequent work) princi-
ples and parameters theory within a Y-model of grammar commonly
called the Minimalist Program (MP).
Furthermore, I will assume that syntactic structures licensed
within MP may be mapped in a tight, one-to-one fashion with the
semantics such that the they may be ‘read’ directly off of the syn-
tactic structure.
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I will employ a type-driven truth conditional semantics, adopting
the general approach and framework espoused in Heim and Kratzer
(1998), but with two additions to the set of basic types, namely that
in addition to entities of type e and truth values of type t, there exist
eventualities of type s (a cover type for both states and events (Bach
1986)) and properties of type π (Chierchia 1985, Bowers 1993). π,
like s, may be considered a cover type for various properties that
will be motivated through the course of the analysis. These include
properties of locations i, times t and spatiotemporal intervals ∆.
Denotations of individual lexical items will be either that of en-
tities, truth values, eventualities, properties or functions built up
from these basic types (e.g. <e,<s,t>>, <e,π>, <s,t> etc.). I
assume that the interpretation of a syntactic tree proceeds compo-
sitionally, through the processes of functional application (FA), and
event(uality) identification (Ev.Id.) (used here almost exclusively
for addition of the external argument (Agent)):
(25) a. Functional Application
If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daugh-
ter’s, and [β] is a function whose domain contains [γ],
then [α] = [β]([γ]).
(Heim and Kratzer 1998, p.44)
b. Event Identification
A function of type <e,<s,t>> may be event identified
with a function of type <s,t> to produce a function of
type <e,<s,t>>:
<e,<s,t>> <s,t> −→ <e,<s,t>>.
(Kratzer 1996, p.122)
Argument introduction, to which we turn next, takes a prominent
role in the characterisation of get, and for this reason it receives a
section all to itself.
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1.4.1 Argument Introduction
I will assume that argument introduction proceeds in a neo-Davidsonian
way for the addition of non-core verbal arguments such as Agent and
Holder (Kratzer 1996). Core arguments may or may not be reflected
in the text in a neo-Davidsonian format with no resulting conse-
quence, e.g. the necessary need for neo-Davidsonian representation
in the syntax. Thus, a sentence like John tickled Mary will have the
following syntactic and semantic structure (ignoring tense)5:
vP
λe.
[tickle(e) & Theme(e,Mary) & Agent(e,John)]
John v′
λx.λe.
[tickle(e) & Theme(e,Mary) & Agent(e,x)]
v
λx.λe.
[Agent(e,x)]
VP
λe.
[tickle(e) & Theme(e,Mary)]
V
λx.λe.
[tickle(e) & Theme(e,x)]
tickled
Mary
Partially following Bowers (1993), I will assume that the phrases
of categories that may denote properties are restricted to the set {A,
P, N, Res, Pass-v6}, i.e., most of the set of predicational categories
that may be considered unsaturated in the ‘Fregean’ sense. The
category V, conspicuous by its absence, is not included as it will
be assumed that VP cannot have a Holder argument and that for
5As a word of caution, Voice and little v will be used interchangeably in the discourse and
are assumed to perform the same grammatical functions.
6Res and Pass-v will be defined properly in chapter 5, but are essentially an A and defective
v, respectively.
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all non-unaccusative constructions, the external argument is added
via event identification with VP. The ‘special’ status of all of these
categories as predicates of language is due to what Chomsky (1986)
has called a Complete Functional Complex (CFC), that is, once
they are saturated (mediated by a Pred or little v head), each one
can “stand on its own as a complete thought or information unit”
(Bowers 1993, p.649).
A final comment is in order. It will be taken as fact that there
exist various types of by phrases: those that name implicit Agents
and those that describe a cause are the ones most used herein, al-
though others do exists (e.g. by himself = ‘alone’). Although I have
not differentiated between them in the analysis using special terms,
I have tried to refer to which one is in use at any given time.
Next, I will simply provide examples for all of the get construc-
tions that are not under consideration in this work.
1.5 Get constructions for future work
I will not be analysing the following host of get constructions, but
my hope is that the analysis will be, at least in the main part, not
too difficult to extend to these structures. The most obvious are
those with DP, particle and infinitival VP complements:
(26) a. John got (Mary) the doctor/a new bike
b. John got (Mary) out/off/in/on
c. John got (Mary) to fire Peter
d. John got (Mary) fixing the car
Other constructions outside the remit of this thesis include the fol-
lowing:
(27) a. I get that you like her but why?: Get = ‘understand’
b. I got you = I understood/beat/tricked you etc.
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Finally, and less obviously, the Experiencer constructions, which are
so-called because the matrix subject receives an Experiencer θ-role.
These are briefly considered in section 2.2.2, but no fully worked out
analysis is provided for them:
(28) a. John got his car stolen
b. John got Mary’s car stolen on him
We turn now finally, to a discussion consisting mainly of a review
of a subpart of Pylkka¨nen 2008, in which strong motivation for the
proposed value of get, as given in (20), is to be found.
1.6 Support for the proposed denotation of get
The semantic value assigned to get in (20), repeated in (29), is
posited elsewhere in the literature as the “universal causative el-
ement” Cause (Pylkka¨nen 2008, p.84). According to Pylkka¨nen,
Cause is, in principle, available to all languages as a way to intro-
duce a causing event into the semantics of a non-causative predi-
cate. So, just as Kratzer (1996), Bowers (1993), (2001) and indeed
Pylkka¨nen (2008), among others, use functional heads to introduce
event arguments, Pylkka¨nen also uses the functional head Cause to
introduce an event proper.
(29) JgetK = λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′[f(e′) & cause(e,e′)] = Cause
The denotation in (29) says that, given some set of eventualities f,
and some eventuality e, there exists an eventuality e′ such that e
causes e′ and e′ is characterised as the eventuality in the comple-
ment of Cause (or get). Crucially, the given entry does not relate a
participant to the causing event, although there is also nothing to
stop one being added on separately by Voice (Kratzer 1996).
Pylkka¨nen’s (2008) claim competes with an alternative stance
positing that causativity is simply the result of the use of a Kratze-
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rian style argument introducing functional head as illustrated in (30)
(Doron 1999).
(30) λf<s,t>.λx.λe.[f(e) & Causer(e,x)]
As Pylkka¨nen states, these two opposing theories make different pre-
dictions about what causative sentences mean, and therefore about
what their possible semantic structures are. More specifically, for
any event of (for example) a vase breaking, if John broke the vase
then, assuming a θ-role analysis as in Doron 1999, John was the
Causer of a breaking of the vase. However, assuming a bi-eventive
analysis as in Pylkka¨nen 2008, John was an Agent of some event
where that event caused a breaking of the vase. Syntactically, the
two structures look as follows:
(31) The θ-role analysis
VoiceP
Causer Voice′
VoiceCauser
Caused Event
(32) The bi-eventive analysis
VoiceP
Agent Voice′
Voice CauseP
Cause
Caused Event
These two meanings are significantly different in that only the
second allows for the possibility of a causative construction without
the necessity of an external argument, (33), i.e., the possibility of a
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sentence with the meaning some event caused a breaking of the vase.
It is exactly this kind of meaning that I am claiming is encoded in
(A-type) get constructions. Thus, in so far as this claim is shown
to be correct, it will provide strong empirical support for Pylkka¨nen
2008.
(33)
CauseP
Cause
caused event
(34) The vase got broken ≡ ‘some event caused a breaking of the
vase’
For Doron 1999, to introduce an external argument as a Causer is
to introduce causativity into the semantics of the relevent sentence,
and consequently there is no way to achieve this without an external
argument. Therefore, crucial evidence both in support of the bi-
eventive analysis, and against the θ-role analysis, will come in the
form of causative constructions which demonstrate no discernible
Agent. Pylkka¨nen 2008 describes two such cases; the Japanese ad-
versity causative and the Finnish desiderative causative. In the next
two sections I will run through the relevant data.
1.6.1 Japanese adversity causatives
The Japanese adversity causative is used by speakers to express that
the nominative argument has somehow been adversely affected by
some caused event. The basic example is a causativised unaccusative
as follows:
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(35) Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
musuko-o
son-acc
korob-ase-ta
fall.down-cause-past
a. ‘Taroo caused his son to fall down’
b. ‘Taroo was adversely affected by his son falling down’
(from Pylkka¨nen 1999b)
We know that (35) is causativised because it has the causative
marker ‘sase’. The meaning of (35) is ambiguous between a standard
causative, in which the nominative argument is interpreted as the
Agent of the causing event, (35-a), and an interpretation in which
it can be read as an affected argument of the caused event, (35-b).
A similar construction with a similar meaning exists in Japanese,
namely the adversity passive:
(36) Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
musuko-ni
son-dat
korob-are-ta
fall.down-pass-past
‘Taroo was adversely affected by his son falling down’
Leaving Case to one side, the only surface difference in this con-
struction, as compared to (35), is the use of the passive marker
‘rare’ in place of the causative marker. However, as will be seen,
other differences do exist.
For now, the important case to consider is (35-b), which is pre-
dicted to have the following structure, and a causative interpretation
in which the causing event has no related participant:
(37) = structure of (35-b)
CauseP
λe.∃e′. [Cause(e,e′)
& falling down(e′)]
Cause
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′
[f(e′) & Cause(e,e′)]
λe.falling down(e)..
(falling down event)
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To show that this is a possible structure for (35-b), Pylkka¨nen
demonstrates three properties of the sentence. She gives evidence
that:
1. The nominative argument ‘Taroo’ is not an external argument.
2. There is a causing event in the structure.
3. There is no implicit external argument.
Passivisation facts demonstrate that the nominative argument is
not an external argument. The adversity causative patterns like
both unaccusatives and adversity passives in that it does not pas-
sivise:
Adversity Causative:
(38) Musuko-ga
son-nom
korob-ase-rare-ta
fall.down-cause-pass-past
a. ‘The son was caused to fall down’
b. *‘Somebody was adversely affected by their son falling
down’
Adversity Passive:
(39) *Musuko-ga
son-nom
korob-are-rare-ta
fall.down-pass-pass-past
‘Somebody was adversely affected by their son falling down’
Unaccusative:
(40) *Korob-are-ta
falling.down-pass-past
‘There was falling down going on’
To show that there is a causing event, but no implicit argument
present in the adversity causative, Pylkka¨nen compares how it and
the passive combine with by-phrases.
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In Japanese, like in English, a by-phrase may either modify an
event argument or specify an event participant. The Japanese by-
phrase is ni-yotte:
By-phrase modifying event:
(41) Taro-wa
Taro-top
kawa-wo
river-acc
oyogu
swim
koto
c
ni-yotte
by
mukougisi-ni
the-other-side-dat
watatta
got
‘Taro got to the other side by swimming across the river’
By-phrase specifying implicit Agent event participant in passive:
(42) a. Nikki-ga
diary-nom
Hanako-ni-yotte
Hanako-by
yom-are-ta
read-pass-past
‘The diary was read by Hanako’
The unaccusative does not have an implicit argument and as such
will not combine with a by-phrase:
By-phrase not able to specify event participant:
(43) *Yasai-ga
Vegetable-nom
Hanako-ni-yotte
Hanako-by
kusa-tta
rot-past
‘*The vegetable rotted by Hanako’
If the adversity causative names a causing event but has no implicit
argument it is predicted to be able to take a ni-yotte phrase naming
this causing event, but not one naming an implicit Agent. The
converse should be true for passives. These predictions are borne
out:
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Adversity causative:
(44) a. Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
sensoo-ni-yotte
war-by
musuko-o
son-acc
sin-ase-ta
die-cause-past
‘Taroo’s son was caused to die on him by the war’
b. *Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
Hanako-ni-yotte
Hanako-by
musuko-o
son-acc
sin-ase-ta
die-cause-past
‘Taroo’s son was caused to die on him by Hanako’
Passive:
(45) a. *Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
sensoo-ni-yotte
war-by
musuko-ni
son-dat
sin-are-ta
die-pass-past
‘Taroo’s son died on him by the war’
b. Taroo-ga
Taroo-nom
Hanako-ni-yotte
Hanako-by
korob-ase-rare-ta
fall.down-cause-pass-past
‘Taroo was caused to fall down by Hanako’
Thus, Pylkka¨nen succesfully shows that there is at least one con-
struction in Japanese in which Cause is introduced without also
having to merge Voice above it. A second construction of this type
is the so-called Finnish desiderative causative, ‘desiderative’ in that
the construction expresses a desire on the part of the subject to do
the event in question.
1.6.2 Finnish desiderative causatives
The Finnish desiderative causative is essentially a causativised unerga-
tive. It is so called by Pylkka¨nen because it denotes a desire and
contains a causative marker ‘-tta-’7:
7I leave to one side, as irrelevant for my purposes here, how Pylkka¨nen accounts for the
desiderative part of the meaning
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(46) Maija-a
Maija-par
laula-tta-a
sing-cause-3sg
‘Maija feels like singing’
To show that this truly has a causative meaning, but no Causer
external argument, as Pylkka¨nen claims, she again demonstrates
that the construction conforms to the following three properties:
1. The pre-verbal (partitive) argument is not an external argu-
ment.
2. There is a causing event in the structure
3. There is no implicit external argument
Taking these in turn, the first is relatively easy to show. In
Finnish, partitive Case, and not accusative Case, always marks the
object when the event described by the verb is atelic. Thus, to show
the first property, Pylkka¨nen need only show that the sentence is
atelic. In fact it is stative (and therefore atelic) which can be es-
tablished through comparison of how statives in Finnish work in
contrast to eventives. In the present tense, Finnish eventives, like
English eventives, have only a habitual interpretation, (47-a). Sta-
tives, on the other hand, have a ‘true’ present tense meaning, (47-b).
Desideratives pattern with stative verbs, (47-c):
(47) a. Maija
Maija-nom
aja-a
drive-sg
avoauto-a
convertible-par
‘Maija drives a convertible (habitually)’
b. Jussi
Jussi-nom
osa-a
know-3sg
ranska-a
French-par
‘Jussi knows French (at present)’
c. Maija-a
Maija-par
laula-tta-a
sing-cause-3sg
‘Maija feels like singing (at present)’
Note that the stative in (47-b) has its post-verbal object marked
with partitive case, whereas the desiderative has the preverbal (ob-
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ject) marked with partitive case. This is not a problem as derived
subjects always retain partitive case:
(48) Pekka-a
Pekka-par
rakaste-ta-an
love-pass-agr
‘Pekka is loved’
Pylka¨nen concludes, then, that the subject of a desiderative is like
a derived subject of a passivised stative verb, and crucially not an
external argument8.
The second task is to establish that the desiderative is semanti-
cally causative. To do this, Pylkka¨nen compares the construction
with a standard non-causative expression of desire such as (49).
(49) Halua-isi-n
want-cond-1sg
laula-a
sing-inf
‘I would like to sing’
The desiderative causative contains causative morphology pointing
towards the existence of a causing event. (49), however, contains no
causative morphology and as such should show no causative compo-
nent in its interpretation. This seems to be the correct prediction,
as (50) and (51) illustrate. In the former, the causative desider-
ative, the causative event may be questioned. In the latter, the
non-causative desiderative, it may not:
(50) Minu-a
I-par
laula-tta-a
sing-cause-3sg
mutt-en
but-not.1sg
tieda¨
know
mika¨
what-nom
‘Something makes me feel like singing but I don’t know what
(makes me feel like singing)’
8Partitive case may occur on external arguments but only with plural and mass nouns.
The fact that the singular is grammatical in a desiderative environment indicates again that
the subject is not an external argument.
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(51) *Halua-isi-n
want-cond-1sg
laulaa
sing
mutt-en
but-not.1sg
tieda¨
know
mika¨
what.nom
‘I would like to sing but I don’t know what (makes me want
to sing)’
The final property that needs to be established is that the causative
desiderative construction contains no implicit external argument.
To do this, Pylkka¨nen applies by-phrases and purpose phrases to
the construction, phrases normally employed to refer to the implicit
external argument in passives.
By-phrases in Finnish come in two types; toime-sta = ‘action-
ela’ and taho-lta = ‘direction-abl’9. When used, the former refers
to an implicit Agentive argument and the latter to an implicit non-
Agentive argument.
Passives :
(52) a. Rakennus
building
pure-tti-in
tear-pass-agr
kaupungi-n
city-gen
toime-sta
action-ela
‘The building was torn down by the city’
b. Ministeri-a¨
minister-par
viha-ta-an
hate-pass-agr
tyo¨va¨enluoka-n
working.class-gen
taho-lta
direction-abl
‘The minister is hated by the working class’
When no implicit argument is available, as is the case with unac-
cusatives and non-causative psych predicates, they are ungrammat-
ical:
*Unaccusative with by-phrase
(53) *Laiva
ship-nom
upposi
sankINTR
vihollise-n
enemy
toime-sta
action-ela
‘*The ship sank by the enemy’
9Strictly speaking these are not by-phrases, but rather periphrastic equivalents to the kind
of by-phrases used in English and Japanese.
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*Non-causative psych predicate
(54) *Minna
Minna-nom
viha-stu-i
angry-become-past
Liisa-n
Liisa-gen
taho-lta
direction-abl
‘*Minna became angry by Liisa’
As well as by phrases, passives will also accept purpose clauses:
(55) Maija-a
Maija-par
laula-te-ta-an
sing-cause-pass-agr
tarkoituksella
on.purpose
‘Maija is caused to sing on purpose’
Crucially, however, neither a by-phrase nor a purpose clause may be
used with the causative desiderative:
(56) a. *Maija-a
Maija-par
laula-ttta-a
sing-cause-3sg
Liisa-n
Liisa-gen
toime-sta/taho-lta
action-ela/direction-abl
‘Maija is caused to feel like singing by Liisa’
b. *Maija-a
Maija-par
laula-tta-a
sing-cause-3sg
tarkoituksella
on.purpose
‘something causes Maija to feel like singing on purpose’
Pylkka¨nen successfully shows, then, that for the Finnish causative
desiderative there is indeed a causing event, but no external ar-
gument, and therefore that the Cause head is independent of the
external argument.
In contrast to Finnish and Japanese, English has no causative
morpheme. In the next section I will go through Pylkka¨nen’s (2008)
analysis for English zero-causatives.
1.6.3 Voice bundling and the English zero-causative
As has been seen, Cause may be realised separately from Voice, effec-
tively leading to the possibility of a causativised unaccusative. How-
ever, in English no such sentences are attested. This is explained
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by appeal to a system that accounts for cross-linguistic variation.
The idea is that, as opposed to Japanese and Finnish, English re-
alises Voice and Cause in one (zero) morpheme. This phenomenon
is called bundling, and produces syntactic structures of the following
form:
(57) Voice/Cause Bundling
VoiceP
John Voice′
[Cause, Voice]
broke the vase
With no way to realise Cause and Voice separately, the possibil-
ity of a causativised unaccusative is zero and the syntax looks like
the syntax of a θ-role analysis. The bi-eventive semantics, however,
are maintained. Cause and Voice cannot semantically combine with
each other,10 so functional application with the complement is as-
sumed to apply in which ever order possible. Here this means that
Cause will take the embedded event, followed by Voice taking the
result of the first operation, (58). The opposite order again results
in a type mis-match, (59):
(58) Cause followed by Voice
a. Functional Application: Cause, of type <<s,t>,<s,t>>,
takes the embedded event, of type <s,t>, and spits out
something of type <s,t>
b. Event Identification: Voice, of type <e,<s,t>>, conjoins
with the result of step (58-a), and spits out something
of type <e,<s,t>>, which is then free to functionally
apply with the Agent
10Cause is of type <<s,t>,<s,t>> and Voice is of type <e,<s,t>>.
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(59) *Voice followed by Cause
a. Event Identification: Voice, of type <e,<s,t>>, conjoins
with the embedded event, of type <s,t>, and spits out
something of type <e,<s,t>>
b. *Functional Application: Cause, of type <<s,t>,<s,t>>,
cannot take the result of step (59-a) due to a type mis-
match, and the derivation crashes.
While it is true that there are no attested zero-causative, causativised,
unaccusative sentences in English, the reader may have already no-
ticed that what I am proposing for the get constructions under
consideration is a kind of overtly, causativised, unaccusative con-
struction, leading to an interesting question about parameterisation.
Clearly, Cause and Voice in English causative verb constructions
are bundled but, assuming robustness of the analysis to be outlined,
Voice/Cause bundling cannot be a parameter of English. Rather, it
must be merely a parameter of some sub-section of the grammar,
perhaps characterisable as consisting of all ‘main’ verb and ‘light’
verb causative constructions except get11. Although an interesting
problem, due to space restrictions I will not be able to provide any
further analysis of this.
In the next chapter, I will investigate to what extent a bi-eventive,
non-bundled analysis for adjectival get constructions is successful at
handling the relevant data.
11None of the other plausibly ‘light’ causative verbs seem to have non-agentive variants:
(60) a. John caused Mary to cry
b. *Mary caused to cry
(61) a. John made Mary cry
b. *Mary made cry
(62) a. John had Mary cry
b. *Mary had cry
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Chapter 2
Adjectival
Complementation
2.1 Introduction
There will be just two constructions under consideration in this
chapter; A-type adjectival get constructions, of which (1-a) is an
example, and their counterpart B-type adjectival get constructions,
of which (1-b) is an example.
(1) a. John got angry
b. Mary got John angry
As the semantic value of get that I am proposing is equivalent to
Cause, and get is universally present in the constructions under
consideration, I will begin in section 2.2.1 by testing for the presence
of Cause, and then, preempting later discussion on external and
implicit arguments, I will continue by teasing apart the thematic
roles of the arguments in each of the two structures (section 2.2.2).
In sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, I will go on to consider how feasible it is
to treat the constructions as demonstrative of a bi-eventive analysis
rather than a θ-role analysis, that is, evaluate whether they project
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Cause and Voice separately by testing whether either one of them
plausibly projects Cause but no Voice.
To do this will involve showing that the same three properties
true of Japanese Adversity Causatives and Finnish Desiderative
Causatives are also true for the constructions in hand, namely that:
1. There is a causing event in the structure.
2. The matrix subject is not an external argument.
3. There is no implicit external argument.
Having established an answer to this I will then, in section 2.4,
consider what restrictions there are on the type of adjective that may
appear in an adjectival get construction and investigate whether the
proposed analysis can account for these absences or whether more
must be said to capture the data.
Finally, the chapter will be rounded off with a look at how the
analysis works when applied to an actual adjectival get construction
(section 2.5).
2.2 Support for a bi-eventive analysis
2.2.1 The presence of Cause
To test for the presence of Cause is relatively straightforward. The
fact that I am positing that get is a causing event of some sort,
entails that it is, at the very least, eventive (rather than stative).
Therefore, testing for eventivity is the logical place to begin and,
to this end, there are several tests in the literature that probe this
distinction (e.g., Dowty 1979, Harley 1998). Three such tests are
listed in (2):
(2) a. Pseudoclefting, or the ‘What happened was..’ test
b. The Progressive test
c. The True Present Tense (TPT) test
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Considering each in turn, pseudoclefting imposes on the utterance
that whatever the eventuality described in its complement be, it had
better be of a type which accurately fits the description of some sort
of “happening”, i.e., it better be an event. Hence, the ungrammat-
icality of its use with a stative verb like know, (3-b):
(3) a. What happened was John gave up French
b. *What happened was John knew French
By converting the aspect of a sentence into the progressive we im-
pose the restriction that the predicate must be able to describe an
eventuality that is true at speech time. Statives are true independent
of time and are therefore incompatible with progressive structures,
(4-b):
(4) a. John is giving up French
b. *John is knowing French
The English present tense conveys at least two readings, one for
statives and one for eventives. For the former, the interpretation is
what I have called (after Harley 1998) the true present tense (TPT),
and for the latter, an habitual or generic reading is returned, in other
words, what we might call the habitual present tense (HPT). Thus,
both stative and eventive predicates are felicitous:
(5) a. John gives up French (regularly) HPT
b. (Look...!) John knows French TPT
However, eventives are incompatible with the TPT and likewise,
statives with HPT readings. Thus, the forcing out of one or other
of the two interpretations constitutes a possible diagnostic test for
eventivity/stativity, and this is what the TPT test does:
(6) *Look...! John gives up French TPT mis-match
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The HPT can be problematic as a test1, so in what follows, along
with the other two tests described above, of the two tense oriented
tests, I will use only the TPT one on get.
(8) Pseudoclefting
a. What happened was John got angry
b. What happened was Mary got John angry
(9) Progressive
a. John is getting angry
b. Mary is getting John angry
(10) True Present Tense
a. *Look...! John gets angry
b. *Look...! Mary gets John angry
Judgements are as expected and, without doubt, both A-type and
B-type adjectival get constructions denote an event. There are sev-
eral reasons why it is unlikely that this event is associated with the
embedded adjectival predicate. Firstly, adjectives are inherently
stative (Chierchia 1995, Saeed 1997, Levin and Rappaport Hovav
1995), and secondly, even disregarding their intrinsic stativity, com-
parison with similar stative be and have constructions show that for
these cases there is no event argument despite the presence of the
adjective and its predication over the same entity:
1Below, the grammaticality judgements with eventive get constructions will be shown to
pattern conversely with grammaticality judgements for equivalent stative be constructions.
Testing with the HPT, however, leads to grammaticality with both be and get :
(7) a. John regularly gets angry
b. John is regularly angry
The unexpected grammaticality of (7-b) occurs because regularly, aside from modifying an
event to mark it as habitual, may also modify a state so long as it is s-level, not i-level; *John
is regularly tall. The test is, therefore, partly flawed, so is avoided on that basis.
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(11) a. *What happened was John was angry
b. *John is being angry
c. Look...! John was angry
(12) a. *What happened was Mary had John angry
b. *Mary is having John angry
c. Look...! Mary has John angry
A second way to show that get constructions are eventive is to
demonstrate that they denote a change of state. To this end, con-
sider (13):
(13) a. John got angry at 7 pm
b. John was angry at 7 pm
The stative be construction is silent about John’s situation before,
and indeed after, 7 pm. All that is conveyed is John’s state with re-
spect to anger at 7 pm, and no more. In contrast, the corresponding
get construction clearly conveys information not only about John’s
situation at 7 pm, but also, before. Specifically, before 7 pm, John’s
state was one of anything but anger. In other words there is a change
of state from one of John not being angry, to one of him being angry,
and that change of state occurred at 7 pm.
While changes of state are always indicative of the presence of
an event in the semantic structure, the event may or may not be
causative in the sense intended in this thesis, i.e., where a Cause
head is present. This is arguably true of the intransitive forms of
the inchoative/causative alternation verbs whose non-causative in-
carnations, as suggested by the label non-causative, do not contain
Cause. The causative incarnation does, however (Pylkka¨nen 1999a).
Given bi-eventivity and Voice/Cause bundling, Pylkka¨nen’s (1999a)
semantics for each alternant follow:
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(14) The ice melted (Inchoative (non-causative) variant)
VP
λe.
[become-melted(e) & Theme(e,the ice)]
V
λx.λe.
[become-melted(e) & Theme(e,x)]
melt
DP
the ice
(15) John melted the ice (Causative variant)
vP
λe.∃e′.
[become-melted(e′) & Theme(e′ ,ice)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,John)]
John v′
λx.λe.∃e′.
[become-melted(e′) & Theme(e′ ,ice)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,x)]
[Cause, v]
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′
[f(e′) & Cause(e,e′)]
λf<s,t>.λx.λe.
[f(e) & Agent(e,x)]
VP
λe.
[become-melted(e)
& Theme(e,ice)]
λx.λe.
[become-melted(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
melt
DP
the ice
This is a pertinent observation as inchoative/causative alterna-
tion verbs seem to share one particularly important characteristic
with get constructions, namely the fact that they alternate.
(16) Inchoative/causative alternation
a. The vase broke
b. John broke the vase
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(17) Alternation in get constructrions (A-type vs B-type)
a. The path got muddy
b. The farmer got the path muddy
Given, then, that get constructions indicate a change of state, and
furthermore, that there is some kind of alternation taking place, it
seems reasonable to assume that a relevant verb class with which
these get constructions could be compared is indeed the causative/
inchoative alternation verb class, of which there exist two types;
break type verbs, characterised as externally caused change-of-state
verbs and bloom type verbs, characterised as internally caused change-
of-state verbs (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995).
As we have seen, in their intransitive forms, change-of-state verbs
do not contain Cause in their logical form and thus, to maintain
terminological consistency and avoid confusion, I will refer to the
phenomena of internally and externally caused change-of-state as
simply internal and external change of state (internal CoS and ex-
ternal CoS, respectively).
Intuitively, internal CoS verbs are verbs for which the means
of bringing about the CoS event is conceptualised as in some way
residing in the characteristics of the entity undergoing the change.
This class consists of verbs whose denotations assert the existence
of a natural phenomenon involving a change of state inherent to the
‘life’ of the event participant, such as is characterised by bloom for
certain plant life. Flowers bloom as a result of something inherent in
the make-up of flowers, and in that sense internal to flowers. Some
more examples follow:
(18) Internal CoS verbs
Bloom, flower, blossom, germinate, sprout
In contrast, external CoS verbs describe events in which the CoS is
deemed to take place as a result of some force external to the event
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participant, and is characterised by verbs such as break. Thus, if a
vase breaks it is not the vase itself that is responsible, but rather,
something external to the vase. Given what we know about the
world, this is deemed true even in the intransitive variant where the
external cause is not named. (19) gives more examples.
(19) External CoS verbs
Break, melt, freeze, open
Each of the two types provides an argument for showing that get
means Cause.
Firstly, for internal CoS verbs the argument proceeds as follows:
Internal CoS verbs may not be externally caused, (20), but never-
theless demonstrate a CoS. On the other hand, external CoS verbs
may be externally caused, (21). This difference provides a good
diagnostic for determining that get means Cause.
(20) a. *The gardener bloomed the flowers
b. *The spring weather bloomed the flowers
(21) a. The gardener broke the vase
b. The storm broke the window
Just as we may say that the vase broke, we can state that the flowers
bloomed. Given, however, that blooming events may not be exter-
nally caused, and if get denotes Cause, we would expect bloomed
to be ungrammatical as a verbal element in get ’s complement. The
opposite is predicted to be the case for broken. The predictions are
correct:
(22) a. The vase got broken
b. *The flowers got bloomed
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These judgments would be hard to explain if get were the spellout
of, say, a ‘becoming’ event2.
Secondly, if the semantics in (14) and (15) are correct then there
is one event in The ice melted, but two events in John melted the ice.
This conclusion is backed up by evidence from again modification
(von Stechow 1996). Von Stechow argues that modification possibil-
ities using again help determine the number and type of events in a
structure. This is argued to be the case because the use of again re-
turns two possible interpretations, namely a repetitive reading and a
restitutive reading, where each reading is the result of modification
of a different type of event. The former is the one in which a causing
event is deemed to have occurred again. The latter reading is the
one in which a result state is restored. The difference is illustrated
here with the verb catch:
(23) a. John caught the cat then he caught him again
[Repetitive or Restitutive]
b. Someone caught the cat then John caught him again
[Restitutive only]
(Example taken form Marantz 1997 and modified.)
The restitutive reading presupposes that the cat had already been
caught at sometime in the past but, although possible, it is not
required that John himself had caught it before. The repetitive
reading presupposes that John himself had caught the cat before.
For reasons of strict compositionality von Stechow provides the
following syntactic tree structure as representative of the sentence
in (24).
2By ‘becoming ’ event, I mean a purely inchoative event, not an event where simply the
English word become may be used. The flowers bloomed is often postulated to contain an
abstract become operator (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995, among others), but this does
not mean that the phrase *The flowers became bloomed should therefore, necessarily be gram-
matical.
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(24) Randi caught the cat again
VoiceP
REPETITIVE
MODIFIER
again
λe[VoiceP(e)]
NP
Randi
Randi
λx:Voice′
V(e)
XP
RESTITUTIVE
MODIFIER
again
XP
NP
den Bockhirsch
Bockhirsch
X
PRISONER
prisoner
V
BECOME
(&) Voice
ACTIVE
Agent(x)(e)
The verb caught has been decomposed into [(Cause) [x become
prisoner]] (to allow for adjunction in the syntax of restitutive again
with appropriate semantic scope) and Bockhirsh is the name of the
cat. As is evident, there exist two available positions for again
to attach, each corresponding to the semantic scope of the desired
reading. Restitutive again scopes low down above the result state
level while repetitive again scopes above VoiceP, the level at which
the external argument is introduced (from Kratzer 1996).
Translating this into the semantics we are using for CoS verbs,
the insertion positions look as follows:
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(25) John opened the door
vP
REPETITIVE
MODIFIER
again
vP
λe.∃e′.
[become-opened(e′)
& Theme(e′ ,door)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,John)]
John v′
λx.λe.∃e′.
[become-opened(e′)
& Theme(e′ ,door)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,x)]
[Cause, v]
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′
[f(e′) & Cause(e,e′)]
λf<s,t>.λx.λe.
[f(e) & Agent(e,x)]
VP
RESTITUTIVE
MODIFIER
again
VP
λe.
[become-opened(e)
& Theme(e,door)]
λx.λe.
[become-opened(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
open
DP
the door
The restitutive position must scope below Cause but above the
caused eventuality (the result state), while the repetitive position
must scope above Cause, which, because of bundling, results in a
position above the external argument too.
As the tree structure indicates, we predict just one reading for
(26), namely the one in which the result state is restored. The
contextualised story in (27) helps to show that this is the case:
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(26) The door opened again
(27) John assembled a single-door cupboard leaving the job of
hanging the door until last. He attached it in an open po-
sition and therefore, although open, the door had never ac-
tually been through a process of opening before. He then
proceeded to close the door, but as he had forgotten to in-
stall the door catches, the door opened again (by itself).
Another diagnostic that shows this to be true is the use of the prefix
re-. In contrast to again, re- only allows for the restitutive inter-
pretation (Marantz 1997). We know this because for verbs whose
interpretations do not include a result state, such as activity verbs,
the use of re- is infelicitous:
(28) *John re-walked
Thus, the fact that we can say ‘the door re-opened’ shows that what
is being modified is the result state.
On the other hand, the example in (29) is predicted to be am-
biguous depending on which event is being modified by again.
(29) John opened the door again
The repetitive reading is shown to be a possibility in the following
example where John’s opening event is repeated:
(30) John opened the door, closed it and then he opened it again.
The restitutive reading may be isolated from the repetitive reading
in two ways, either by setting up a context in which the Agent/Cause
complex is occurring for the first time, but the caused event for the
second (John has never opened the door before, but his opening of
it has resulted in the door being restored to an open state), (31),
or, we may simply employ re-, (32).
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(31) Mary opened the door and then closed it. Later, John
opened it again.
(32) John re-opened the door
Recall that the aim here is to show that the event denoted by get
is Cause. Therefore, the structure of a get construction, even in its
A-type variant (equivalent to intransitive break or bloom), necessar-
ily contains two eventualities, the Cause event and the small clause
eventuality, which should both be detectable using again modifica-
tion in the following way:
(33) Again modification
VP
REPETITIVE
MODIFIER
again
VP
get
(=Cause)
PredP
RESTITUTIVE
MODIFIER
again
PredP
Holder XP
The prediction is therefore that both a restitutive and a repetitive
interpretation should be possible for any given get construction, even
an A-type construction. To ensure an A-type construction we will
use an inanimate subject3:
(34) The car got dry again
3It is necessary to use an inanimate subject here as A-type get constructions are ambiguous
between an agentive reading (equivalent to John got himself dry) and a non-agentive reading.
The desired reading is the latter, which may be forced using an argument that cannot be
interpreted agentively, i.e., an inanimate (*The car got itself dry). This is discussed in more
detail in section 2.2.2, and given an analysis in chapter 4.
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The repetitive reading is easy to discern. In a context where it rains
every morning and is hot and sunny every afternoon we can say:
(35) The car got dry in the sun on Monday afternoon and then
it again got dry in the sun on Tuesday afternoon [repetitive]
The restitutive reading is isolated in the following context. Imagine
a situation in which cars are built dry and then put through a car
wash before being painted. Most are still damp when painting begins
but:
(36) One car got dry again before being painted
Here, it cannot be claimed that the car had previously, say at time
t-1, got dry as this would entail that it was, prior to time t-1, not
dry. However, we know from the context that this is not true as it
was built dry, so the only possible reading is the one in which the
state of being dry was restored, i.e., the restitutive reading.
It is not possible to show the restitutive reading using re- prefixa-
tion for independent reasons, specifically, that re- requires that the
verb it attach to have a direct internal argument that may stand
alone with the verb in an active verb phrase (this is Wechsler’s
(1989) generalisation). This discounts verbs which take small clause
complements and therefore discounts get.
(37) *The car re-got dry
We will now look in more detail at thematic role assignment in
adjectival get constructions.
2.2.2 Thematic roles and the possible lack of an external
argument
As noted earlier, a general property of get constructions is that the
thematic role of the subject DP in the A-type construction seems
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to correspond to the role played by the immediately post-get DP
in the B-type counterpart, that is, John in both (38-a) and (38-b)
plays the role of the entity that ends up ill, independent of the fact
that there is a mis-match in its linear position in each example.
(38) a. John got ill Pre get
b. Mary got John ill Post get
It is also important to consider the role of the other participant,
namely Mary in (38-b). Empirically, it is clear that if Mary got
John ill, then Mary did something such that the statement John got
ill holds true. Mary, then, is the Agent of the causing event which
we have established that get denotes.
(39) Mary got John ill
→John: Holds the property of being ill
→Mary: Agent of an event that causes the property of being
ill to hold of an eventuality of which John is the Holder
Assuming this to be correct, what can we say about (38-a)? John
is still the ill one, but what of the role that Mary plays in its coun-
terpart? Is this role still relevant and is it played by John? In other
words, does (38-a) have the argument structure shown in (40) or
(41)?
(40) John got ill
→John: Holds the property of being ill
(41) John got ill
→John: Holds the property of being ill
→John: Agent of an event that caused the property of being
ill to hold of an eventuality of which John is the Holder
Interestingly, there is evidence pointing in both directions here. It
appears that whether John in (38-a) plays a kind of dual role, as
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both Holder and Agent, or just the one role as Holder, is optional.
Before discussing this issue further however, I will first establish that
the matrix subject of the B-type construction really is an Agent.
Agent-Oriented Adverb Test (Truswell 2007)
Agent-oriented adverbs modify the way in which an Agent carries
out the action described by the verb by further qualifying the man-
ner in which the Agent has done so. In this way they ‘target’ Agents,
and are therefore infelicitous in an Agent-less context. Agent-less
contexts come in the form of derived subject constructions such as
passives and unaccusatives:
(42) a. Passive
#John was intentionally killed
b. Unaccusative
*Mary carefully died
In (42-a), the adverb cannot be interpreted as modifying the way
in which John is acting, the grammatical interpretation coming
from the reading in which intentionally is predicated of the implicit
Agent. (42-b) has no grammatical reading as not even an implicit
Agent can be inferred.
Instrumental Phrase Test (Truswell 2007)
Instrumental phrases describe the means by which an Agent carries
out the action described by the verb, and therefore an Agent is
again required. As expected, the derived subject constructions fail
the test:
(43) a. Passive
#Mary was killed with a gun4
b. Unaccusative
#Mary arrived with a map
4As expected, the active equivalent is grammatical. The external Agent wields the instru-
ment: ‘Bill killed Mary with a gun’.
47
Example (43-a) has an irrelevant grammatical interpretation where
the implicit Agent uses the gun to kill Mary. The relevant meaning,
i.e. the one in which Mary used the gun to killed herself, is ungram-
matical. Sentence (43-b) also has an irrelevant meaning where with
is used in its ‘accompaniment’ sense. The relevant reading, where
with introduces the instrumental phrase, is ungrammatical.
The implementation of these tests on sentences (38-a) and (38-b)
produces interesting results. Application to the former suggests that
‘Mary’ has agentive properties - the adverbial-related intentionality
here unequivocally lies with ‘Mary’:
(44) Mary intentionally got John ill
Application to the second test sentence is where the real surprise is:
(45) John intentionally got ill
Again, the intentionality clearly lies with the matrix subject which
must therefore be playing two thematic roles (despite only one overt
appearance), namely as both matrix Agent and Holder of the em-
bedded state.
The instrumental phrase test backs up this conclusion:
(46) a. Mary got John ill with a series of drug overdoses
b. John got ill with a series of drug overdoses
We have shown then that Agentivity is a possible feature of the
matrix subject of both A-type and B-type get constructions, but is
it an obligatory feature?
Starting with A-type sentences, the grammaticality of the follow-
ing examples indicates that the answer to this question is negative.
Agents are normally assumed to be animate, and thus, under the
assumption that the matrix subject is strictly an Agent, the use of
an inanimate in subject position should be ruled out.
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(47) a. The car got cold
b. The ship got dry
c. The container got full
There is no possibility of appealing to teleological capability either
(Folli and Harley 2007). Teleological capability, as describe by Hig-
ginbotham (1997), is taken to refer to “the inherent qualities and
abilities of an entity to participate in the eventuality denoted by the
predicate.” (Folli and Harley 2007, p.191). Thus, as ticking is an
inherent property of clocks, and the verb tick is unergative5, to as-
sert (48-a) is to say that the Agent of the ticking was the inanimate
clock. The difference between this example, and those in (47) is that
in (47), the embedded predicate bears no relation to the teleological
capabilities, if any, of the respective sentential subjects; it is not an
inherent property of cars that they be cold, or of ships that they be
dry, or indeed of humans that they tick, (48-b). (48-b) shows that,
depending on the verb, teleological capability can be more impor-
tant than even animacy for determining the felicitousness of a given
Agent.
(48) a. The clock ticked
b. *John ticked
Further, more solid, evidence comes from testing again with the now
familiar Agent-Oriented Adverb and Instrumental Phrase tests, (49)
and (50):
(49) Agent-Oriented Adverb Test
a. *The car intentionally got cold
b. *The ship carefully got dry
c. *The container intentionally got full
5Unergatives are normally considered to take Agent subjects, a notion that is built into
the very syntax of these kinds of verbs’ argument structures in syntactic approaches like that
of Hale and Keyser (1993), (2002).
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(50) Instrumental Phrase Test
a. *The car got cold with a fan
b. *The ship got dry with a towel
c. *The container got full with a fork lift.
Consideration of the most salient interpretation of a given sen-
tence can also indicate that for animate subjects too, it is not neces-
sarily the case that the subject be an Agent - it is entirely felicitous
(and arguably a more natural interpretation) to assert (51) without
wishing to imply that John played any part in bringing his own
illness about. In other words, (51) may be employed simply as a
statement of the fact that some event caused a state of illness to
hold of John.
(51) John got ill
Furthermore, inference patterns also indicate that this is the right
conclusion to draw. (52-a) infers (52-b) but we already know from
the former that Mary is the Agent so, as long as there is no shift in
context, we can deduce that John cannot be in the latter:
(52) a. Mary got John ill
b. John got ill
These facts point to a raising analysis and therefore a derived sub-
ject. It is therefore not an obligatory feature of the subject of a
A-type get construction that it be an external argument, and prop-
erty 2 has been shown. In what follows I will refer to the A-type
constructions that have no external argument as true A-type get
constructions.
Turning to B-type get constructions, the answer to the question of
whether the subject is obligatorily agentive is, at best, mostly. Cer-
tainly for adjectival get constructions the obligation holds. However,
an agentive interpretation is, in a minority of cases, not obligatory
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for passive get constructions where, in the right contexts, an Expe-
riencer interpretation is also possible:
(53) a. Johni got hisi car stolen (on him)
b. Johni got petrol spilled on himi
John may have arranged for his car to be stolen or to have had
paint spilled on him, playing what we tend to think of as the Agent
thematic role, or alternatively, he may be experiencing these even-
tualities, i.e., playing an Experiencer role. I will not be investigating
this further except to say that, on an empirical level, it appears to
be the case that access to these readings depends on there being
an item co-indexed to the matrix subject but thematically related
to the embedded predicate. It is therefore possible that in (53) the
two subject DPs are really just one ‘split’ DP along the lines of (54)
and (55), where just a subpart of the relevant DP has raised into
subject position, leaving a pronounced agreeing pronominal behind,
perhaps as a carrier of the available thematic role. Of course this is
pure speculation and is left here as an open question.
(54) John got his car stolen
Johni
got
[hisi car]j
stolen tj
(55) John got petrol spilled on him
Johni
got
petrol
spilled
on himi
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Returning to B-type adjectival get constructions, one prediction
of the observation that their subjects are obligatorily agentive is that
there should be a general restriction on inanimate Agents. This,
however, can also sometimes be false:
(56) Only Ariel non-bio got the clothes properly clean
(57) The sun got the clothes bone dry in just 10 minutes
The reason for this appeals to the notion of teleological capability
already mentioned above. An inherent property of wash powder is
that it is a cleaning agent, while the sun emits heat, a property
with the inherent capability of drying wet things, and hence, their
aptness in these contexts. Notice, however, that the grammatical-
ity is quickly lost once the examples are converted into passive get
constructions. The reason for this is that the entity now responsible
for doing the cleaning/drying is not the matrix Agent, but rather
the implicit Agent. The role of the matrix Agent is still as Agent of
Cause, but Cause now causes a state whose Agent is another indi-
vidual. For whatever reason, this kind of causal sequence requires
an animate Agent.
(58) *Only Ariel non-bio got the clothes cleaned properly
(59) *The sun got the clothes dried to the bone in just 10 minutes
2.2.3 No implicit Agent available
The presence or absence of an implicit Agent constitutes one of the
main differences between unaccusatives and passives. The former
do not license an external argument in their syntax, while in the
latter, the Agent is present implicitly, if not overtly, and therefore
reasoned to be syntactically accessible in some relevant way. Thus,
should true A-type get constructions pattern with unaccusatives in
this respect, we can reasonably conclude that they have no implicit
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Agent.
Agents, either implicit or overt, may control the PRO in a pur-
pose clause:
(60) a. Overt Agent:
Johni burnt the building down PROi to collect the in-
surance payout
b. Implicit Agent:
The building was burnt down PRO to collect the insur-
ance payout
No implicit Agent is available to control PRO in an unaccusative
and therefore these sentences crash:
(61) No implicit Agent:
a. *The building burnt down PRO to collect the insurance
payout
b. *The car broke PRO to settle the score
To ensure that the test is being carried out on a true A-type get
construction, it is necessary to use an inanimate subject:
(62) *The car got dirty PRO to settle the score
The inanimate subject in (62) cannot be an Agent, leaving open the
possibility of an implicit Agent. However, the fact that PRO has no
controller indicates that one is not available.
Implicit Agents, where present, are semantically entailed. Thus,
another way to test for them is to force a contradiction by cancelling
the entailment. This is what drives the judgment variance between
(63-a) and (63-b):
(63) a. Passive: *The ice was melted but no-one melted it
b. Unaccusative: The ice melted but no-one melted it
Once again the get construction patterns with the unaccusative:
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(64) The car got dirty but no-one dirtied it
Finally, implicit arguments can be picked out in English with the
use of a by-phrase, as in the passive examples below:
(65) Passives
a. Mary was arrested by the police
b. The pot was broken by Peter
Conversely, for constructions with no implicit argument, a by-phrase
will be impossible:
(66) Unaccusatives
a. *John arrived by Mary
b. *John died by Peter
Again, A-type adjectival get constructions pattern with unaccusatives
indicating once more that there is no implicit argument:
(67) *The car got dirty by Mary
2.3 Intermediate summary
We have shown, then, that true A-type adjectival get constructions
demonstrate the three conditions necessary to set them apart as
representative of causative constructions with no Voice head, i.e., as
constructions which project Cause, but no implicit or explicit Agent
responsible for Cause. They represent, along with the Japanese
Adversity Causative and the Finnish Desiderative Causative, an-
other example of a causative construction with no external argu-
ment. However, they differ from the other two in that, where Cause
is denoted by a causative morpheme in Japanese and Finnish, in
English it shows up as the (semantically light) verbal element get.
It is unclear how a θ-role analysis would be able to cope with the
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evidence provided above.
There are certain restrictions on which kinds of adjectives may
appear in adjectival get constructions. We will consider how to
account for these in the following sections.
2.4 Adjectival restrictions
While it is easy to find adjectives that may combine with get, it is
equally as easy to find ones which will not. I will call these adjectives
Incompatible Adjectives (IAs). Some examples follow:
(68) a. *John got blesse´d/*The ship got sunken
b. *John got human/male
c. *John got former/possible
d. *John got (the) tallest
The adjectives in example (68-a) are both purely attributive. In
(68-c) former is a privative adjective while possible is a modal ad-
jective. Tallest in (68-d) is a superlative and finally, the two adjec-
tives in (68-b) are individual-level. The conclusion that I will draw
is that to be felicitous in the complement structure of an adjectival
get construction, an adjective must be stage-level, a classification
that subsumes that the adjective also be predicative. The classifi-
cational terms used here will be explained in the following sections
along with the reasons for the grammaticality judgements we find
in (68).
2.4.1 Attributive and predicative adjectives
As a general rule, in English there exist two sentential positions
for adjectives. They may either occur in the so-called attributive,
pre-nominal position, (69), or alternatively, in a predicative, clause-
final position, (70). The two adjectives in (68-a) are both examples
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of purely attributive adjectives, contrasting most dramatically with
purely predicative adjectives such as ill. The two classes are there-
fore diagnosable through their syntactic position in the sentence:
(69) a. The sunken ship ↔ *The ship is sunken
b. The alleged murderer ↔ *The murderer is alleged
(70) *The afraid woman ↔ The woman is afraid
Many adjectives may be used either attributively or predicatively,
eg angry/pregnant :
(71) The pregnant/angry woman↔ The woman is pregnant/angry
Notice, however, that as a class, only the purely attributive adjec-
tives are bad in the complement structure of get, (68-a), suggesting
that all uses of adjectives in this position are predicative, indepen-
dent of whether the given adjective may be used attributively. For
several reasons, this is exactly as we would expect. Firstly, recall
the explanation already put forward for get ’s semantic ‘lightness’.
The semantics of get reveal it to carry no propositional weight and
for this reason a predicative complement is needed. The functional
element Pred fulfills this role by introducing an event of which the
property denoted by its complement holds true. Assuming, as we
are, that adjectives simply denote properties of type π, whatever the
functional element is that transforms this property into something
which may be used attributively (let’s call it AttAdj) it must create
a modificational piece of structure. That is, at the relevant point in
its derivation, an attributive will need to be of type <α, α>, where
<α> is the type of the modified element. For the case in hand,
this translates into the type <<e,t,>,<e,t>> (given a fairly stan-
dard analysis in which the common noun it is modifying is of type
<e,t,>, see (72)). Aside from being unclear as to what exactly it
might mean to modify a Pred head with an attribute adjective, at-
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tributives are of the wrong type to combine with a Pred head via
functional application, (73). The semantics of predicative adjectives
will be addressed later.
(72) Type-driven tree structure for an attributively modified com-
mon noun
DP
the AttAdjP
<e,t>
AttAdj′
<<e,t>,<e,t>>
AttAdj
<<pi>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>
Adj
<pi>
sunken
CommonNoun
<e,t>
ship
(73) AttAdj type: <<π>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>
Pred type: <<π>,<<e>,<s,t>>>
However, that an adjective is, or may be, predicative in nature is not
sufficient for it to be used to create a well-formed get construction.
Both angry and alive are predicative yet only the former may be
used with get :
(74) a. John got angry
b. *John got human
Therefore, while all purely attributive adjectives may be discounted
as IAs, not all predicative adjectives may be counted in, as it were,
as compatible adjectives (CAs) and as such, a further means of
subdividing the domain will need to be examined. We will do this
in the next section.
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2.4.2 Stage and individual level adjectives
Predicative adjectives may be further sub-divided into stage-level
(SL) adjectives, and individual-level (IL) adjectives, terms first in-
troduced by Carlson (1977). The adjectives in (68-b) are both con-
sidered IL. Carlson divided up the set of entities into individuals
and stages, where the latter are spatiotemporal slices of the former.
Thus, an individual like John has stages, which may be thought of
as John in a particular location and/or at a particular time. Cor-
respondingly, predicates may predicate over either the individual
John or the stage John at x time in y location. For example, the
property of humanness, as related to the human individual John, is
individual level in the sense that it is true of John independent of
his spatiotemporal specifics, whereas, for a predicate such as dry, as
related to the same individual John, the specifics of his location and
time are of the utmost importance in determining if the property of
dryness is true of (a particular stage of) him.
This contrast has diagnosable effects on grammaticality and the
meanings of sentences. For example, in the context of the past tense,
IL predicates impart a strong feeling that their subject is no longer
alive, compare (75) with (76):
(75) John was intelligent [IL]
(76) John was drunk [SL]
The reason for this is that IL properties tend to be permanent prop-
erties that hold of an individual for most of their life. Therefore,
situating the property in the past is akin to situating the individual’s
life in the past.
Past tense considerations aside, there exist at least five other
linguistic environments that can be used to distinguish between SL
and IL predicates.
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1. Temporal and locative modification:
Only SL predicates may be modified with temporal adverbials
and locatives:
(77) a. Mary was pregnant 2 years ago/happy on Tuesday
b. Mary was happy in France
(78) a. *Mary was intelligent on Monday/human yesterday
b. *Mary was human in France
2. Perception sentences:
Perception verbs, like see, resist taking IL predicates in their
complement structures. However, no ungrammaticality results
with SL predication.
(79) I saw Mary pregnant
(80) *I saw Mary female
3. There sentences:
Only SL adjectives are permitted in the coda position of there
sentences.
(81) There are two women pregnant
(82) *There are two women intelligent
4. Bare plurals:
In the case of bare plurals, both SL and IL predication is gram-
matical, their respective interpretations being the difference be-
tween them. SL predicates may receive either an existential or
a generic interpretation:
(83) Firemen are available
=‘There are firemen available’
=‘Availability is a property true of all firemen’
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While IL predicates receive only a generic interpretation:
(84) Fireman are altruistic
* ‘There are firemen altruistic’
=‘Altruism is a property true of all firemen’
5. Adverbs of quantification:
SL predications interact with adverbs of quantification with no
resulting ungrammaticality.
(85) When Mary is drunk, she is aggressive
On the other hand, IL predicates do not combine well with
these adverbs.
(86) *When Mary is female, she is aggressive
An important point to note here is that we may naturally think
of certain adjectival predicates as IL and others as SL, but that in
neither case is this necessarily a fixed classification. A predicate like
intelligent, for example, is more naturally thought of as referring to
an IL property of an individual. We tend to be either intelligent or
not, independent of our spatiotemporal location. However, given an
appropriate context, it is perfectly grammatical to use it as an SL
predicate:
(87) Context:John is not the brightest spark in he box, but is
currently surprising everyone by making something difficult
look easy.
John is being intelligent [IL to SL coercion]
The converse is also true. By removing temporal boundaries, pred-
icates generally thought of as SL may be used as IL predicates. To
this extent, Carlson (1977) argued that (88) is ambiguous between
an SL reading in which, in a particular situation in the past, John
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engaged in the smoking of more than one Cuban cigar, and an IL
reading in which the smoking of Cuban cigars was deemed to be a
habit of John’s. Note that the latter reading again imparts a strong
feeling that the individual is no longer alive.
(88) John smoked Cuban cigars
Carlson called coerced SL predicates habitual predicates, differenti-
ating them from the kind of IL predicates we have seen thus far and,
as we will see, he accounts for them in different ways in his analysis.
However, what his analysis cannot account for is the kind of IL
to SL coercion detailed in (87), and the arguably non-habitual SL
to IL coercion exemplified below:
(89) Non-habitual SL to IL coercion?:
Being happy, John had many friends
It is difficult to argue that, in the same way that smoking Cuban
cigars was a habit of John’s in (88), the most natural interpretation
of (89) is that happiness was deemed to be a habit of John’s.
Thus, the bi-classification of adjectival predicates into IL and SL
is not a consistent one. Rather, with appropriate contextualisation,
we may often force a predicate to be of one type or the other.
Accounting for most of these facts, Carlson (1977) develops an
analysis in which property types correspond to these entity types
such that individual level properties predicate over individuals and
stage level properties predicate over stages. In this way, not only are
there two types of entities present in the lexicon, but also two types
of predicates. For stage level predication, he suggests that it is the
copula that mediates the relationship between the predicate and the
individual it holds of. The copula semantics are shown below:
(90) JbeK = λPs.λxi.∃xs.(R(xs, xi) & Ps(xs)) [SL]
Example (90) states that given some SL property Ps and some indi-
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vidual xi, there exists some stage xs such that xs is a stage of xi, and
property Ps is true of that stage. Therefore, effectively, the function
of the copula is to allow a stage-level predicate to combine with an
individual. With regards to IL predicates, these may combine di-
rectly with individuals, relegating the function of the copula to an
identity map:
(91) JbeK = λf.λPi.λxi.[f(Pi)(xi)] [IL]
Semantically, it is unclear why this copula is obligatorily employed,
given that the predicate may combine directly with the subject (al-
though there may be some syntactic dependency that motivates its
use here).
To explain the kind of coercion we see in (88), he posits a generic
operator, gen, a syntactic element that has the function of trans-
forming SL predicates into habitual IL predicates. However, as pre-
viously stated, there is no account for (87) or (89).
Since Carlson (1977), many other analyses have surfaced. Among
them, Kratzer (1995) argues that the difference between SL and
IL predication can be put down to argument structure variation
between the two. She takes the position that SL predicates have an
extra Davidsonian spatiotemporal argument (DSA) not possessed
by IL predicates, that has the function of situating the predicate in
time or space, and uses this insight to derive their differences. For
example, the DSA is considered to be a variable over which place
and time adverbials may quantify. Given a requirement that no
quantification may be vacuous (Chomsky 1982), examples (77), (78),
(85) and (86) are explained. However, Kratzer’s analysis suffers from
the drawback that it cannot cope with the fact that IL habitual
readings may also be temporally and locatively modified:
(92) John smoked Cuban cigars in the pub/in the evenings
If habitual readings are IL, and IL predicates do not possess a DSA,
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then how can the IL predicate in (92) freely co-occur with place and
time adverbials?
Contrary to Kratzer (1995), Chierchia (1995) adopts the position
that all predicates have a DSA, and explains the difference between
SL and IL predication by positing that for IL predication only, the
DSA is bound by gen. He implements this differently from Carlson
by positing that all IL predicates come with a feature built into their
lexical entry that forces the local (defined as within VP) presence of
gen, but that for SL predicates no featural dependency of this type
exists per se, but rather, that gen may be employed above VP level
to force habitual readings, exactly like phonologically overt adverbs
of quantification such as always or usually. Essentially, then, gen
renders our interpretation of a given IL subject predicate relation
as true at all times and in all locations (i.e., as true independent of
the subjects location in space and time), whereas, for an SL sub-
ject predicate relation, gen has the effect of returning an habitual
reading.
Again, certain data is left unexplained, namely the possibility of
IL to SL coercion evidenced in (87), and the non-habitual SL to IL
coercion in (89). If the presence of gen is forced by the need to
check a feature on IL predicates, what happens to this feature in
cases of SL predication of a canonically IL predicate? Furthermore,
for an SL predicate to be coerced into a non-habitual IL reading,
gen would need to appear within the VP, which is not an option if
the relevant SL predicate is born without the relevant feature.
What all three of these accounts have in common is that none
of them are able to explain the full range of coercion facts we have
seen above. The problem is that at some level of representation,
there is a stipulation which determines whether the interpretation
of a given adjective is SL or IL. All three analyses build this into the
lexicon. For Carlson there are two separate property types, Pi and
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Ps, and the type of any given adjective is therefore predetermined in
the lexicon. Like Carlson, both Chierchia and Kratzer use a similar
subdivision of the lexicon. Kratzer stipulates an inherent argument
structural difference between IL and SL predicates, where only the
latter enters the numeration with an extra DSA, while Chierchia, as
we have seen, suggests that the division is feature based.
With respect to the get constructions under investigation here,
the SL/IL distinction is an important one:
(93) a. IL Adjectives:
*Mary got female
b. SL Adjectives
Mary got pregnant
The question is why this should be the case? I suggest that the
semantic denotation we have assigned to get (see (29)) offers a nat-
ural solution. As stated, IL properties are true of the entities they
refer to, independent of where and when the entity happens to be.
As such, IL properties can be thought of as “tendentially stable”
(Chierchia 1995) or “intransitory” (Kratzer 1995) in nature and are
thus not the sorts of properties that can be acquired or lost. Given
that our lexical entry for get denotes an event that causes a new
state to hold of some argument, it follows naturally that IL predi-
cation will be infelicitous in its complement. The subject of Pred
acquires the property referred to by the adjective and, as we have
seen, only a property which is SL in nature may be acquired. Thus,
in the case of adjectival complements, only SL adjectives will be
acceptable.
(94) Mary got pregnant/happy/dry
(95) *Mary got intelligent/human/female
To implement this formally, we will adopt an alternative, syntactic
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approach to the IL/SL problem proposed by Adger and Ramchand
(2003) (henceforth AR) which utilises Carlson’s insight that the cop-
ula is responsible for mediating the relationship between the predi-
cate and the individual it holds of, while maintaining that all adjec-
tives enter the derivation with an equal semantic value, thereby do-
ing away with the need for two separate adjective types. I stipulate,
therefore, that the interpretational difference between SL and IL
predicates boils down to no more than language convention, which
may be coercively broken through the use of either metaphor, or
other inventive, playful sentence creation. Before discussing AR,
however, we will consider the examples in (68-c) and (68-d).
2.4.3 Extensional and Intensional adjectives
Adjectives like carnivorous are extensional in nature, picking out
the set of things with the property they name, in this case, the set
of carnivorous things. Thus, a carnivorous animal is a member of
both the set of animals and the set of carnivores. Set-theoretically
this picks out the intersection, and hence, these adjectives are called
intersectives, (96) (the various classes of adjective discussed in this
section are taken from Kamp and Partee 1995):
(96) Jcarnivorous NK = JcarnivorousK ∩ JNK
Another class of adjectives, the subsectives, are intensional, effec-
tively depending on the reference set N of the noun they modify
to pick out a subset of N. Thus, the subsective adjective typical,
in an example like a typical plumber, defines a subset of the set of
plumbers the members of which are in some way typical.
(97) Jtypical NK ⊆ JNK
The difference between intersectives and subsectives can be made
clearer with an inference pattern example as in (98). It is invalid to
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infer that John is a typical father from the information that he is a
typical plumber, but valid to infer that he is a carnivorous father if
he is a carnivorous plumber:
(98) a. If John is a typical carnivorous plumber
b. and John is a father
c. then John is a carnivorous father
d. *then John is a typical father
A further class consists of adjectives that are neither intersective
nor subsective. These so-called non-subsectives include privative
adjectives, eg former and modal adjectives, eg possible, see (68-c).
Privatives entail neither the intersection nor a subset, but rather,
that the intersection be the empty set - a former president cannot
be both formerly a president and also currently a president (where
his role of presidency in both cases is over the same organisation or
state):
(99) a. Jformer presidentK 6= JformerK ∩ JpresidentK
b. Jformer presidentK * JpresidentK
c. Jformer presidentK ∩ JpresidentK = ∅
Finally, modal adjectives have no entailments: a possible/alleged
con man may or may not be a con man.
It is not sufficient for an adjective to be either subsective or in-
tersective for it to be felicitous in the complement structure of get :
(100) a. The animal is carnivorous/red/dead
b. John got red
c. *John got dead
(101) a. The basketball player is small/skillful/typical
b. John got skillful
c. *John got typical
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These classes therefore do not capture any kind of generalisation
with respect to the constructions under consideration here. How-
ever, it seems that the same is not true of privative or modal adjec-
tives which are universally IAs:
(102) Privative adjectives
a. The gun is fake/imaginary
b. *The gun got fake/imaginary
(103) Modal adjectives
a. That 2+2 = 5 is questionable
b. That a+b = c is possible
c. *That 2+2 = 5 got questionable
d. *That a+b = c got possible
Therefore, like attributives, these classes of As may be discounted as
possible complements to get. In the case of privative adjectives, the
reason appears to be straightforward and due to the fact that their
interpretations are strongly IL. For modals however, it is difficult
to argue that they are IL. The possible or questionable truth of
a proposition P is not an immutable fact about P. I believe that
the crucial difference here is that in predicative position, non-modal
adjectives operate over nominal arguments specifying some property
(of the nominal) whereas modal adjectives operate over propositions
providing judgements about the way the world is. As such, notions
like s-levelhood and i-levelhood are irrelevant to their interpretation,
and the requirement that the complement of get be SL is violated.
2.4.4 Comparatives and superlatives
On the surface, comparatives and superlatives appear to have the
same syntactic distribution. Both may be used in attributive and
predicative environments:
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(104) Attributively
a. The taller boy
b. The tallest boy
(105) Predicatively
a. This boy is taller (than that one)
b. This boy is/seems (the) tallest
However, their distribution differs in that only comparatives will
combine with get :
(106) This boy got taller ↔ *This boy got (the) tallest
According to our discussion thus far, there may only be two reasons
for this. Either superlatives cannot, despite appearances, be pred-
icative, or they are predicative, but are not capable of stage-level
interpretation.
Intuitively, it is difficult to argue that they are not SL. For an
entity to be the tallest, fattest, most beautiful etc, the property
of being the tallest, fattest, most beautiful etc is not necessarily IL.
Recall that an IL property is true of an entity independent of its spa-
tiotemporal location. Temporally, however, an animate may grow
and become over time the tallest, fattest, most beautiful of its kind,
and may even, over time lose this mantle. Hence the grammaticality
of (107).
(107) Of all the women in the world, Mary became the tallest/
fattest/most beautiful.
Even an inanimate may gain or lose this kind of property: On April
20th 2004, the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat pro-
claimed the Taipei 101 building to be the tallest on Earth. Before
then, the Petronas was considered the tallest.
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Conversely, whether held by an animate, or an inanimate, a su-
perlative property is not the type of property that one may, as it
were, switch on or off. When you are the tallest, fattest or most
beautiful of your kind at a particular time and/or place, you as-
sume those properties with no control. For this reason, they are
ungrammatical with the present continuous, despite this being one
way to test for s-levelhood.
(108) *Mary is being the tallest/fattest/most beautiful
The facts, then, appear contradictory and difficult to pin-point. The
reason for this may be that superlatives are not actually predica-
tional at all. Matushansky (2008) argues for this position. In her
article she provides multiple arguments that this is the case in both
English and cross-linguistically. Here we will consider just a few.
The first thing to note is that superlatives (almost6) always re-
quire the presence of the definite article, even in predicative posi-
tion. Matushansky uses the standardly presumed assumption that
the presence of an article depends on the presence of a nominal pro-
jection to claim that in predicative superlative phrases there is a
null nominal which the superlative adjective modifies attributively.
A sentence like (109) will thus have a structure like the one shown7.
6There are exceptions, but the exceptions are not cross-linguistically consistent and there-
fore provide only weak evidence against the claim.
7The structure in (109) is a simplified version of what Matushanskys would presumably
look like, and is for expplanatory purposes only.
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(109) This boy is the tallest
VP
DP
This boy
V′
is DP
the NP
AP
tallest
NP
∅one
Beyond the fact that the definite article must be used, evidence
elsewhere for the presence of a nominal projection in the structure
comes from considerations of how measure-phrases and anaphoric
so interact with the constructions.
Beginning with measure phrases, in predicative comparative con-
structions they may occur either to the left of the AP, or on the right
AP-periphery in a by-PP (all examples taken from Matushansky
2008):
(110) a. Thumbelina is two inches/three times taller than
Tom Thumb
b. Thumbelina is taller than Tom Thumb by two inches/the
factor of three
The distribution for attributive comparative constructions is limited
to the by-PP only:
(111) a. Thumbelina is a (*two inches/*three times) taller
doll than Tom Thumb
b. Thumbelina is a taller doll than Tom Thumb by two
inches/the factor of three
Abney (1987) notes as a general rule that measure phrases are not
allowed NP-internally, (112-b). This generalisation explains the un-
grammaticality of (111-a).
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(112) a. Thumbelina is two inches tall
b. *Thumbelina is a two inches tall girl
c. Thumbelina is a two-inch (tall) girl
Interestingly, superlative constructions pattern with attributive com-
parative constructions even when the superlative is in predicative
position:
(113) a. *Thumbelina is the two inches/three times tallest
(of/ among the dolls)
b. *Thumbelina is two inches/three times the tallest
(of/ among the dolls)
c. Thumbelina is the tallest (doll) by two inches/by the
factor of three
Matushansky believes this to be the case because of the presence
of a null NP in the projection which the superlative modifies, and
furthermore, that superlatives must be obligatorily attributive as the
fact that Abney’s constraint is applicable rules out the availability
of any purely predicative structure.
Examination of anaphoric so behaviour leads to the same conclu-
sion. Once again, the distribution of comparatives and superlatives
differs within this environment. Comparatives allow so anaphora,
(114-a), whilst superlatives do not, (114-b) (again, all examples
taken from Matushansky 2008):
(114) a. The panda is a charming animal, but the lemur ismore
so
b. *There are many charming animals, but lemurs are the
most so
If so cannot appear as a noun modifier, (115), and superlatives
modify a null NP then the dichotomy is explained.
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(115) a. *The panda is a charming bear, and the lemur is a so
primate
b. *The panda is a charming bear, and the lemur is amore
so primate
The ungrammaticality of superlatives in get constructions provides
more support for Matushansky’s analysis. If predicative, the argu-
ment against their possible interpretation as stage-level is at best
weak, and moreover, Matushansky’s arguments for their role as
pure attributives demonstrate that a classification as predicative
is unlikely. As briefly discussed in the thesis conclusion (chapter 6),
get combines with NP complements to form constructions with the
broad meaning of acquisition; the subject in some way comes to ac-
quire the NP complement. If superlatives indeed modify a null-NP
we predict them to be fine under this kind of interpretation. The
prediction is borne out:
(116) Context: Six children are choosing one puppy each from a
litter of six.
John got the smallest
Predicative interpretations of get constructions with superlative com-
plements are at best marginal, and only then without the definite
article:
(117) a. *Of the triplets, Mary got the tallest
b. ??Of the triplets, Mary got tallest
On the other hand, as long as a comparative may be used predica-
tively, given an appropriate context even IL adjectives may be used
in a get construction:
(118) a. John got more human/alive
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I will assume therefore that the comparative morpheme aids the
process of IL to SL coercion and return to the question of how in
section 2.5, where a semantics for the functional head responsible
for turning an adjective into a comparative, namely Deg, will be
proposed.
2.4.5 Returning to AR
Adger and Ramchand (2003) defend the position that “all seman-
tic predicational structures are constructed asymmetrically via a
syntactic predicational head.” (AR, p.1). This translates to the di-
agrammatic syntactic structure, shown below, of the predicational
core of small clause constructions, off of which the semantic struc-
ture may be mapped in a one-to-one fashion:
(119)
PredP
subject Pred′
Pred XP
As we have already seen, this is essentially the view that I am
also proposing and defending for the small clause complement of get,
with the function of get itself being the addition of an extra causing
event layer.
From a cross-linguistic point of view, perhaps the main conclu-
sion of AR is that the functional head Pred may come in several (or
at least two) “flavours”. Specifically, for the Scottish Gaelic predi-
cational constructions AR considers, one type of Pred head selects
unsaturated properties of type π, the semantic type of simple prop-
erties, and relates an argument directly to that property resulting
in an interpretation in which the property is asserted to hold of the
nominal in question:
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(120) JpredK = λπλx[holds(π,x)]
In these cases, the only possible interpretations are those in which
the property denoted by the complement of Pred holds intrinsically
of the subject, or in other words, holds of the subject independently
of the particular spatiotemporal situation the subject may find itself
in at the relevant time. In Scottish Gaelic, one such construction
where this type of Pred head is found is the inverted copular clause
(ICC), in which the Pred head position is occupied by the defective
copula is/bu:
(121) Initial ICC structure for Calum is a teacher
TP
T′
T PredP
DP
Calum
Pred′
Pred
is
XP
teacher
(122) Final ICC structure for Calum is a teacher
TP
Pred′
is teacher
T′
T PredP
DP
Calum
ti
AR postulate that the defective copular forms is (used to de-
note present) and bu (used to denote past, future or conditional)
carry the particular semantics shown in (120), and therefore, these
structures return what we have been calling IL interpretations. SL
interpretations, on the other hand, are returned in clauses in which
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the Pred head is of a different ‘flavour’, namely with the following
semantics:
(123) JPredK = λπ.λx.λe [holds(π,e) & Holder(e,x)]
In these cases, a property is not predicated directly of an individual,
but rather, it is predicated directly of an eventuality, specifically, the
particular eventuality contextually relevant to the individual in sub-
ject position, given its spatiotemporal circumstances. An example
of a Scottish Gaelic construction demonstrating this kind of pred-
ication is the Substantive Auxiliary Construction (SAC), so-called
in AR because the (non-defective) copular ‘be’, bith, is standardly
termed the substantive auxiliary in Scottish Gaelic language gram-
mars:
(124) SAC structure for Calum is in the shop/(being) careful
TP
T′
T
tha
PredP
DP
Calum
Pred′
Pred PP/AP
in the shop/careful
Note that, seen in these terms, i-levelhood and s-levelhood may
no longer be considered relevant interpretive properties of particular
predicates. Rather, the distinction arises as a result of the interpre-
tive property of the sentences in which they are found, i.e., as a
result of which type of Pred head is projected in any given sentence.
Interestingly, SACs with nominal complements require extra struc-
ture for grammaticality:
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(125) *Tha
Be-pres
Calum
Calum
tidsear
teacher
‘Calum is a teacher’
(126) Tha
Be-pres
Calum’na
Calum in-3ms
thidsear
teacher
‘Calum is a teacher’
Precisely, what they require is the addition of the prepositional par-
ticle ‘na from the preposition ann meaning ‘in’. The question is
then, why this should be the case only for NP complements? To
resolve this, AR appeal to Stowell (1981), Higginbotham (1985) and
Parsons (1990). Stowell (1981) was the precursor to the kind of
predicational structure shown in (119) and it was he who initially
concluded that the category of XP must be restricted to the set of
lexical categories N, V, A and P, all heads which may be semanti-
cally unsaturated. The difference in distribution highlighted above
then boils down to differences between the categories. Generally,
what distinguishes on the one hand NPs from, on the other, VPs,
APs and PPs is that the former lack an eventuality variable in their
semantic makeup that is present in the logical representations of the
latter, a charcteristic argued for by both Higginbotham and Parsons.
AR implement this by positing that the functional structure under
which N, A, V and P roots are embedded is to be held responsi-
ble. Specifically, the particular functional structures which select
As, Vs and Ps introduce eventuality variables and correspondingly,
these structures all denote properties of individuals with respect to
an eventuality. Ns, on the other hand, are selected by D-related
functional layers which do not introduce eventuality variables and
thus, NP structures may only denote properties of individuals.
Analysed like this, nominal SAC structures, as in (125), are pre-
dicted to be ungrammatical, and the extra prepositional material
needed to ‘save’ these structures, see (126), is explained. However,
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predictions in the opposite direction are less clear-cut. ICC con-
structions should be ungrammatical with AP and PP complements,
yet both are possible (although not very productive):
(127) Is
Cop-pres
mo`r
big
an
that
duine
man
sin
‘That man is big’
(128) Is
Cop-pres
le
with
Calum
Calum
an
the
cu`
dog
‘The dog belongs to Calum’
AR reason that the grammaticality of APs, (127), and PPs, (128),
in ICC constructions means that at some level their eventuality vari-
able must be bound off through a nominalisation process.
In English, the distinction between (122), John is a teacher, and
(124), John is careful/in the shop, is less structurally and lexically
clear, as the same variety of forms of the copular verb are used in
plausibly the same structure independent of what the complement
of the Pred head may be:
(129) Calum is a teacher/in the shop/careful
TP
T′
T
is
PredP
DP
John
Pred′
Pred
(is)
NP/PP/AP
a teacher/in the shop/careful
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that English be may license
both types of Pred head (or alternatively, if base generated in Pred,
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may be the lexicalisation of either type of Pred head). The seman-
tics of get, on the other hand, is such that it may only semantically
combine with an eventuality, thereby restricting its complement to
the Pred found in SAC structures, and predicting the ungrammati-
cality of get constructions with NP complements on the reading in
which the NP is to be interpreted as being predicated of the subject.
This turns out to be an accurate restriction and one which we will
return to, if only briefly, in the thesis conclusion (chapter 6):
(130) a. John got a doctor 6= John is a doctor
b. John got Mary a doctor 6= Mary is a doctor8
This analysis provides us with a natural way to restrict the output
readings of adjectival get constructions to SL interpretations while
sidestepping the need to divide the adjectival domain in two, as in
Carlson (1977), Chierchia (1995) and Kratzer (1995). The SL/IL
distinction exists simply as a direct result of the type of Pred head
employed, a difference which appears lexically at least in Scottish
Gaelic, if not in English. Furthermore, under this system, coercion
may just be seen as the result of breaking with convention about
which predicates are standardly conceptualised as being of one type
or another. As far as habitual IL readings are concerned, the topic
is not tackled by AR. However, presumably a third copula may
be employed which allows for the interpretation that the event be
one of many identical events all of which hold of the individual in
question. This would have the benefit of implying IL predication,
but would also allow for adverbial time and place quantification. As
get constructions never return IL readings, habitual IL predication
is irrelevant and so the details of such an analysis, if indeed feasible
or even desirable, will not be tackled in the present work.
8Incidentally, this discounts any analysis which might suggest that the semantics of get
includes become in its logical representation.
78
2.5 Application of the analysis to get construc-
tions
2.5.1 The structure of the complement of an adjectival get
construction
Application of the analysis in AR to the constructions under consid-
eration here results in the following structure for the SC complement
of get :
(131) [SCJohn angry]
PredP
λe.
[holds(angry,e) & Holder(e,John)]
John Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(angry,e) & Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
APpi
angry
In words, PredP says that John is the Holder argument of an
eventuality e, and that the property of anger holds of e. Thus, anger
is in some way relevant to, i.e., holds of, a situation which is in some
way relevant to John, i.e., where John is a Holder. The holds and
Holder relations are used here and throughout this thesis as quasi-
intuitive relational concepts. The exact nature of what it means, in
the world as we perceive it, to be a Holder of an eventuality, or
for one thing to hold of another, will not be tackled in much detail,
but, for the latter, I hope to remain realistic throughout as to what
properties may reasonably be attributed to an eventuality. This will
be discussed some more in chapter 6.
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The story for comparatives is trickier. To maintain strict unifica-
tion of the syntax and semantics of the get constructions in question,
I have proposed that get always takes a PredP as its complement.
Given the value I have assigned to Pred, the complement of Pred
is forced to be a property of type π. Thus, DegP, the phrase-level
node of the functional head responsible for returning comparative
adjective readings from ‘normal’ adjective readings, must be of type
π, while Deg must combine with a property of type π. Deg, then,
must look like a modificational element of type <π,π>.
(132)
PredP
<s,t>
Holder
e
Pred′
<e,<s,t>>
Pred
<pi,<e,<s,t>>>
DegP
pi
Deg
<pi,pi>
adjectival
property
pi
I will assume, following Adger (2006), that Deg is a function
that combines with adjectives and returns a scalar interval, I, where
I may be analysed as a property and thus serve as a complement to
Pred.
(133) JDegK = λπ.ιIpi.[scale(π,S) & interval(I,S)]
Deg takes a property and returns a scale S and an interval function
which selects an appropriately context determined subpart I of S.
Evidence from Schwarzschild (2002) and Schwarzschild andWilkin-
son (2002) demonstrates that adjectives and their comparative coun-
terparts are modified by different elements. More specifically, the
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quantity modifiermuch modifies comparatives but not normal adjec-
tives, and conversely, the intensifier very modifies normal adjectives
but not comparatives:
(134) a. This calculation is very easy/*much easy
b. This calculation is much easier/*very easier
Measure phrases also point to an analysis in which normal adjectives
and comparative adjectives differ semantically. The former are often
unable to receive measure phrase modification while the latter may
always receive it:
(135) a. 2 times easier
b. *2 times easy
(136) a. 2 degrees colder/hotter
b. *2 degrees cold/hot
(137) a. 8 weeks older/younger
b. 8 weeks old/*young
(138) a. 2 metres longer/shorter
b. 2 metres long/*short
Schwarzschild (2002) and Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002)
take measure phrases and much to be modifiers of scalar intervals
prompting the anaysis in Adger (2006) and herein.
On this account, an adjective is an abstract, unstructured concept
on which deg operates to not only organise it onto a scale S, but also
pick out a subpart I of S. As a subpart of S, I is, by definition, also
a scale, albeit a bounded one. In other words S, and therefore I too,
is a property with a scalar structure and as such still a property in
essence. For this reason, I may be treated like a property in the
semantics.
Exactly in what way I is bounded, is determined by the compar-
ison subpart of S, call it I ′, which is also contextually determined (if
not overtly framed in a than-phrase as in John got colder than Mary,
although even here the extent of Mary’s coldness is only known from
prior context). Thus, if John got angrier, then the interval on S, the
scale of angriness, that held of an eventuality of which John was the
Holder, immediately after the causative ‘getting’ event took place,
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was greater than the contextually supplied interval on S that held of
an eventuality of which John was the Holder just before the ‘getting’
event took place. In other words, I>I ′, and I therefore has a lower
bound such that it cannot be an interval on the scale of angriness
that is at any point on the scale less than the highest point of I ′.
We might therefore wonder what happens if we want to express
the less than relation, i.e., convey that I<I ′? In other words, to
express the sentence John got less angry what must change about
Deg? To separate out these two opposing meanings for deg we will
write the difference directly into its value by including a stricter
definition of what may constitute an appropriate interval. In the new
definitions below, superscript C stands for ‘contextually determined’,
and thus, CI ′ is some other contextually determined interval which
the interval I must either be greater than, in the case of more, or
less than in the case of less :
(139) JDegmoreK = λπ.ιIpi.[scale(π,S) & interval(I>CI
′,S)]
(140) JDeglessK = λπ.ιIpi.[scale(π,S) & interval(I<CI
′,S)]
The structure is as in (141):
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(141) [SCJohn angrier]
PredP
λe.
[holds((scale(angry,S) & part(I>CI′,S)),e)
& Holder(e,John)]
John Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds((scale(angry,S) & part(I>CI′,S)),e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
DegPmore
ιIpi.
[scale(angry,S) & part(I>CI′,S)]
Degmore
λpi.ιIpi.
[scale(pi,S) & part(I>CI′,S)]
-er
AP
angry
At the PredP level, the semantics state that for the individual
John, and some eventuality e, an interval I, which is a contextually
relevant subpart of a scale of angriness, holds of e (e is therefore
effectively a state of being more angry than some other contextually
relevant degree of angriness) of which John is the Holder argument.
The question now is, what is it about the semantics of Deg that
allows us to coerce IL predicates and use them in the complement of
Pred? Towards an answer to this, consider the following example.
Figuratively, if the more that one errs the more human one is con-
sidered to be, then if John has never erred, the moment he does, he
will be deemed more human and we legitimise the phrase in (142).
(142) With every mistake John got more human
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This is because we have taken a property normally considered im-
mutable and organised it on a scale, which has the effect of immedi-
ately presenting us with the possibility that an interval of that scale
relevant to an individual may change over time. The semantics of
get are such that exactly a change of this sort is asserted.
2.5.2 Merging get
Note first, that for the constructions John is angry and John is
angrier, not much more than the above need be added. TP can
take PredP directly in its complement, and license be in its head as
a hook for tense realisation.
Merging get is also relatively straightforward. Both (131) and
(141) are of type <s,t> so can merge directly into the complement
of the verb. We will use [John angry], not [John angrier], in the
following trees:
(143) [John got angry]
VP
λe.∃e′
[holds(angry,e′) & Holder(e′,John)
& cause (e,e′)]
V
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′
[f(e′) & cause (e,e′)]
got
PredP
λe.
[holds(angry,e) & Holder(e,John)]
John Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(angry,e) & Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
APpi
angry
After get merges, TP will merge and John, the Holder argument,
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will move (re-merge) for nominative Case marking in the Spec of TP.
For a B-type get construction, the Holder argument will remain in-
situ and be Case marked as accusative by vP. vP, of course, merges
and introduces, via event identification, the Agent argument which
moves to Spec TP for nominative Case. (144) is an example of this
kind of construction:
(144) Mary got John angry
I have touched upon the fact that A-type constructions have two
interpretations, one agentive and one, what I have labelled the true
A-type construction, not (section 2.2.2). For now, we will ignore
consideration of agentive A-type constructions and return to them
in detail in chapter 4.
2.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter we began by providing evidence in support of the
claim that adjectival get propositions constitute one English con-
struction that may denote a causing event, lexicalised by get, with-
out necessarily projecting Voice. This was done by demonstrating
that the following three properties in particular may simultaneously
hold of the true A-type variant of these constructions:
1. There is a causing event in the structure.
2. The matrix subject is not an external argument.
3. There is no implicit external argument.
An example in which this is true is shown in (145)
(145) The car got dirty (by being driven in the rain/*by Mary)
The felicitous by phrase names the Cause denoted by get. As an
inanimate, the matrix subject the car cannot be an Agent (external
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argument). The infelicitous by phrase is trying to pick up on an
implicit Agent but cannot as there is not one present.
The focus then shifted to a discussion of the various adjective
classes that have been analysed elsewhere in the literature, as a
means to arriving at an accurate characterisation of which may and
which may not serve as complements to get. The relevant division
was drawn between i-level (IL) adjectives and s-level (SL) adjectives
where only the latter are well-chosen as complements of get. A
principled reason was given for this based on two things, the meaning
of get and the meanings of SL vs IL adjectives. Briefly, the meaning
of get, as being close to the meaning of English cause, is such that
it causes the onset of a new state of affairs of some sort. In the
adjectival domain, this requires application to a property state that
may in some way be acquired. The property must therefore be of a
transitory nature, or in other words, stage-level.
Following Adger and Ramchand (2003), one way to implement
this transitoriness is to say that the relevant property holds of some
situation which is true of a particular individual at the relevant
reference time. This is done using a Pred head of the following
value:
(146) JPredK = λπ.λx.λe.[holds(π,e) & Holder(e,x)]
On the other hand, IL adjectives, which describe properties true of
individuals independent of the particular situations they find them-
selves in, are related to individuals in the semantics via another Pred
head in which the property holds directly of an individual:
(147) JPredK = λπ.λx.[holds(π,x)]
The semantic value of get is such that it can only combine with
phrases of type <s,t>:
(148) JgetK = λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′[f(e′) & cause (e,e′)]
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Therefore, only the first of these Preds is of a suitable type at the
phrase level to combine with get, providing a formal way to discount
IL complements that matches the intuitive and empirical reasons to
wish to do so.
Lastly, the analysis was applied, for expository purposes, in the
derivation of two relevant get constructions.
In the next chapter we will test the analysis on get constructions
with prepositional complementation.
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Chapter 3
Prepositional
complementation
3.1 Introduction
The analysis thus far successfully accounts for get constructions with
an adjectival complement. In this section we will test the analysis
with a second complement type, namely a (spatial) prepositional
complement, as exemplified below:
(1) a. A-type:
John got off the roof
b. B-type:
Mary got John off the roof
Recall that we are working towards a story in which Cause may be
realised separately from Voice resulting in an interpretation for A-
type get constructions in which the matrix subject is not an external
argument of get and no implicit Agent is present yet, nevertheless,
the construction is causative. Thus, after a short introduction to
the prepositional domain, we will proceed in a manner parallel to
the previous chapter and demonstrate these three properties to be
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true, before looking more closely at the semantics of PPs and what
restrictions exist, if any, on the prepositions that may be used felic-
itously in the complement structure of get.
3.2 Introduction to the prepositional domain
The main point of this short introduction is to show that the spatial
prepositional domain may be divided broadly into two types, namely
(i) those prepositions that describe the position of one entity with
respect to another, so-called locative prepositions (henceforth LocPs
- see (2)) (Zwarts and Winter 2000, Zwarts 2005) or place preposi-
tions (Svenonius 2008), and (ii) those that describe directed motion
of one entity along a path associated in some way or other with a
second entity, so-called directional prepositions (henceforth DirPs -
see (3)) (Zwarts and Winter 2000, Zwarts 2005) or path prepositions
(Svenonius 2008).
(2) LocPs
a. The boy is on the table
b. The boy is in the car
(3) DirPs
a. The boy crawled onto the car
b. The boy swam into the car
To clarify which argument is being referred to at any particular time
through the course of the discussion, for the set of LocPs, we will
follow Svenonius (2008) (from Talmy 1983) and call the entity whose
location is under consideration the Figure, and the entity where the
Figure is located, the Ground. In (2), the boy is the Figure, and
the table/car are the Grounds. For the set of DirPs, we will follow
Zwarts (2005) in calling the entity with which the path is associated
the reference object. In (3), the reference object is the car. The
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boy has some thematic relation to the main verb which is always a
motion verb and we will therefore sometimes refer to this entity as
the Mover (Kracht 2002).
Initially, then, we can divide the set of prepositions up into LocPs
and DirPs as follows1:
LocPs: above, at, behind, below, beside, between, in, in front of,
inside, near, on, outside, under
DirPs: across, along, around, away from, down, from, into, off,
onto, out of, over, past, through, to, towards, up
Closer inspection of the examples in (2) and (3), reveals a dis-
tributional distinction between the two types, namely that LocPs
may be distinguished from DirPs through their distribution with re-
spect to be constructions. LocPPs combine with be to form stative
locative sentences:
(4) The book is in the box/under the table/on the shelf
In the main part, DirPs will not combine with the copula2, (5).
However, under the condition that one must be able to understand
the location “as the endpoint of a hypothetical journey....from an
implicit point of view” (Zwarts 2005, p.741) the constructions are
grammatical. In other words, and unlike the LocP examples, even in
conjunction with the copula, there is an understood path involved,
(6).
(5) *The book is into the box/onto the shelf
1Although inaccurate, these lists will suffice for now. As will become clear, there is in fact
a substantial amount of cross-over. For example, over is listed as a DirP, but it also has LocP
uses, e.g. the cloud is over my head means that the cloud is located in a position directly
above my head. The lists are, of course, incomplete too. Although a closed class, the total
number of prepositions exceed the number shown here.
2This is potentially problematic for the analysis being presented here. If it can be shown
that get can combine with DirPs, then be should automatically be grammatical with DirP
complements, after all, get constructions are seen here as causative versions of PredP sentences
as analysed by Adger and Ramchand (2003). A solution to this is proposed in section 3.9, in
which it is shown that, in fact, the copula can take most DirP complements and that there is
a principled reason why those it cannot take lead to ungrammaticality.
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(6) The postbox is up the street/over the road (from here)
A further distinction is evident. DirPs, unlike LocPs, can play a part
in determining the aspectual properties of a sentence. They com-
bine well with verbs of motion, which by themselves are aspectually
atelic, (7). However, depending on the preposition, the aspectual
properties can vary, (8):
(7) John swam *in an hour/for an hour
(8) a. John swam into the enclosure in one hour/*for one hour
b. John swam towards the north bank *in one hour/for one
hour
c. John swam across the lake in one hour/for one hour
The preposition into gives rise to telic aspect, towards leads to atelic
aspect and across is ambiguous in that it may bring about either a
telic or an atelic interpretation.
LocPs, on the other hand, cannot affect aspect. Whatever the
LocP used, the atelic nature of the verb of motion remains constant:
(9) a. John ran on/near/beside/under/below the bridge *in one
hour/for one hour
b. John ran behind/in front of/beside/between the cars *in
one hour/for one hour
These facts about DirPs allow us to further sub-divide the domain
into the four types summarised below.
LocPs: above, at, behind, below, beside, between, in, in front of,
inside, near, on, outside, under
Telic DirPs: into, off, onto, out of, past, to
Atelic DirPs: along, away from, from, towards
Telos ambiguous DirPs: across, around, down, over, through, up
91
With respect to get, at first inspection, it looks like only the atelic
DirPs are incompatible:
(10) LocPs
John got on/beside/under the ladder
(11) Telic DirPs
John got out of/into/in the theatre
(12) Atelic DirPs
*John got towards/along/from the river
(13) Telos Ambiguous DirPs
John got across/over/through the river
However, there is one notable exception from the set of LocPs,
namely at, which will be discussed in section 3.8.
(14) *John got at the river
Furthermore, for the telos ambiguous DirPs, in combination with
get they appear not to be ambiguous anymore. Indeed, if John gets
across, over or through a river then he has reached the other side
of the river, the other side marking the endpoint of the journey and
therefore providing a telos. The in an hour/for an hour test shows
this more clearly:
(15) John got across/over/through the river in one hour/*for one
hour.
This problem is related to the wider problem of finding out what
exactly it is about DirPs, as opposed to LocPs, that allows them to
influence the telicity of a sentence in the first place.
These problems and more will be addressed later. For now, how-
ever, it is sufficient that we have determined that the spatial prepo-
sitional domain divides into two broad types, and that at least some
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prepositions from each type combine with get. We will therefore,
in the following sections, test the two broad types (LocP and DirP)
for the presence of Cause, an Agent and an implicit Agent to show
what kinds of constructions we are looking at and whether they are
equivalent to those considered in chapter 2.
3.3 Three properties in support of a bi-eventive
analysis
We will tackle each of the three relevant properties in turn, beginning
with Cause in section 3.3.1, moving onto detecting Agents in 3.3.2,
ending finally with a section on implicit Agents, 3.3.3.
3.3.1 The presence of Cause
To ascertain if the relevant get constructions are causative, we will
once again show them to be eventive first and then proceed to deter-
mine whether the event is causative (leading to a change of state).
The relevant tests are repeated below:
(16) Eventive/Stative tests
a. Pseudoclefting, or the ‘What happened was..’ test
b. The Progressive test
c. The True Present Tense test
(17) Pseudoclefting with a LocP
a. What happened was John got on the roof
b. What happened was Mary got John on the roof
(18) Pseudoclefting with a DirP
a. What happened was John got off the roof
b. What happened was Mary got John off the roof
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(19) Progressive with a LocP
a. John is getting on the roof
b. Mary is getting John on the roof
(20) Progressive with a DirP
a. John is getting off the roof
b. Mary is getting John off the roof
(21) True Present Tense with a LocP
a. *Look...! John gets on the roof
b. *Look...! Mary gets John on the roof
(22) True Present Tense with a DirP
a. *Look...! John gets onto the roof
b. *Look...! Mary gets John onto the roof
With regards to the LocP examples, the results clearly indicate the
presence of an event which is, as before, unlikely to be associated
with the complement. The interpretation denoted by the LocPP
on the roof is undoubtedly stative as the examples with stative be
constructions below demonstrate:
(23) a. *What happened was John was on the roof
b. *John is being on the roof
c. Look...! John is on the roof
As we have seen, DirPs will not combine with the copula3. They are
also ungrammatical in conjunction with absolutive with-phrases:
(24) a. With John on the roof, Mary...
b. *With John onto the roof, Mary...
3In fact, we will show in section 3.9 that the majority of DirPs are compatible with the
copula. For those that are not, there is a principled reason why. Once this has been shown it
becomes clear that the be test is relevant to DirPs and can show that they too are stative.
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These two facts point towards an analysis in which they may be
considered non-stative. However, pre-empting later discussion, we
will not commit to calling them eventive just yet as they appear
to occupy an unusual place somewhere in between statehood and
eventhood. They denote a path along which an individual travels,
and furthermore, they are spatiotemporally bound in the sense that
the path has a start and an end and spatial progression along the
path advances with the progression of time. However, there is no
explicit process evident, as we would find in an eventive VP for ex-
ample, and there is no way to modify the DirP in ways traditionally
associated with event modification, such as with adverbs in VPs or
the adjectives constant and frequent for event nominals.
(25) a. *John slowly onto the roof
b. *John constant onto the roof
(26) a. #John ran slowly onto the roof
b. #John’s constant running onto the roof
Slowly and constant, in (26-a) and (26-b) respectively, modify the
event associated with running. What we can modify is the path
by, for example, cutting it short or measuring its length. This,
however, does not look like event modification as such, but rather,
modification of the spatial/temporal structure of the event:
(27) a. John ran halfway to the shops
b. John ran 10 metres into the house
Therefore, we will be agnostic about the eventivity of the DirPPs,
and assume that as get is eventive elsewhere, despite currently hav-
ing no way to show it, it is also eventive here.
As before, we can empirically verify that the event denotes a
change of state:
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(28) a. John got on(to) the roof at 7pm
b. John was on the roof at 7pm
Included in the interpretation of the a. example are two pieces of
information about John and his relationship with respect to the roof.
Firstly, that he was on the roof at 7pm, and secondly, that before
7pm, he was not on the roof. This second piece of information is
not conveyed by the stative b. example which merely informs us
about a state of affairs true at precisely 7pm. Thus, the former re-
lays a change of state interpretation narrowing the options available
as to the type of event that get communicates, namely either an
inchoative or a causative.
Inchoatives, like intransitive break, express the beginning of a
state or process without a causative part to their meaning and are
thus comprised of one eventuality. Causatives are distinguished
from inchoatives by the fact that they express a relation between
two eventualities, namely a causing event and a caused eventuality
(Lewis 1973). Thus, through reason alone it may be concluded that
get constructions are causative - we have shown that there are two
eventualities present, one denoted by get, the causing event, and the
other denoted by the complement of get, the caused eventuality.
The presence of two eventualities can also be demonstrated, as
before, with adjectival get constructions, using again modification.
Recall that again may either scope (i), below the causing event
and above the caused event, leading to a restitutive reading, or (ii),
above the causing event, leading to a repetitive reading (von Stechow
1996), (29).
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(29) John opened the door
vP
REPETITIVE
MODIFIER
again
vP
λe.∃e′.
[become-opened(e′)
& Theme(e′ ,door)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,John)]
John v′
λx.λe.∃e′.
[become-opened(e′)
& Theme(e′ ,door)
& Cause(e,e′) & Agent(e,x)]
[Cause, v]
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′
[f(e′) & Cause(e,e′)]
λf<s,t>.λx.λe.
[f(e) & Agent(e,x)]
VP
RESTITUTIVE
MODIFIER
again
VP
λe.
[become-opened(e)
& Theme(e,door)]
λx.λe.
[become-opened(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
open
DP
the door
For B-type constructions, it is relatively straightforward to show
that they are bi-eventive. The repetitive reading is shown in (30)
and the restitutive in (31):
(30) Mary got John on(to) the roof and then she got him on(to)
the roof again
(31) Sue got John on(to) the roof and then Mary got him on(to)
the roof again
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The aim, however, is to demonstrate that even A-type prepositional
get construction are bi-eventive, so I will use an inanimate subject to
force a true A-type construction. Consider the following context. A
bird builds its nest in a tree. The nest has never left the tree before
but one day it falls out. The next day, however, the same nest is
back in the tree. In this case (32) shows the restitutive reading.
(32) The nest got in(to) the tree again
The same example may also be repetitive if the whole event happens
for a second time.
In conclusion, for both LocPP and DirPP complements of a get
construction, we have shown that even the A-type constructions are
causative, and that the causativity is related to the event denoted
by get. We will now look at agentivity.
3.3.2 Agentivity and the θ-role ambiguity
In section 2.2.2 it was demonstrated that A-type adjectival get con-
structions are ambiguous when the matrix subject is animate (or
at the very least, teleologically capable). Specifically, it was shown
that for the sentence John got ill, the following two interpretations
are possible:
(33) John got ill
→John is the Holder of the property of being ill
→John is the Agent of an event that caused the property of
being ill to hold of John (e.g. John got ill on purpose so he
could get off school)
While for a sentence such as the car got cold, only one interpretation
is possible:
(34) The car got cold
→The car is the Holder of the property of being cold
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For B-type adjectival constructions it was also shown that only one
interpretation is possible:
(35) Mary got John ill
→Mary is the Agent of an event that caused the property
of being ill to hold of John
To demonstrate the existence of a non-agentive interpretation was
the overall goal of the section as it represented one step towards
the conclusion that Cause may be realised without Voice. With the
same end in mind, I will show that an identical ambiguity exists for
prepositional get constructions with animate subjects and that the
ambiguity is not present for either B-type prepositional get construc-
tions or A-type prepositional get constructions with an inanimate
subject.
A series of three tests were previously used to show this to be the
case. The three tests were:
(36) a. The purpose clause test
b. The Agent-oriented adverb test
c. The instrumental phrase test
Consider B-type constructions first. The goal for these is to show
that the matrix subject is an Agent. Thus, they should accept an
appropriate purpose clause (PC) - that is, one in which the PRO
may only be controlled by an Agent - and be compatible with both
Agent-oriented adverbs and instrumental phrases. We will begin
with the PC test.
In (37), the pronoun embedded inside the PC forces the c-comma-
nding PRO to be of a different index from it (Condition B), but in
(38), the corresponding anaphor forces the c-commanding PRO to
refer to the same entity as it (Condition A).
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(37) Marym got Johnj on the roof PROm to hide himj from the
police
(38) *Marym got Johnj on the roof PROj to hide himselfj from
the police
Considered together, (37) and (38) show that Mary, the matrix sub-
ject, is the only possible Agent. The same is true in DirP contexts:
(39) Marym got Johnj onto the roof PROm to hide himj from the
police
(40) *Marym got Johnj onto the roof PROj to hide himselfj from
the police
As for the other two tests, the intentionality in (41) obviously lies
with the matrix subject, and the instrumental phrase in (42) clearly
describe the means by which Mary, and crucially not John, carried
out the ‘getting’ event. Both tests support the conclusion already
drawn from the PC test, strongly suggesting that the subject of a
B-type prepositional get construction is an Agent.
(41) Intentionally, Mary got John on(to) the roof
(42) Mary got John on the roof with a catapult
Thus far, this is all as expected. The more interesting cases are the
A-type constructions which are often ambiguous. The three tests
used above are all felicitous with A-type constructions so long as the
subject is animate (I have included (43) to show that with a suitable
context the sentence The stick got on(to) the roof is grammatical).
(43) The stick got on(to) the roof by being thrown there by John
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(44) PC test
a. Johnj got on(to) the roof PROj to hide himselfj from
the police
b. *The sticks got on(to) the roof PROs to hide itselfs from
the ruthless dog
(45) Agent-oriented adverb test
a. Intentionally, John got on(to) the roof
b. *Intentionally, the stick got on(to) the roof
(46) Instrumental phrase test
a. John got on(to) the roof with a catapult
b. *The stick got on(to) the roof with a catapult
Thus, an animate subject of an A-type prepositional get construc-
tion can be agentive and therefore be a suitable controller for PRO.
However, it can also be shown that animate subjects are not neces-
sarily agentive. Consider the following context. In a gameshow in
which couples compete to complete tasks, the first task is for the
female members of the couples to get their respective partner from
a starting position on the ground to a finishing position in a bath-
tub without any help from the partner. Three couples are involved,
Nicholas and Vanessa, Sebastian and Maria, and John and Mary.
Let us stipulate that only Vanessa and Maria complete the task.
Despite their clearly non-agentive roles we can still use the males as
the grammatical subjects and summarise the results of the contest
by saying (47):
(47) Nicholas and Sebastian got in(to) the bathtub but unfortu-
nately John didn’t.
Thus, an animate subject of an A-type prepositional get construc-
tion is not necessarily an Agent.
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Finally, we need to show the third condition, namely that no
implicit Agent is present. This is only pressing for the true A-type
get constructions as we have already shown that B-types include an
overt Agent. The following section will therefore be concerned with
showing that true A-types have no implicit Agent.
3.3.3 No implicit Agent
Evidence of there being no accessible implicit Agent comes from
the use of Agent-oriented by phrases. These kind of by phrases are
found in passive constructions to pick out the implicit Agent, and
so their use with unaccusatives is expected to be infelicitous:
(48) Passive
The door was closed by Mary
(49) Unaccusative
*The door closed by Mary
The get constructions under consideration pattern with unaccusatives:
(50) a. *The stick got on the roof by Mary
b. *The stick got onto the roof by Mary
The argument above is, however, quite weak as it is possible that
(49) and (50) are ungrammatical for other reasons, for example,
if Agent-oriented by phrases are only licensed in the presence of a
passive participle. Stronger evidence comes in the form of purpose
clauses.
Recall that for constructions with Implicit Agents, like the pas-
sive, although covert, the Agent may still control PRO. For unac-
cusatives, where no Implicit Agent is present, purpose clauses lack
a controller for PRO and the sentences crash:
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(51) Passive
The stick was broken in two PRO to reduce its length
(52) Unaccusative
*The stick broke in two PRO to reduce its length
The most reliable way to ensure a true A-type get construction is
to use an inanimate subject. The use of the pronoun in (53) to refer
back to the stick from inside the embedded clause, forces an entity
different from the stick to control PRO (by Condition B) and, as a
knock on effect, ensures that the stick cannot be interpreted as an
overt Agent (as to do so would require PRO to refer to the same
entity as the stick). PRO must be controlled, but there is no overt
Agent to do so. The next best thing would be an implicit Agent,
but ungrammaticality shows that there is not one available.
(53) *The sticks got on(to) the roof PRO to hide its from the dog
The way the test is set up to work means that it is possible to
use a purpose clause to ensure a true A-type get construction - the
embedded pronoun need only corefer with the matrix subject. Thus,
testing for an Implicit Agent can also be done on animate subject
A-type constructions too.
(54) *Johnj got on(to) the roof PRO to hide himj from the police
Again, there is no implicit Agent present to control PRO and the
sentence crashes.
Thus, we have successfully shown that the following three prop-
erties are all true of A-type prepositional get constructions:
1. That there is a causing event in the structure.
2. That the matrix subject is not an external argument.
3. That there is no implicit external argument.
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We will now return to the semantic features of LocPs and DirPs,
and how they relate specifically to get constructions.
3.4 A closer look at locative and directional Ps
Recall that earlier we split the prepositional domain into LocPs and
DirPs, and then the latter into three further classes, those that give
rise to telic aspect, those that gives rise to atelic aspect, and those
that are compatible with both telic and atelic interpretations. This
gave us the following breakdown:
LocPs: above, at, behind, below, beside, between, in, in front of,
inside, near, on, outside, under
Telic DirPs: into, off, onto, out of, past, to
Atelic DirPs: along, away from, from, towards
Telos ambiguous DirPs: across, around, down, over, through, up
We then showed that get is incompatible with both the LocP
at, and the atelic DirPs. This immediately leads to some problems:
how to account for at, how to account for the fact that DirPs are
capable of influencing telicity, and related to that, why ambiguous
DirPs are no longer ambiguous inside a get construction - they are
unambiguously telic. We will leave these problems for later, turning
our attention first towards a more thorough investigation of the
features of each type of preposition.
3.4.1 Blurred division lines
The neat categorisation of prepositions into the four types listed
above does not entirely reflect the truth of the matter. In fact,
many of the prepositions listed as DirPs have locative uses:
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(55) a. The log is lying across the stream
b. The belt is around his waist
Likewise, many in the LocP category have DirP uses, (56). As
pointed out by Svenonius (2007), they may sometimes, particularly
in conjunction with motion verbs, acquire a directional interpreta-
tion, although the locative meaning is normally the most salient
one.
(56) a. The boat drifted behind the hill
b. The boat drifted inside the cave
c. The boat drifted below the bridge
d. The boat drifted beyond the city limits
e. The boat drifted in front of the palace
f. The boat drifted above the dam
Examples taken from Svenonius (2007)
In other words, the meaning of (56-a) is ambiguous between one in
which the boat is located behind the hill and drifting within that
location, and one in which the boat began not behind the hill and
drifted to a location behind the hill, i.e., a path interpretation.
Svenonius suggests that this is so because of the presence of a
null path head with a meaning approximately equivalent to overt
to. In fact, overt to is even arguably acceptable, (57), and to reflect
a converse path reading (for example, a path leading from a position
behind a hill to a position not behind a hill), we need only add the
converse preposition from, (58).
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(57) a. ?The boat drifted to behind the hill
b. ?The boat drifted to inside the cave
c. ?The boat drifted to below the bridge
d. ?The boat drifted to beyond the city limits
e. ?The boat drifted to in front of the palace
f. ?The boat drifted to above the dam
Examples taken from (Svenonius 2007)
(58) a. The boat drifted from behind the hill
b. The boat drifted from inside the cave
c. The boat drifted from below the bridge
d. The boat drifted from beyond the city limits
e. The boat drifted from in front of the palace
f. The boat drifted from above the dam
Examples taken from (Svenonius 2007)
This works for many LocPs, but not for all. Again, at, is a notable
exception and one which we will consider in more detail in section
3.8:
(59) a. The man was running at the race-meet
b. *The man was running to at the race-meet
c. *The man was running from at the race-meet
This also highlights another problem. Given that as a LocP, only
at will not combine with get, and furthermore that, unlike the other
LocPs above, it does not seem to have a DirP use, a natural question
to ask is whether LocPs may ever be used with get? In other words,
is it the case that get may take a LocP in its complement structure,
or are the LocPs that appear there really being used as DirPs? This
is an important question that is answered in the next section with
the conclusion that LocPs are indeed felicitous with get.
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3.4.2 LocPs or DirPs?
As has been seen, LocPs locate a Figure with respect to a Ground
whereas DirPs describe the trajectory of a Mover with respect to a
reference object. The fact that these two broad categories have such
different interpretations should mean that, as they are composition-
ally merged with other elements, these differences should influence
the meanings of the overall sentences they are contained within in
predictable ways, a LocP denoting a location for an entity and a
DirP denoting a path along which an entity travels. The difference
is clear for the examples in (60)
(60) a. John is on the dance floor
b. John ran onto the dance floor
The difference should also be as equally clear in any other cases, but
for get this is not true:
(61) a. John got in the car
b. John got into the car
(62) a. John got behindLoc the sofa
b. John got behindDir the sofa
Knowing that almost all LocPs, including both in and behind, may
also be used as DirPs, and given that at is seemingly the only LocP
that both resists a DirP use and will not combine with get, we might
reason that all LocPs in the complement of get are really just dis-
guised DirPs. There is, however, a strong argument against this
conclusion from evidence based on the respective LocP and DirP
meanings of prepositions like across and over. These two preposi-
tions differ from in and behind in that the locations they denote as
LocPs differ significantly from the endstate locations they denote as
DirPs. Whether a man is simply located behind a sofa, or moves to
a location behind a sofa, in either case, after all is said and done,
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he is behind the sofa. However, if a log is located across a road or
has moved to a position across a road, its location in the first case is
very different to its endstate location in the second. In the first, the
LocP use, the log lies across the road bisecting it. In the second,
the DirP use, the log moves to a position on the opposite side of
the road from where it started. Something equivalent holds for over
too. If a spaceship is located over a city it is positioned vertically
above the city (the LocP use), but if a spaceship flies over a city (in
less than an hour, say), we know it has moved in some way from
one side of the city to the other side.
The meaning of get is such that a new state of being is caused,
directly implying a transition from an old state of being. This kind of
transition in the spatial domain is normally accompanied by directed
movement and hence the confusion when the endstate in either case
(LocP or DirP) is the same. For across and over, however, this
is not a problem. Thus, if the bisection/vertically above readings
are feasible with get then we can be sure that get can take a LocP
complement. The following examples show that both these readings
are indeed possible:
(63) Pointing at a log bisecting a road:
How did the log get across the road?
(64) Watching District 9:
How did the spaceship get over Johannesburg?
In the next section we will set out a formal analysis for locational
prepositional get constructions.
3.5 Locational prepositions
To unify the analysis of these prepositional get constructions with
the one already set out for adjectival get constructions in the previ-
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ous chapter, the locative preposition will need to combine with Pred.
Recall that get selects Pred which takes a property expression π in
its complement and relates it to an argument x in its specifier, (65).
It does this via an eventuality e, such that π holds of e and x is a
Holder of e.
(65) JPredK = λπ.λx.λe.[holds(π,e) & Holder(e,x)]
The reason for using this kind of Pred head, as opposed to one that
directly associates the property to the argument (see (120) in chap-
ter 2), was that in the adjectival domain it provides a natural solu-
tion to the problem of excluding the use of i-level predicates in the
complement structure of get without ruling out s-level predicates.
Predicative prepositional structures, both locative and directional,
are spatiotemporal and therefore inherently s-level (recall that one
way to diagnose s-levelhood is to test its compatibility with spatial
and temporal modifiers. If a given sentence is s-level, spatiotempo-
ral modification is unproblematic, but if a given sentence is i-level,
modification of this sort results in ungrammaticality). Therefore, as-
suming that they are property denoting, there is, a priori, no reason
to discount either LocPs or DirPs as complements of Pred. Following
Bowers (1993), Bowers (2001), Adger and Ramchand (2003) among
others, I will widen the scope of what may constitute a property ex-
pression to include the set of predicational elements at phrase level,
namely the lexical category phrases NP, AP and PP4. The Pred head
does the job of turning the property into a proposition by relating
an argument to the property over which it predicates with respect
to an eventuality.
As discussed, LocPs give rise to stative locational interpretations:
if John is on the roof then John is located on the roof. Like predica-
tive adjectives, then, we will assume that here too there is a property
that can combine with an entity x mediated by Pred, in this partic-
4I will not include VP here as I will assume that the Agent θ-role is introduced by little v.
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ular case ‘John’, and assign that property to x via an eventuality.
The property is one of being located with respect to an entity x, in
this case, the property of being on x where x is ‘the roof’. The roof
may be defined as a set of contiguous points i in a 3D landscape.
We will therefore take on the roof to denote a property of the set
of point locations i5, (66). Pred, then, has the same function as
before - it takes in the property, π, and states that π holds of an
eventuality of which some individual x is a Holder. Formally, what
we have is the following:
(66) JonK = λx.λi.[i has the property on(x)]
(67) John on the roof
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,John)]
John Pred′
λx.λe.
[Π,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
LocPP
λi.
[i has the property on(the roof)]
= Π
LocP
λx.λi.
[i has the property on(x)]
on<e,pi>
DP
the roof
5I will leave out the temporal side to the property as I believe that, in the spatial domain,
it is less important then location. Its role may be more pronounced for non-spatial uses of
prepositions with get such as in particle constructions like John got on well with Mary. As
will be seen, greater import to time will necessarily be given in chapter 5 which discusses the
domain of events and states resulting from events.
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3.5.1 Merging get
PredP in (65) can then merge with get and the DP in Spec PredP
will either move up to Spec TP to form what we have been calling
a true A-type construction, or alternatively, the DP may either (i)
remain in-situ while a second DP is merged as the external argu-
ment of get to give a B-type construction, or (ii) re-merge in Spec
vP position to form an agentive A-type construction. An A-type
structure from the Cause VP downwards is represented below.
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(68) John got on the roof [A-type construction]
VP
λe.∃e′.
[cause (e,e′) &
holds(on(the roof),e′) &
Holder(e′,John)]
V
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′.
[cause (e,e′) & f(e′)]
got
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,John)]
John Pred′
λx.λe.
[Π,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) & Holder(e,x)]
LocPP
λi.
[i has the property
on(the roof)]
= Π
LocP
λx.λi.
[i has the
property on(x)]
on<e,pi>
DP
the roof
The analysis here is fairly non-standard in that LocP is a function
from individuals to properties, the property being a property of
locations. The standard analysis is that a preposition like on denotes
a relation between two individuals such that one (the Figure) is
located with respect to another (the Ground) (Heim and Kratzer
1998, p.63). A less standard analysis treats PPs as properties of
events (Adger and Ramchand 2003):
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(69) JonK = λx.λe.[on(e,x)]
e is an event of being on x
In (67), however, we are taking the LocPP to be a kind of atomic
property of locations, albeit one with internal structure, and to get
the stage-levelhood of the LocP out, it is then predicated with re-
spect to an eventuality e such that the property is true of an indi-
vidual just in case that individual is a Holder of e. Another way to
reach the same kind of intuition through the semantics would be to
treat the LocPP as a predicate of events and then ‘intentionalise’ it
using Chierchia’s (1985) ∩ operation before applying Pred to convert
it into a predicate of events, a possibility alluded to in Adger and
Ramchand 2003, footnote 8 p. 12.
We will now move on to the more tricky subject of directional
prepositions, beginning in the next section with an introductory
discussion of paths and prepositional aspect.
3.6 Directional prepositions
The features that distinguish DirPs from LocPs are that they are
able to affect sentential telicity, and that they project a path as part
of their interpretation. In this section we will look more closely at
these two features including a summary of a recent analysis of path
algebra and prepositional aspect formulated by Zwarts (2005). We
will begin, however, with an informal discussion of the two features
in which we look at ways other than telicity to divide up the DirP
domain into useful classifiable subdivisions.
3.6.1 Paths and prepositional aspect
As has been seen, the telicity of a motion verb can be affected by the
choice of directional preposition used in its complement. Likewise,
the telicity of verbs of motion can also be affected by turning them
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into verbs of motion to a goal. The nominal a mile in (70) introduces
a spatial path with an understood endpoint located one mile from
the start of John’s swim, the goal being the endpoint.
(70) John swam a mile in 10 minutes/*for ten minutes
DirPs also introduce paths, along which an individual is deemed to
travel. With respect to get constructions, we have so far stated that
if a DirPP is uttered in its complement, it must be telic. Telicity,
however, is a characteristic normally associated with events, a telic
event being one in which the interpretation includes an end result.
We might therefore posit that telicity in the domain of DirPs is equal
to the requirement that the reference object denote an endpoint
location:
(71) John swam to the pier in five minutes/*for five minutes
In (71), the reference object denotes an endpoint and the sentence
is telic. In fact, however, a DirPP may fail to denote an endpoint
location, but may still transfer telicity to the sentence it is contained
within. This is the case with, for example, both past and off :
(72) John tiptoed past the guard’s cabin in seconds
In (72), the cabin is not the endpoint of the path traversed by John,
but rather, it represents a set of points (not including the startpoint
or endpoint) near the path that John must traverse in order to pass
it by. There is, however, a result conveyed, namely the state of John
being somewhere beyond the other side the cabin with respect to
John’s position before the activity event took place.
(73) John climbed off the roof in minutes
In (73), the roof represents an area within which the startpoint of the
path traversed by John is located, and again, no endpoint location is
explicitly defined. However, as before, a result is conveyed, namely
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the state of John being located somewhere not on the roof.
As we have seen, get constructions denote an end result and
therefore impart telic aspect. We know that there is an end result
because it cannot be contradicted:
(74) *John got onto the roof but in the end he wasn’t on it
Again, however, this does not mean that the reference object need
necessarily be defined as including an endpoint for the relevant path.
Both past and off are compatible with get too:
(75) a. John got past the guard’s cabin unseen
b. John got off the roof
We need therefore to distinguish prepositions that give rise to telic
aspect (get-compatible DirPs) from those that give rise to atelic
aspect (get-incompatible DirPs) on some ground other than the ex-
istence of a specified endpoint location. Thus, from now on, we will
refer to the former as bounded and the latter as unbounded, notions
to be clarified below. First, however, we will better clarify how to
refer to the semantically distinct types of DirPs just discussed.
3.6.2 Goal, source and route DirPs
Within the DirP domain, Zwarts (2005) divides up the set of DirPs
into goal, source and route denoting PPs. Prepositions like off are
source prepositions, because their complement, the reference object,
defines a set of contiguous points any of which may be used as
a startpoint for the understood path. A preposition like past is
one of a number of route prepositions, because its reference object
defines a contiguous set of points somewhere on or near the route
of the understood path without defining either a start location or
an end location. Finally, prepositions like to are classified as goal
prepositions because the reference object defines a contiguous set of
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points any of which may be used as an endpoint for the understood
path. These three prepositions all give rise to telic interpretations
so are bounded.
We may also divide the prepositions that give rise to atelic inter-
pretations, the unbounded ones, along similar lines.
(Away) from may be classified as a source preposition as the
reference object defines a location that gets further from the path
traverser as the path is moved along. The reference object does not
define the actual start location for the Mover, so we will consider it
as a ‘would be’ source. Along may be classified as a route preposition
as the reference object defines a location that remains near the path
traverser, throughout the extent of the path. The reference object
defines a ‘would be’ route. Finally, towards may be classified as
a goal preposition as the reference object defines a location that
gets nearer to the path traverser as he/she moves along the path,
but again, the reference object location does not include an actual
endpoint for the path as the path never reaches the reference object
and thus, neither does the Mover. We will consider it to be a ‘would
be’ goal.
The prepositions through and across used as unbounded DirPs
are different again. For these cases, the entire path is encased within
the location defined by the reference object. In other words, it is
not that the reference object lies somewhere on or near the path,
but rather, that the path lies ‘on’ the reference object. As the
entire route of the path is within the reference object we will also
call these route prepositions. They also have bounded uses that are
semantically similar to past.
These classifications are summarised in the table in (76).
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(76) DirP classes
Bounded Unbounded
Source off, out of (away) from
Goal to, into, onto towards
Route past, through, across, over along, through, across
We will now begin to tackle what is meant by the bounded, un-
bounded distinction.
3.6.3 Boundedness
On an intuitive level, the reference object of a DirP defines a set of
contiguous points in a 3D landscape which we will call an extended
location (EL). Also intuitively, a path may be defined as a set of
contiguous points arranged linearly. A feature of the meaning of
unbounded DirPs is that for any path p in their denotation, if we
split p into smaller paths, these smaller paths will also be in their
denotation. The subparts of any path through an EL are also through
the EL.
This observation is not true of the bounded DirPs. For example,
for a DirPP such as off the roof, what is important about the paths
in its denotation is that they all start at the source EL, the roof, and
cross its outer edge (boundary) ending up no longer on the EL. Thus,
a subpart of a path off a roof which does not include any points in
the source EL can no longer be deemed to be representative of a
path off the roof.
Zwarts (2005) defines this property formally as divisivity and
shows that it is problematic as a criterion for boundedness as, in fact,
it is not true that all subparts of, for example, an unbounded path
towards an EL may be considered towards that EL. For example, if I
take a path towards a river that initially, say for the first 20 metres,
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leads geographically further away from the river, then the subpart
of my path towards the river that includes the first 20 metres only, is
not, in its own right, a path towards the river. Similarly for through:
if subparts of a path through a tunnel run across the tunnel from
one side to the other, can we really also refer to those subparts as
paths through the tunnel?
In fact, what successfully distinguishes boundedness from un-
boundedness is a condition in the opposite direction, i.e., a fact
about joining smaller paths to make larger ones. To define this con-
dition we will need a formal algebra of paths. We will therefore
begin with this in the next section after which we will look at a
theory of how prepositional aspect is transfered to events.
3.6.4 An algebra of paths
To see Zwarts’s explanation of how aspect may be transferred to the
verbal domain we will first need an algebra of paths. For this we
use Zwarts (2005):
(77) An algebra for paths:
a. P is the set of paths in the universe of discourse.
b. A path p is a continuous function from the real unit in-
terval [0,1] (the indices) to positions in a model of space
such that:
(i) The starting point is p(0).
(ii) The end point is p(1).
(iii) For any i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is the corresponding point of
the path.
P is partially ordered by a subpath relation:
(78) p is a subpath of q (p≤q) if p is the same path as q restricted
to part of its domain.
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Paths may be ‘added’ by an operation called concatenation:
(79) Concatenation
For two paths p,q, if p(1)=q(0), then the concatenation of
p and q (p+q) is the path that goes from p(0) to q(1) via p
and q.
As the definition shows, concatenation is only defined when the
second path (q) starts at the end of the first path (p). In this way,
each ‘concatenant’ is a subpath of the concatenation. As we will see,
this is particularly important when considering boundedness from a
formal perspective, a topic to which we turn next.
If a path is bounded, it cannot be cumulative, and if a path is
unbounded, it must be cumulative (Zwarts 2005). Cumulativity is
as defined below:
(80) Cumulativity
A set of paths X is cumulative iff
a. there are p, q ∈ X such that their concatenation (p +
q) exists and
b. for all p, q ∈ P, if p + q exists, then p + q ∈ X.
Consider the bounded DirPP to the river, call it g. The set of paths
G denoted by g are all the paths whose endpoint G(1) is at the river.
Thus, given (79), no two paths p, q in the denotation of g may be
concatenated (p(1) cannot equal q(0) as p(1) is necessarily at the
river and q(0) is necessarily not at the river). As such p + q does
not exist and to the river is not cumulative. On the other hand, an
unbounded DirPP like along the river (call it h) is cumulative. The
set of paths H denoted by h are all the paths which run alongside
the river. It is therefore possible to find two paths p,q in H such that
p(1) = q(0), and concatenate these paths to make another, longer
path still in H. As such, h is cumulative and therefore unbounded.
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3.6.5 Aspectual transfer
Transfer of prepositional aspect to the verbal domain is achieved
via a thematic function that gives the relevant event a spatial trace
(Zwarts 2005 based on Link 1998 and Krifka 1998). Zwarts calls
this function Trace and it is defined over motion events only as the
path followed by the relevant event participant (e.g. by the Theme
of a pushing event or the Agent of a Walking event):
(81) JVmotion DirPPK = {e ∈ JVmotionK: Trace(e) ∈ JDirPPK}
Trace is structure preserving. That is, following Zwarts (2005), (i)
two spatiotemporally adjacent events may be concatenated just as
two paths that meet head-to-tail (spatial path adjacency) may be
concatenated, and (ii), motion events may be made up of subevents,
as paths may be made up of subpaths. Armed with these assump-
tions we can then say that if a motion event e′ is a subpart of a
motion event e, then the path mapped out by trace(e′) is a sub-
path of the path mapped out by trace(e), (82-a). Furthermore, the
trace of two concatenated events is equal to the trace of the first
concatenated with the trace of the second, (82-b).
(82) a. e′ ≤ e −→ trace(e′) ≤ trace(e)
b. trace(e+e′) = trace(e) + trace(e′)
With these assumptions and relations in place, we can concatenate
suitably adjacent motion verb events into longer events of motion
and as such, motion verbs, like unbounded paths, may also be de-
fined as cumulative in reference (and therefore atelic). If however,
we combine a motion verb with a non-cumulate DirPP the result is
non-cumulative (and therefore telic). This is because if we map two
concatenated events in the VP denotation to their paths, the paths,
due to structural preservation, will necessarily be concatenated too
and will therefore lie outside of the denotation of the bounded DirPP
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which, by definition, includes no concatenated paths.
To see this more clearly we will consider an example that Zwarts
(2005) provides. If John swims from 1am to 2am from location A
to location B, and from 2am to 3am from location B to location
C, then these two events may be concatenated into one event e of
swimming from 1am to 3am from A to C. The swimming event
from A to B, call it e′, may therefore be considered a subevent of
e, as may the swimming event from B to C, call it e′′, and the two
together as concatenable subevents of e. As such, the paths mapped
out by their traces may be considered as concatenable subpaths
of trace(e). The meaning of atelic swim, in combination with an
unbounded DirPP like across the lake (for hours), remains atelic. If
the swimming event passes locations A, B and C as described above,
then both e′ and e′′ fall inside the denotation of swim. Each has a
trace, trace(e′) and trace(e′′), which also fall inside the denotation
of the unbounded DirPP (both denote a path across the lake (read
as unbounded across) albeit a subpath of trace(e)) and the result
is an atelic sentence. If, on the other hand, we combine the same
swimming event with a bounded preposition like to C, again, both
e′ and e′′ fall inside the denotation of the swimming event. The
problem is that their traces do not both fall inside the denotation
of the DirPP. Specifically, e′ fails to denote an event of swimming
to C. The bounded DirPP to C, in effect, restricts the number of
possible paths to just those whose endpoint is at C. If all the paths
must end at the same location, no two are concatenable and the
interpretation of the sentence is telic.
Compositionally, a sentence like John swam to location C works
as follows (ignoring tense):
(83) John swam to location C [Telic]
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e) ∈ Jto location CK & Agent(e,John)}=
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e) ∈ {p: p(1) is at location C} & Agent(e,John)}=
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e)(1) is at location C & Agent(e,John)}
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In words, (83) denotes the set of swimming events e such that the
endpoint of the path followed by John, the Agent of e, is at location
C. An atelic sentence looks as follows:
(84) John swam across the lake [Atelic]
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e) ∈ Jacross the lakeK & Agent(e,John)}=
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e) ∈ {p: for all i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is on the lake}&Agent(e,John)}=
{e ∈ JswimK: Trace(e) is on the lake & Agent(e,John)}
In words, (84) denotes the set of swimming events e such that the
path followed by John, the Agent of e, is on the lake.
The fact that Trace is only defined over motion events is prob-
lematic for the analysis we are defending in this thesis, as get is not
a motion event. It is particularly problematic in view of the fact
that there does appear to be a path interpretation for these kinds
of get constructions. To see this, we need to look at some ways of
detecting paths.
3.6.6 Diagnosing Paths
There are several ways to test for the presence of a path. We will go
through two in this section. The first is to modify some feature of
the path. For example, we can add that on John’s trek in a national
park, the path he traverses includes a section that passes via the
main entrance gate. We will call this the Via Test:
(85) Path is present
a. John trekked into the national park
b. John trekked into the national park via the main en-
trance
(86) No path is present
a. John trekked at the national park
b. *John trekked at the national park via the main entrance
122
A second diagnostic, suggested by Tenny (2000), involves the use
of a measure adverb like partway. The idea is that if a sentence
contains a path, the traversal of the path by the subject should be
measurable. The use of this type of adverb follows the expected
pattern. We will call this the Measure Test:
(87) a. John trekked partway to the national park [Path is present]
b. *John trekked partway at the national park [No path is
present]
With these two tests we now have the tools to evaluate if there are
path interpretations included in the denotation of prepositional get
constructions with DirP complements:
(88) Via Test
a. John got onto the roof via the drainpipe
b. Mary got John onto the roof via the drainpipe
(89) Measure Test
a. John got partway onto the roof
b. Mary got John partway onto the roof
The tests confirm the presence of a path for both A and B-type
constructions. An interesting fact is that even for A and B-type
constructions with a LocP in their complement, it is possible to
detect a path:
(90) Via Test
John got in the car via the front door
(91) Measure Test
John got partway in the car
The meaning of a get construction is, intuitively, and even formally,
under the analysis thus far, one of change of state. In the spatial
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domain this kind of change is normally mediated by movement. For
a new location to hold of an entity, the entity must move. This
movement interpretation is strong enough to coerce, where possible,
canonically locative prepositions into DirPs.
As we saw in section 3.4.2, there are some ambiguous PPs that
combine with get but leave meanings clearly associated with their
LocP uses. The examples given were for across and over, repeated
below:
(92) Pointing at a log bisecting a road:
How did the log get across the road?
(93) Watching District 9:
How did the spaceship get over Johannesburg?
Even in these cases, however, a path may be detected. Possible
answers to the above examples demonstrate this:
(94) a. The log got across the road via the hill which it rolled
down before coming to rest
b. The spaceship got over Johannesburg via Namibia and
Botswana.
The same reasoning applies here. Get is causative demanding a re-
sult phrase complement which is interpreted as a caused eventuality.
Given the fact that the eventuality has been caused, the result may
be seen as a description of a newly acquired state. For PP com-
plements we are based in the spatiotemporal domain, meaning that
acquisition of a new state is akin to acquisition of a new location
which must entail movement from a previous location. Thus, if not
formally present in the semantics, a path will necessarily be implied.
Any analysis of get must be able to account for this in some way.
We will now look at some formal values for the various directional
prepositions before formulating an alternative analysis of how they
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combine with motion verbs and get, and transfer their aspect to the
relevant event.
3.6.7 Semantic prepositional values
Zwarts, in his 2005 paper, gives definitions to all of the main prepo-
sitions in terms of the possible sets of paths they may denote. I have
split them up into different types under the more general headings
of bounded and unbounded.
Bounded DirPs:
(95) Goal DirPPs
a. Jto xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 1
and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is at x}
b. Jonto xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 1
and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is on x}
c. Jinto xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 1
and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is in x}
Notice that the definition for to x here is more complex than the
one used earlier in (83) repeated in (96):
(96) Jto xK = {p: p(1) is at x}
The reason for this is that (96) denotes paths that we would nat-
urally tend not to include in the meaning Jto xK. (96) allows any
path so long as the end of the path is at x. Thus, paths that are
located entirely at x are included as well as paths that move to and
from x several times. What to x is most normally understood to
denote is a path with a two stage structure (Fong 1997 and Kracht
2002), the first stage of which is not at x and the second stage of
which is at x. We can represent this schematically as in (97):
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(97) One possible path denoted by to x :
- - - - + + + + + + + +
0 1
The minuses stand for points on the path not at x and the plusses
stand for points on the path at x. The path in (97) begins with a
minus at 0, the startpoint, and ends with a plus at 1, the endpoint,
changing just once, giving a two stage structure. Some paths outside
the denotation of to x in (95-a), but within the denotation in (96),
look as follows:
(98) a. + + + + + + + + + + + +
0 1
b. + + + + - - - - - - - + + + +
0 1
c. - - - - + + + + - - - + + + +
0 1
The path in (98-a) has just one stage in its structure and is located
entirely at x. (98-b) and (98-c) have 3 and 4 stages respectively.
To ensure a two stage structure only, in (95-a) a path interval
has been introduced which includes the endpoint of the path and
consists of all points on the path which are at x. In this way, any
points that are at x will occur after those points that are not at x, of
which there will necessarily be at least one, namely the only point
which is definitely not within the specified interval, the startpoint.
The interval for a source DirP works in an identical manner but
with opposing perspective by including the startpoint but not the
endpoint:
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(99) Source DirPPs
a. Jfrom xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 0
and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is at x}
b. Joff xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 0
and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is on x}
c. Jout of xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
0 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is in
x}
Route DirPs specify an interval which includes neither the start-
point of a path nor its endpoint. In this way they have a tripartite
structure, (101):
(100) Route DirPPs
a. Jvia xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
neither 0 nor 1 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is at x}
b. Jacross xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
neither 0 nor 1 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is on x}
c. Jthrough xK = {p: there is an interval I⊂ [0,1] including
neither 0 nor 1 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is in x}
d. Jover xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
neither 0 nor 1 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is on/above x}
e. Jpast xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
neither 0 nor 1 and consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is near x}
Specifically, for through x, an entity must start outside x, then be in
x and then end outside x again:
127
(101) through x
- - - - - + + + + + + - - - - -
0 1
Bounded up and down are different again:
(102) Up and Down
a. Jup xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is on x and p(1)
is the highest point on x}
b. Jdown xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is on x and p(1)
is the lowest point on x}
As defined above, both up and down appear to have a one stage
structure. However, there is still something ‘special’ about the end
point which marks it out, namely that it is either the highest or
lowest point of x. I will mark this by using a larger plus sign to
signify highest, and a smaller one to signify lowest. We will consider
the structure bipartite with one of its stages including just one point,
the endpoint:
(103) up x
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
0 1
(104) down x
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
0 1
Leaving up and down to one side for the moment, what is common to
all these definitions is that firstly, there is an interval, that secondly,
they all have a stage structure >1 and that thirdly, the points in the
interval are defined with respect to a basic locative preposition, a
pattern which sometimes repeats across all three types. Thus, there
is a goal on preposition, a source on preposition and a route on
preoposition, onto, off and across respectively. The same is true
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for in, and additionally, there is a goal preposition for at and route
prepositions for near and on/above.
(105) Bounded DirPs
at on in near on/above
Goal to onto into
Source off out of
Route via across through past over
The fact that the points in the interval are defined with respect to
a locative preposition means that, by extension, so is the endpoint.
For a Goal DirP where the endpoint lies within the interval, this is
straightforward, but for source and route DirPs this is also true, the
difference being that the endpoint must be located with respect to
the negative of the relevant locative preposition. Thus, if the source
or route DirP is an on DirP, the endpoint is necessarily not on the
reference object.
To unify matters more, the definitions for up and down may also
be framed with an interval:
(106) Up and Down
a. Jup xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including all
points i ∈ [0,1] except 1 and for which p(i) is on x and
p(1) is the highest point on x}
b. Jdown xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including
all points i ∈ [0,1] except 1 and for which p(i) is on x
and p(1) is the lowest point on x}
However, where up and down fit into the table in (105) is unclear
as what seems to count more is the meaning of the preposition in
combination with the reference object and verb. Thus, someone may
run up/downstream meaning they follow a path near the stream,
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or swim up/downstream meaning they follow a path in the stream.
They might fly up/downstate meaning they follow a path above the
state, or drive up/downstate meaning they follow a path in the state.
Or, they may climb up/down a hill meaning they follow a path on
the hill (this is the definition supplied in (106)), or climb up/down
a tree meaning they follow a path in the tree. In any case, however,
the interval is defined with respect to a locative preposition, and
by extension, so is the endpoint. We will now look at unbounded
DirPs.
Unbounded DirPs:
We may differentiate unbounded DirPs from the bounded ones
above in two ways. Firstly, the entire path from p(0) to p(1) is equal
to the interval (or alternatively, there is no interval), and secondly,
as a direct result of the first difference, they all have a single stage
structure. A single stage structure is achieved in one of two ways.
Either no point on the denoted path lies at the reference object,
which is what we see with the source and goal prepositions, or all
the points on the denoted path lie in, on, above or near the reference
object, seen with the route prepositions and up and down.
(107) Goal DirPP
Jtowards xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is not at x and
p(1) is nearer to x than p(0)}
(108) Source DirPP
Jaway from xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is not at x and
p(1) is further from x than p(0)}
The structure for the goal and source DirPs may be represented as
a series of minuses as the goal/source is never reached/begun from.
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(109) towards/away from x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0 1
(110) Route DirPPs
a. Jacross xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is on x}
b. Jthrough xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is in x}
c. Jover xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is on/above x}
d. Jalong xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is near x}
(111) Unbounded DirPs
not at on in near on/above
Goal towards
Source (away) from
Route via across through along over
Up and down show the same range of meaning we saw for their
bounded counterparts:
(112) Up and Down
a. Jup xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is on x and p(1)
is higher than p(0)}
b. Jdown xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is on x and p(1)
is lower than p(0)}
The path structure for the route DirPs up and down may be repre-
sented as a series of pluses, as the path is deemed to exist entirely
within the extended location denoted by the reference object (e.g.
all points across a field are on the field, all points through a tunnel
are in the tunnel etc).
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(113) Route DirPs, up and down
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
0 1
For up and down (as well as for towards and away from), the location
of p(1) is defined in terms of the location of p(0). This is fine if p(1)
and p(0) are within a demarcated interval (which would give a one
stage structure), because then it is clear where they are in relation
to the reference object. However, if they are not included in the
interval (which would give a 3 stage structure), their locations in
relation to the reference object go undefined and the meaning for
the preposition collapses.
(114) a. *Jup xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] not including 0 and 1,
p(i) is on x and p(1) is higher than p(0)}
b. *Jdown xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] not including 0 and
1, p(i) is on x and p(1) is lower than p(0)}
Each of the definitions for the unbounded DirPs may trivially be
re-written to include an interval which will necessarily include all
points of the path, placing these points with respect to the reference
object in some way or another.
Next we will consider a novel analysis for DirPPs.
3.7 Analysis of DirPPs
In this section, we will develop an alternative analysis to Zwarts
(2005) in which a DirP will be considered a property of locations,
similar to LocPs, but with an organised structure6. We will continue
to use Zwarts’s path algebra for defining how a given path is struc-
tured. The property of locations may then, as before, be predicated
of an individual to create a small clause proposition. Some of these
6This is, in some ways, analogous to the distinction made between ‘normal’ adjectives and
comparative adjectives in the previous chapter.
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small clauses will be resultative (the ones with a bounded DirP)
and some not (the ones with an unbounded DirP), and only the for-
mer are compatible with get. Within the broad notion of property
assumed here, this kind of analysis does not present a problem as
predication of a DirPP over an individual results in a meaningful
clause, that is, gives us a conceptual completeness of some distinc-
tion (Chomsky’s (1986) Complete Functional Complexes).
To maintain this analysis we need to show that it holds not only
for get constructions, but also for motion verb constructions. In
other words, we need to maintain that the DirP complement of a
verb of motion is a small clause, (115).
(115) John ran [scinto the house]
At first sight this does not look too promising, but in fact, there is
some supporting evidence shown by the following paradigm in which
a phrase with a DirP is compared to one with a LocP adjunct in
order to identify potential argument positions:
(116) a. John walked into the river
b. John walked in the river
(117) a. John walked the dog into the river
b. John walked the dog in the river
(118) a. John walked himself into the river
b. *John walked himself in the river
The fact that the extra anaphoric argument position is available
in (118-a) seemingly with little change to the meaning in (116-a),
but not available in the locative equivalent, is difficult to explain
unless we posit that into the river is predicating over the individual
denoted by the anaphor.
(119) Johni ran [scJohni into the house]
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Following Svenonius (2007), we will assume that the denotation of
a DirP is built compositionally out of a LocP functionally applied
to a relevant Path head. Path heads will either be goal, source or
route in nature and we will label them as GDirP, SDirP and RDirP
respectively. Their values are as follows:
(120) JGDirPK = λπ.λi.[there is a path p and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including 1 and consisting of all the i ∈
[0,1] for which holds(π,p(i))]
(121) JSDirPK = λπ.λi.[there is a path p and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including 0 and consisting of all the i ∈
[0,1] for which holds(π,p(i))]
(122) JRDirPK = λπ.λi.[there is a path p and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including neither 0 nor 1 and consisting
of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which holds(π,p(i))]
These DirPPs are modificational. They take in a LocPP property
of locations of type π and give back a property of locations also of
type π. In doing so, they provide us with a number of new bits of
information as follows. They organise a set of points (the locations
which make up the property) as a contiguous linear path in which
intervals of that path are related in some way to the property of
locations denoted by their LocPP complement. Thus, if the DirPP
is into the house then there exists a path p with an interval I of
p including the endpoint of p such that I is entirely located inside
the house. Although not made explicit in its meaning, the fact
that the startpoint of p is not included in I means that there must
be another interval, say I′, which minimally includes the startpoint
but will consist of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is not in the
house. Furthermore, I′ concatenated with I is equal to p. This,
of course, satisfies the intuition that a Goal path consists of a two-
stage structure. We will continue to assume that I′ is not made
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explicit in the meaning of into, but rather, that it is understood as
an entailment of the fact that p has an interval I. We will return to
this shortly. Formally, then, we have the following:
(123) into the house
GDirPP<pi>
λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is in the house]
GDirP<pi,pi>
λpi.λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which holds(pi,p(i))]
to
LocPP
λi.
[i has the property in(the house)]
LocP
λx.λi.
[i has the property in(x)]
in
DP
the house
Thus, the property into the house denotes a set of points organ-
ised as a path with a two stage structure, the end of which (and
crucially not the start of which) is included in an interval I of the
path in which all points of I are inside the house. Predicating this
of an individual via Pred gives the following:
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(124) John into the house
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,John)]
DP
John
Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
GDirPP<pi>
λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is in the house] = Π
GDirP<pi,pi>
λpi.λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which holds(pi,p(i))]
to
LocPP
λi.
[i has the property
in(the house)]
LocP
λx.λi.
[i has the
property in(x)]
in
DP
the house
PredP says that for some event e it holds that there is a path
with a two stage structure, the end of which is in the house, and
that John is the Holder of the event e and therefore the Mover along
the path.
Returning to entailments, as Zwarts (2005) notes, sentences with
DirPs have entailments that tie them to a locative expression (namely
the LocPP that appears in their denotation):
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(125) Bounded Goal DirP entailment
a. John will go into the vault→ John will be in the vault
b. John will go behind the house → John will be behind
the house
This however is only one of the entailments that these goal prepo-
sitions have. There is also the entailment shown in (126):
(126) a. John will go into the vault → John is not in the vault
b. John will go behind the house → John is not behind
the house
There are, then, two entailments for these prepositions and the same
is true for bounded source DirPs, up and down:
(127) Bounded Source DirP
John will go out of the house →
a. John is in the house
b. John will not be in the house
(128) Bounded Up
John will go up the hill →
a. John will be on the hill
b. John will be at the highest point of the hill
(129) Bounded Down
John will go down the hill →
a. John will be on the hill
b. John will be at the lowest point of the hill
On the other hand, bounded route DirPs entail three things:
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(130) Bounded Route DirP
John will go through the tunnel →
a. John is not in the tunnel
b. John will be in the tunnel
c. Having been in the tunnel John will not be in the tunnel
again
The generalisation we can pull out here is that the number of en-
tailments matches the number of stages the DirPs represent and we
therefore predict that one stage structures (i.e., unbounded DirPs)
will have only one entailment:
(131) Unbounded Goal DirP
John will go towards the river 9
a. John will be near the river
b. John is not near the river
Certainly if John goes towards the river he will be nearer than he
was to the river (as reflected by its semantic value in (107)), but
this does not necessarily mean he will be near, in some contextually
verifiable way, to the river. The only thing we can entail from (131)
is that John is not at the river. The same is true for the unbounded
source DirP and, as for the rest of the unbounded DirPs, we can see
that they also convey only one entailment:
(132) Unbounded Source DirP
John will go away from the river 9
a. John will not be near the river
b. John is near the river
(133) John will go away from the river→ John is not at the river
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(134) Unbounded Route DirP
John will go through the woods (for hours)
a. → John will be in the woods
b. 9 John is not in the woods
(135) Unbounded Up
John will go up the hill
a. → John will be on the hill
b. 9 John will be high on the hill
c. 9 John will be at the highest point of the hill
(136) Unbounded Down
John will go down the hill
a. → John will be on the hill
b. 9 John will be low on the hill
c. 9 John will be at the lowest point of the hill
Each entailment, then, is a description of a stage of the relevant
path, and given that each path means what it means, each of a
path’s entailments will carry through the derivation of a sentence.
Moreover, however, it seems that what these entailments may also
indicate are ‘states’ of the Mover with respect to the LocPP prop-
erty in the complement of DirP. In other words, each entailment
refers to a possible location along the path that the Mover may
hold with respect to not only the reference object, but the entire
LocP+Reference-object complex. Thus, if a pair of entailments say
that (i) John is not in the vault, and (ii) that he will be in the
vault, we know that at the beginning of the path John will hold the
property (or state) of not being in the vault, and that at the end
of the path, John will hold the property (or state) of being in the
vault, and therefore, that a change of state occurred at some point
on the path between the two extremities. The fact that a change of
state occurs allows for a result state meaning to be imparted which
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explains the impossibility of negating this result:
(137) *John ran into the house but didn’t end up in the house
Where there exist three stages to a path (bounded route DirPs), two
changes of state are denoted and again a result state is conveyed,
but where only one stage is evident (unbounded DirPs), no change
of state is conveyed.
(138) *John ran through the tunnel (in 15 minutes) but didn’t
reach the end
(139) Unbounded non-result DirPs
a. John ran across the field (for 10 minutes) but didn’t
reach the other side
b. John ran towards the river but didn’t reach the river
Note that whether the (bounded) DirP in use is goal, source or
route, the result state it represents is equal to the entailment linked
to the final phase of the path, i.e., the phase including the endpoint.
We must be careful here to emphasise that it is not enough that
an individual be a Mover along a path for there to be a recognis-
able change of state interpretation. While it is true that any kind
of movement does, on some level, signal a change of state, what is
important to the grammar is not only the movement, but also if
there has been a criterial change in location, and that can only be
judged to have taken place if the Mover has crossed from one phase
of a path to another, i.e., the criteria for a change of state inter-
pretation is that the movement must involve a change in location
of the Mover with respect to the LocPP property contained within
the DirPP. This should not be controversial as indeed even with a
simple motion verb, which by definition signifies that some kind of
movement is undertaken by its Agent, it is not enough, just because
movement is involved, to therefore assume that the verb denotes a
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change of state and is thus resultative. In fact, motion verbs, as we
know, are inherently atelic.
To clarify this further we will look at a concrete example of each,
beginning with an unbounded DirP. Consider the sentence in (140):
(140) John swam towards the riverbank
The meaning of (140) involves movement of John along a path in
the general direction of the riverbank. Furthermore, there is an en-
tailment that John is not at the riverbank. This entailment is made
explicit by the meaning of towards x repeated in (141), and is true of
John throughout his entire progress along the path, from startpoint
to endpoint. The particular LocPP that this movement is framed
against is given by the phrase ‘not at the riverbank’. As ‘not at
the riverbank’ is true of the location (state) of John throughout his
entire progress along the path, no change of state interpretation is
possible and the phrase ‘towards the riverbank’ cannot be considered
a result.
(141) Jtowards xK = {p: for every i ∈ [0,1] p(i) is not at x and
p(1) is nearer to x than p(0)}
Now consider (142):
(142) John swam to the riverbank
The meaning of (142) also involves movement along a path in the
direction of the riverbank. However, in this case there are two dis-
cernible entailments, both that John was at the riverbank and that
prior to this John was not at the riverbank. The first of these en-
tailments is explicit in the denotation of to x repeated below, but
is only true of a proper subpart of the entire path, including the
endpoint:
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(143) Jto xK = {p: there is an interval I ⊂ [0,1] including 1 and
consisting of all the i ∈ [0,1] for which p(i) is at x}
The particular LocPP that this movement is framed against is given
by the phrase ‘at the riverbank’. As ‘at the riverbank’ is true of the
location (state) of John for just a subpart of the path he traverses,
a change of state interpretation is possible. The change of state is
characterised as a change from John not holding the property of
being at the riverbank to John holding the property of being at the
riverbank. The phrase ‘to the riverbank’ is therefore result-denoting.
Motion verbs may combine with any kind of DirPP with the
resulting expression being telic, if the DirPP is result-denoting (for
the reasons discussed above) and atelic if the DirPP is non-result
denoting. There is a question of how this composition is achieved in
the semantics as the types do not match for functional application
to apply. Run is of type <e,<s,t>> while PredP is of type <s,t>
(see tree in (145)). However, we can use another operation here,
namely event identification (Kratzer 1996):
(144) Event Identification
<e,<s,t>> <s,t> −→ <e,<s,t>>
Event identification (Ev.Id.) allows us to add further information
to the event described by the verb, and was initially posited by
Kratzer as a mechanism for joining the external argument onto a
verb using Voice. Event identifying Voice and the verbal event adds
the condition that the verb has an Agent. For the case in hand,
however, event identification will need to be used twice, once to add
the Agent onto run, and once to add the condition that the verbal
event denote a path with a particular Mover:
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(145) John ran John into the house
VoiceP
λe.
[run(e) & Agent(e,John)
holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,John)]
DP
John
Voice′
λx.λe.
[run(e) & Agent(e,x)
holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,John)]
(by Ev.Id.)
Voice′<e,<s,t>>
λx.λe.
[run(e) & Agent(e,x)]
(by Ev.Id.)
Voice
λx.λe.
[Agent(e,x)]
VP
λe.
[run(e)]
ran
PredP<s,t>
λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,John)]
DP
John
Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
GDirPP<pi>
λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is in the house] = Π
into the house
The running event in (145) is specified not only as Agentive,
but also as one in which a path with a Mover is included, and
furthermore, that this path has a two stage structure and is therefore
result-denoting and telic.
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In summary, the most important conclusion we can draw from
this analysis is that we can use the Holds relation to transfer prepo-
sitional aspect. If a path has a stage structure with two or three
phases, it is result-denoting, but if a path has a single stage struc-
ture it is not. We will now turn to formulating an analysis along
these lines for get.
3.7.1 Merging get
Merging get calls for a different story. Get, as we know, denotes
Cause as defined below, (146). As such, it obligatorily denotes a
change of state reading in which the caused eventuality (e′ in (146))
is denoted by the result phrase in its complement. The complement
must be result-denoting or else nothing has been caused.
(146) JGetK = Cause = λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′.[cause (e,e′) & f(e′)]
This proviso explains why unbounded paths are unacceptable in
the complement of get. We have seen that the stage structure of a
bounded path p leads to particular entailments holding true of p,
and that because of this, certain paths are able to denote that the
Mover changes state, as it were, with respect to the entire LocPP
against which the movement is framed, giving rise to the interpre-
tation of the DirPP as a result phrase. For unbounded paths, how-
ever, the Mover, although he moves, remains fixed with respect to
the LocPP against which the movement is framed, and as a result,
there is no change of state involved and the DirPP cannot be result-
denoting. Therefore, in conjunction with get there is an aspectual
clash and the sentence crashes7:
7A parallel may be drawn here between the adjectival and prepositional domain, namely
that unbounded DirPs may be considered the i-level predicates of the path prepositional
domain (and by extension, the bounded DirPs as the stage-level predicates). However, while
it has been left to the conceptual module of the way we view the world to account for the
respective i-levelhood and s-levelhood of each adjective, in the spatial domain of paths, the
notion is definable from the perspective of boundedness.
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(147) a. *John got towards the riverbank
b. John got to the riverbank
The formal structure for a grammatical prepositional get construc-
tion is as below:
(148) John got into the house
VP
λe.∃e′.
[cause (e,e′) &
holds(Π,e′) &
Holder(e′,John)]
V
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e
′.
[cause (e,e′) & f(e′)]
got
PredP<s,t>
λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,John)]
DP
John
Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e) &
Holder(e,x)]
GDirPP<pi>
λi.
[there is a path p
and an interval I of p
such that I ⊂ [0,1] including
1 and consisting of
all the i ∈ [0,1] for
which p(i) is in the house] = Π
into the house
It is essential here that the ‘getting’ event is not identified with
the path denoting eventuality as they each represent two separate
eventualities, namely the causing event and the caused eventuality.
At the point in the derivation represented by (148) one of two
things can happen. Either the subject of the small clause will re-
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merge in Spec TP giving us a true A-type get construction, or an
Agent of the ‘getting’ event can be introduced which will either
result in a B-type construction (Agent 6= SC Subject), or an agentive
A-type construction (Agent = SC Subject).
There remain a few loose ends to resolve which will be done in
the following two sections. Firstly, we have still not returned to the
problem of why at will not combine with get, and secondly, there is
a question of how to rule out the copula with DirPPs (*John is into
the house). We will begin with at.
3.8 The problem with at
Based on evidence from sentences such as those in (149), the discus-
sion thus far has implied that there is no DirP use for at. As we will
see, this is not entirely true, although it does appear to be a special
case.
(149) a. The boat drifted at the foot of the hill
b. *The boat drifted to at the (foot of) hill
c. *The boat drifted from at the (foot of) hill
d. *The boat drifted at the foot of the hill via the pier
As a DirP:
In specific contexts, and in conjunction with specific verbs and
nominal complements, at can act as a DirP, with a similar meaning
to towards, but with a necessarily short path - one cannot, for ex-
ample, run at something that is not in ones sight. The broad feeling
that its use as a DirP imparts is either one of danger or excitement,
or one of aim and subsequent movement towards a target:
(150) a. The infantry charged/ran at the enemy
b. The protestor fired the arrow at the target/threw the
stone at the policeman
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Thus, if it is difficult to construe the verb in one of these contexts,
(151), or if the nominal complement is not of the right type, i.e., a
nearby concrete object, (152), the sentence crashes:
(151) *The infantry strolled/swam at the enemy
(152) *The infantry charged/ran at France
As already shown, towards is ungrammatical with get because it is
unbounded and therefore has a single stage structure that prevents it
from being result-denoting leading ultimately to an aspectual clash
when used in a get construction. AtDirP has a meaning similar to
towards so is ungrammatical with get on the same grounds.
As a LocP:
As a LocP at is also ungrammatical with get, (153).
(153) a. *John got at the hospital
b. *Mary got John at the hospital
It is possible that the reason for this is linked to the notion of axial
parts (see Svenonius 2006 and references therein for in depth dis-
cussion of axial parts and vector spaces). Briefly, an axial part is a
region of an object which is determined by the object’s axes. For
example, the front, back, top, bottom, sides and ends of a car are
all axial parts of the car. Prepositions often pick out spaces that
are characterised by an extension of the Ground’s (or reference ob-
ject’s) axial dimensions out into surrounding areas. Thus, if John is
in a hospital then he is deemed to be inside the hospital, or more
crudely, in from the sides of the hospital. However, if he is in front
of the hospital, he is in an area projected out from the front axial
dimension of the hospital.
At, on the other hand, does not appear to work this way. If John
is at the hospital, he is in the general vicinity of the hospital, but
it is left unspecified as to exactly where, with respect to any axial
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part of the hospital, he is. For this reason, at allows us to situate
an individual at a location with no discernible axial parts, (154-a)
or with respect to a point in time, (154-c):
(154) a. John is at the wedding
b. *John is behind/inside/below/beyond/in front of the wed-
ding
c. John killed Bill at midnight
d. *John killed Bill behind/inside/below/beyond/in front
of midnight
Interestingly, in can sometimes work like at, but to do so, the
Ground must be a bare nominal:
(155) a. John is in hospital/school
b. John is in the hospital/school
(c. John killed Bill in the afternoon)
Example (155-b) means that John is inside the hospital while (155-a)
is used in a more abstract sense to infer that John is not well and
therefore interned at the hospital (and therefore also somewhere in
the vicinity of the hospital). It is possible that the abstract sense
is licensed only in the absence of an axial part which otherwise
constricts the meaning to a strictly spatial interpretation. Get is
not compatible with the abstract meaning:
(156) a. *John got in hospital/school
b. John got in the hospital/school
This is not to say however that get is not compatible with any
abstract readings:
(157) a. John got behind with his homework
b. John got over the moon with his test results
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In fact it is even compatible with at under a strictly abstract reading
(with the rough meaning of to annoy):
(158) John got at his classmates all afternoon
The point is that if there is any spatial part to the reading of the
SC complement, get, for whatever reason, needs to locate the sub-
ject of the SC with respect to an axial part of the prepositional
object and locative at, because it does not operate on axial parts, is
ungrammatical with get for this reason.
As a LocP in the complement of a DirPP:
Two at DirPs are identified in the table in (105), repeated below:
(105) Bounded DirPs
at on in near on/above
Goal to onto into
Source off out of
Route via across through past over
They are to, and via. Given our explanation for the ungrammati-
cality of locative at with get we would also expect neither of these
two prepositions to combine with get but as we know, this is not
true for to. We have provided no formal explanation for why get will
only combine with prepositions that operate over axial parts (and
we will not formulate one either for space reasons), but specula-
tively, we might be able to sidestep the problem of to by stipulating
that for some reason, when embedded in a DirPP, the axial part
requirement of get is relaxed or blocked. This, of course, transfers
the problem to why it is that via is not compatible with get? Via
has both bounded and unbounded readings:
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(159) John ran via the river for 5 minutes/in 5 minutes
For the unbounded reading, there is implicit knowledge that the
path via the river is only a section of a longer path with no speci-
fied startpoint or endpoint and that this section is entirely located
alongside the river and took John 5 minutes to run. The start-
point, endpoint and any other points not alongside the river are
not grammatically important. For the bounded reading, the start
and endpoints are grammatically important and there is implicit
knowledge of them. The path from start to end took 5 minutes
to run passing by the river for an unspecified length of time. To
use bounded via with motion verbs, there is no need to specify the
endpoint, but to use it with get there is:
(160) a. *John got via the river in 5 minutes
b. John got here via the river in 5 minutes
Hence via is compatible with get but, at the very least, an endpoint
location must be overtly defined for compatibility. This differs from
other bounded route DirPs which do not need the endpoint overtly
defined:
(161) John got across/through the river in 5 minutes
I will presume that this is because, unless otherwise stated, there
is a minimal assumption that the endpoint in these examples is
defined by the boundary edge of the reference object. Indeed, it is
enough that John be touching the riverbank from inside the water
to felicitously utter (161). For via such a minimal assumption is
impossible as to pass via a location means to pass by it fully, on
the way to another location, not merely on the way to one of its
edges. Thus, the naming of an endpoint is required to ensure that
the DirPP denotes a result.
150
It is unclear why no requirement of this sort is necessary when
via is used in the complement of a motion verb.
3.9 DirPPs as copula complements
We have thus far not looked at why it is the case that DirPPs are said
to be ungrammatical with the copula Zwarts (2005), while LocPPs
are not:
(162) a. John is in the house
b. *John is into the house
The question is pertinent as in the adjectival domain this was not
an issue:
(163) a. John is cold
b. John got cold
To begin with, I would like to suggest that in fact it is only in a
small number of cases that be is not compatible with a DirPP, and
that there is a principled reason for this.
(164) John is (somewhere) up the hill/towards the bank/away
from the fire/past the station/out of the house.
(165) *John is to the river/onto the roof/via the motorway
We will continue to assume that both copula phrases and the copula
itself are stative. Given our analysis of prepositional path structure
and the effect this has on possible change of state interpretations, the
most obvious prediction is that only single path structures should
combine with the copula (recall that the subject of an unbounded
DirPP does not change state with respect to the LocPP property
against which the path is framed). The table in (166) shows that
this is clearly the wrong prediction to make (the superscripts on
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up, down, via, across, over and through are there to indicate if the
preposition is to be understood under its bounded (b) or unbounded
(u) interpretation).
(166) DirP compatibility with be
Be *Be
Goal towards to, into, onto
Source away from, off, out of from
Route along, acrossb, viau,b, acrossu,
overb, past, throughb overu, throughu
upu,b, downu,b
I believe that the correct prediction to make is that, being sta-
tive, the only thing that be requires in the spatial DirPP domain, is
that its subject be at the particular location described by the final
spatiotemporal stage of the path. Seen in this way, there is no a
priori reason why be should be incompatible with any of the DirPs
as all contain at least one stage. The onus now falls upon explaining
why those that are ungrammatical with be are so.
As we know, the denotations of all of these prepositions contain
a LocPP complement which, by definition, describes a location with
respect to a reference object.
With this in mind, consider for now just the prepositions into,
out of and throughb. The syntax of all three of these prepositions
includes a LocPP which describes the location in the house. How-
ever, only in the first is this location included as part of the final
spatiotemporal stage of the path it describes. Thus, if john walks
into a house, then John ends up in the house. On the other hand, if
John walks out of a house or through a house then he does not end
up in the house. Therefore, only in the case of into is the DirPP
reducible to a LocPP which continues to describe the same location
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as the final stage of the path denoted by the DirPP. An equivalent
argument can be made for onto vs off and acrossb.
What of throughu and acrossu and why are these incompatible
with get? The reason is exactly the same. If John walks through
a forest or across a field, then under an unbounded interpretation,
he is in the forest or on the field respectively, and these locations
are the same as the locations described by their respective LocPP
complements.
Thus, the generalisation is that if we can ‘reduce’ the DirP to
its LocP complement without changing our understanding of where
the subject is located, then using the DirP will be infelicitous.
The generalisation predicts that both upu and upb (as well a
downu and downb) should be compatible with be, each one resulting
in a distinct meaning. The prediction is borne out:
(167) John is upstairs =
a. John is somewhere higher up in the building than the
utterer [Most salient reading]
b. John is at the top of the building
(168) John is up the stairs =
a. John is somewhere higher up in the building than the
utterer
b. John is at the top of the building[Most salient reading]
The argument for viau is as follows. For the length of time when
John is ‘via’ an entity x, he is at x, so viau is reducible to at. How-
ever, for viab the reason for its incompatibility with be is related to a
fact about its meaning discussed earlier. The endpoint is grammat-
ically important, but undefined, and no minimal assumption about
it can be made (unlike for across, over and through), so the location
that be wants to pick out for the subject is simply not available.
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Finally, I have no good explanation for from as the generalisation
predicts that it should be compatible with be. It is possible that
interference with the comes from meaning of is from plays a part
such that no spatial interpretation is permitted:
(169) John is from Mars/ the hospital [*spatial reading]
3.10 Chapter summary
In the introduction, it was shown that the prepositional domain
divides broadly into two types of preposition, locative Ps (LocPs)
and directional Ps (DirPs), and that both LocPs, not including at,
and DirPs, not including those that are unbounded, are compatible
with get. Furthermore, it was suggested, following (Zwarts 2005)
and based on examples like (170), that be cannot take a DirP com-
plement.
(170) *John is into the garden
The challenge in this chapter was, therefore, not only to successfully
apply the analysis to the grammatical examples of get with preposi-
tional complementation, but also to provide principled reasons why
potentially problematic ungrammatical examples are, indeed, un-
grammatical, but cannot be considered as worthy counter-examples
to the analysis.
In sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.3, the two types of PP complements
were probed, in the same way that adjectival get constructions were
in the previous chapter, for the presence of Cause, Agents and im-
plicit Agents, and it was shown that, once again, the true A-type
variants pattern as non-agentive causatives, supporting the semantic
denotation of get defended throughout the thesis.
In section 3.4 a deeper investigation of some of the features of
LocPs and DirPs was conducted which revealed a potential misdi-
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agnosis, namely that it can seem entirely plausible that all LocPs in
the complement of get should be considered as covert DirPs. This
possibility was, however, quickly discounted with due consideration
of examples such as (171), which include a reading unarguably linked
to a locational interpretation.
(171) The log got across the road
(The log bisects the road = LocP reading)
With this settled, in section 3.5 the analysis was applied to get with
a LocP complement in terms of a property of locations in which
it was suggested, perhaps somewhat unorthodoxly, that a location
such as in the house, be seen as an atomic property of points i, in
this case consisting of all the i that are located inside the relevant
house.
Sections 3.6 and 3.7 were dedicated to resolving the issues sur-
rounding get with DirPs, and it was proposed, somewhat analo-
gously to the difference between standard adjectives and compara-
tive adjectives, that DirPs be analysed as modificational heads that
take LocPP complements and organise those sets of locations onto
a path structure in various ways, including paths that show cu-
mulative and non-cumulative ‘aspect’, and paths which give greater
prominence to their startpoints, endpoints or routepoints. Unbounded
DirPs were shown to be incompatible with get because they convey
path structures with only one phase, leading to the problem of try-
ing to combine a change-of-state denoting element with an element
that imparts an obligatory no possible change-of-state meaning.
Finally, the problems associated with at and the apparent un-
grammaticality of employing DirPPs in the complement of copula
constructions were resolved in sections 3.8 and 3.9, respectively.
In the next chapter we will consider a problem that has been
avoided thus far, namely the question of how to explain agentive
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A-type get constructions.
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Chapter 4
Get and the reflexive
anaphor
4.1 The Basic Data
Since near the beginning of chapter 2 I have pointed out and often
referred to two distinct interpretations that exist for A-type get con-
structions. Where the ambiguity has been relevant to the discussion,
I have called one variant a true A-type construction, and the other
an agentive A-type construction. Implicitly, the former was so-called
because its pronounced form corresponds more closely to its reading
than the latter, which corresponds less precisely because it includes
an extra θ-role without overtly including an extra argument. The
two readings can be forced in varying ways. The true reading is
forced either when (i), the subject is inanimate (inanimates resist
agentive interpretations) or, by (ii), making sure the subject cannot
be a controller of a purpose clause (PC) only plausibly controllable
by an Agent:
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(1) True A-type get constructions
a. The car got cold/totalled/into the road [Inanimate]
b. Johni got hidden to PROj hide himi from the police [PC]
The agentive reading can be forced by either (i), making the sub-
ject a controller of a PC only plausibly controllable by an Agent,
or (ii), employing an Agent-oriented adverb, or (iii), employing an
instrumental phrase (the instruments in instrumental phrases may
only be wielded by Agents, thereby subsuming their presence in the
relevant utterances):
(2) Agentive A-type get constructions
a. Johni got hidden to PROi hide himselfi from the police
[PC]
b. John intentionally got dry [Adverb]
c. John got onto the roof with a catapult [Instrument]
It has been assumed that agentive A-type get constructions may
be reliably paraphrased with the addition of a reflexive anaphor in
the Spec PredP position with Φ-features matching the sentential
subject:
(3) a. John got arrested = John got himself arrested
b. John got dry = John got himself dry
c. John got on(to) the roof = John got himself (on)to the
roof
Given their similarity in meaning, the two variants may plausibly
be related by positing that the former is also reflexive and there-
fore includes a null reflexive anaphor equivalent to the overt reflex-
ive anaphor of the latter. For whatever reason, the anaphor may
be dropped, so accordingly we will refer to this phenomenon as
anaphoric object drop (henceforth AOD), and the verbs that allow
AOD as AOD verbs. The phenomenon is repeated in other areas
158
of the grammar. Levin (1993) classifies the set of dress type verbs
which have in common that they allow for AOD:
Dress verbs: bathe, change, disrobe, dress, exercise, preen, primp,
shave, shower, strip, undress, wash
(4) Examples of AOD:
a. John dressed (himself)
b. Mary washed (herself)
The same alternation can also be seen with some of Levin’s (1993)
load and push/pull verbs:
Load ‖ push/pull verbs: jam, cram, load, pack ‖ jerk, pull, yank
(5) Load verbs
We loaded (ourselves) onto the wagon
(6) Push/pull verbs
I jerked (myself) free
Furthermore, I have also suggested (section 3.7) that the phenomenon
is available for motion verbs with DirPP complements:
(7) John walked (himself) into the river
I would also like to argue here that in the right context, transitivised
unaccusatives also demonstrate AOD:
(8) John froze (himself) stiff
We can show that John is an Agent here even without an overt
reflexive using the familiar PC test we have seen elsewhere:
(9) a. Johni froze himselfi stiff PROi to hide himselfi from motion
detection
b. Johni froze stiff PROi to hide himselfi from motion detec-
tion
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Although more difficult to construct suitable PC test contexts for,
observationally it seems reasonable that other unaccusatives of the
same kind (i.e., alternating unaccusatives) can also be agentive with
a dropped reflexive:
(10) Before my very eyes it was as if...
a. ...the magician evaporated (himself) to nothing
b. ...the magician broke (himself) in two
c. ...the magician melted (himself) to liquid
Additionally, there is arguably something equivalent going on in at
least another two of the verb classes defined in Levin (1993), namely
the sets of wink and floss verbs for which the alternation is restricted
to a particular anaphoric (in a part-whole sense) body-part:
Wink ‖ floss verbs: blink, clap, nod, point, shrug, squint, wag,
wave, wink ‖ brush, floss, shave
(11) Wink verbs
I winked (my eye)
(12) Floss verbs
I flossed (my teeth)
We will turn now to a deeper inspection of this data to generate a
better understanding of when anaphors may be dropped. We will
begin, however, with a brief look at proxy readings as an insight
into the properties of self anaphors. In what follows all exempli-
fied A-type get constructions are to be understood in their agentive
incarnation.
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4.2 Probing the data
4.2.1 Introduction to proxy readings
It has not gone unnoticed in the literature that there is, in fact, a
difference in the set of possible interpretations the two counterparts
of each of the verbs listed above can have. All meanings available in
the reflexive-less variant are available in the reflexive variant, but the
reflexive variant shows proxy readings (Jackendoff 1992) unavailable
in the reflexive-less variant (Reuland and Winter 2009).
(13) Context: Ringo washes a wax-work model of himself
a. Ringo washed himself [Xproxy]
b. Ringo washed [*proxy]
The same is true for get constructions:
(14) a. John got himself stabbed [Xproxy]
b. John got stabbed [*proxy]
Proxy readings: Those readings in which a close copy of the ref-
erent of a given argument is understood to stand proxy for that
argument.
The standard example comes from Jackendoff (1992) in which
Ringo Starr goes to a wax-work museum and sees a model of himself.
Jackendoff points out that in such a context it is legitimate to say:
(15) Ringo Starr saw himself
Under a proxy reading, himself in (15) refers not to the actual Ringo
but to the wax model version of Ringo. The wax model is a copy of
the real Ringo and sufficiently close in resemblance to stand in as a
proxy for him. We will not look to define exactly how and in what
ways a proxy is determined to be suitable in nature to act as such,
but will just note that there must be certain restrictions. Thus,
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if John is carving a statue of himself, we may say John is carving
himself. If, however, he is carving a statue of a book about himself,
we cannot say John is carving himself. This is precisely because, for
whatever reason, a book about John is not a close enough copy of
John to stand as a suitable proxy for him. We will return later to
proxy readings and what they can tell us about reflexive sentences.
4.2.2 Conditions on anaphoric object drop
On closer inspection, the AOD verbs in the previous section appear
to split into two categories. The two categories are determined by
the possibility of secondary result predication in the reflexive-less
variant. What we will call the class of Inherent Reflexive AOD verbs
are those AOD verbs that cannot successfully drop their anaphor in
the context of a secondary result predicate. This class consists of
the dress, wink and floss verbs:
(16) a. John washed himself clean
b. *John washed clean
(17) a. John winked his eye sore
b. *John winked sore
(18) a. John flossed his teeth raw
b. *John flossed raw
On the other hand, what we will call the class of Non-inherent Re-
flexive AOD verbs are those verbs that can successfully drop their
anaphor only in the context of a secondary result predicate1. Thus,
casting our eyes back over the relevant examples above, we should
expect to see that they all include a secondary result predicate (un-
derlined):
1I will consider property denoting prepositional phrases as secondary result predicates
along the lines of the analysis in chapter 3.
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(19) a. John got (himself) arrested
(20) a. We loaded (ourselves) onto the wagon
b. I jerked (myself) free
c. John walked (himself) into the river
d. John froze (himself) stiff
Condition 1: If not inherently reflexive, an AOD verb can only
drop its anaphor in the context of a secondary result predicate.
More will need to be said, however, as many verbs other than the
Inherent Reflexives cannot drop their anaphor in the presence of a
secondary result predicate either:
(21) a. John ate himself sick
b. *John ate sick
(22) a. John drank himself into a coma
b. *John drank into a coma
(23) a. John shouted himself hoarse
b. *John shouted hoarse
The facts about what the mechanisms are that allow anaphoric drop
are tricky and difficult to pinpoint. While it is possible to tease
out some solid generalisations about secondary result predication
in general, it is hard to come to an exact characterisation of the
anaphoric drop phenomenon, although this is what I will try to do.
For example, condition 2, which concerns secondary result predica-
tion, is fairly well accepted, but condition 3 again does not take us
far enough with respect to a definitive description of exactly what
circumstances license anaphoric object drop:
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Condition 2: “...a resultative phrase may be predicated of the im-
mediately postverbal NP, but may not be predicated of a sub-
ject or of an oblique complement.” (Levin and Rappaport Ho-
vav 1995, p.34)
Condition 3: Anaphoric drop is only licensed if the reflexive object
is θ-marked by the verb.
Logically, condition 2 should rule out all intransitives. However,
unergatives sidestep ungrammaticality through the addition of a so-
called fake reflexive (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995 from Simp-
son 1983) which allows the verb to conform to condition 2. The
immediately post-verbal NP must be a reflexive, cannot be dropped
and does not appear to be in a verbal θ-position:
(24) a. John shouted himself hoarse
b. *John shouted Mary hoarse
c. *John shouted hoarse
d. *John shouted himself
Unaccusatives are said to satisfy condition 2 because their subjects
are derived through movement from the immediately post-verbal
NP position. They cannot take a fake reflexive or a nominal not in
a verbal θ-position.
(25) a. The water froze solid
b. *Himself froze solid
c. *The water froze the lake solid
Condition 3 (in conjunction with condition 1) successfully accounts
for the ungrammaticality of the reflexive-less examples in (21), (22)
and (24), as well as ruling in all the reflexive-less variants in (20),
but it cannot account for why a large number of transitive verbs are
not AOD verbs.
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Himself, in the eat, drink and shout cases, cannot be considered
an argument of the verb as John is not being construed as literally
eating, drinking or shouting himself, thus the reflexive is obligatory.
As for (20), each of the reflexives is in a verbally θ-marked position:
(26) a. We loaded the hay
b. I jerked Mary (in order to wake her up)
c. John walked the dog
d. John froze the ice
However, we are still left with non AOD transitive verbs for which
we, as yet, have no explanation:
(27) a. The cat licked himself clean
b. *The cat licked clean
(28) a. John tickled himself senseless
b. *John tickled senseless
It looks like the relevant difference between the verbs in (27) and
(28), in contrast to those in (20), is one of inherent resultativity.
Specifically, in the above examples, lick and clean pick up resulta-
tivity through the use of a resultative SC. On the other hand, the
verbs in (20) are resultative independently of the SC, suggesting the
proviso we see in Condition 4:
(29) a. *The cat licked himself in an hour
b. *John tickled Mary in an hour
(30) a. We loaded the hay in an hour
b. I jerked Mary in a flash
c. John walked the dog in an hour2
d. John froze the ice in an hour
2We will look at the unergative forms of motion verbs like walk below, where it will
be suggested that the class be split into two variants of which the transitive is inherently
resultative.
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Condition 4: Anaphoric drop is only licensed if the verb is inher-
ently resultative.
Conditions 3 and 4 also help to explain the otherwise strange
judgements we find with motion verbs. Above we have only consid-
ered motion verbs with DirPP secondary result predicates, but they
may also appear with an adjectival result predicate in which case
the anaphor cannot be dropped:
(31) a. John walked himself ragged
b. *John walked ragged
In contrast to (20-c), Condition 3 suggests that the reflexive in (31)
is not θ-marked by the verb, and in contrast to (30-c), Condition
4 suggests that walk is not inherently resultative. We therefore
have two options, either (i), we write off the two conditions, or
(ii), we posit that there are two verbs walk, one unergative and not
resultative, and one transitive and inherently resultative3.
(34) a. John walked
b. John walked the dog
Intuitively, there is at least one difference between (34-a) and (34-b),
namely that the walking is predicated of different entities. In the
former, the Agent is the walker while in the latter, it is not even
important that the Agent be able to walk:
(35) I walk the dog twice a day from my wheelchair.
Of course, if the same entity is referenced in both θ-positions, then it
is essential that it be the walker as well as the one being walked, and
3Possible counter-examples may be found with motion verbs like jog or crawl for which a
transitive use is generally judged ungrammatical. This speaker, however, finds them accept-
able
(32) I jogged Mary (to the station)
(33) I crawled the baby (into his playpen)
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I assume that it is simply pragmatically odd to express this without
further qualification in the form of, for example, a secondary predi-
cate. It is therefore not implausible that motion verbs come in two
varieties, and that the unergative variant is unambiguously linked
with the adjectival result predicate, while the transitive variant is
unambiguously linked with the spatial result predicate.
In relation to get, Conditions 3 and 4, as they stand, do not even
seem applicable. The function of the verbal element get is purely
to add a causative dimension to the result phrase in its complement
position, and therefore has no argument θ-marking properties. Seen
in this way, the only way to save these conditions is to slightly loosen
their restrictiveness:
Condition 3 (version 2): Anaphoric drop is only licensed if the
reflexive object is θ-marked by the main predicate in its clausal
domain.
Condition 4 (version 2): Anaphoric drop is only licensed if the
main predicate is inherently resultative.
The propositional hub of the sentences in (20) revolves around
the main verb, not the secondary result predicate. Ultimately they
are sentences about loading, jerking, walking and freezing, not about
being on a wagon, free, in a river or stiff. On the other hand, for
the get constructions in (19), because of the lightness of get, the
propositional hub of the sentences is centered on the denotation of
the result phrase. For example, in John got (himself) arrested, the
sentence is concerned with relating certain information concerning
an arresting event. One of the bits of information happens to be
that there was some cause, but it is not necessarily important what
that cause was.
Taken in conjunction, Conditions 1, 3v.2 and 4v.2 explain the re-
flexive drop facts associated with get. I will not pursue an analysis
of this, but before moving on it is worth pointing out that 1 and
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3v.2 can be reduced to just one condition. For Condition 1 to hold
we need only say that the anaphor must be a Holder argument of a
small clause, i.e., appear in the Spec of PredP. Assuming θ-marking
takes place under a Spec-Head configuration, Condition 3v.2 amounts
to saying that the anaphor must also appear in a position θ-marked
by the main predicate. For a get construction these two positions
coincide as the Spec of PredP. For other constructions, the second
of these two positions is the object Theme position, Spec VP. Thus,
for get constructions, we can provide the following u¨ber-condition:
U¨ber-condition for get : Anaphoric drop is only licensed if the
anaphor appears as a Holder argument and the main predicate
is inherently resultative.
Furthermore, as all get constructions with anaphors will neces-
sarily locate those anaphors low down in the structure (i.e., not in
external argument position due to Condition A), and because all get
constructions have a resultative interpretation that stems from the
meaning of the main predicate, it follows that all get constructions
should allow anaphoric drop, and this is indeed what we find4. For
the other relevant verbs the condition needs to be stated as follows:
U¨ber-condition for inherently resultative verbs: Anaphoric drop
is only licensed if the anaphor appears as a Holder argument
and raises to the Theme position of the main predicate.
4The use of all here is misleading as it neglects to include get constructions such as those
with complementiser phrases in their complement:
(36) a. I get that you like her but why?
b. *I get myself that you like her but why?
and Experiencer get constructions like the following (subscript Exp indicates that the argu-
ment is to be conveyed as an Experiencer):
(37) a. The babyExp got herself covered in chocolate
b. *The babyExp got covered in chocolate
However, the generalisation does hold for all the constructions considered in this thesis and
some others.
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We will now turn our attention towards formulating a novel the-
ory of reflexivisation.
4.3 A look ahead and a look back
We will start this section by looking ahead to the analysis I will be
positing, before looking back to some recent binding proposals.
4.3.1 The analysis in a nutshell
The analysis we will work towards justifying is as in the tree-structure
in (38):
(38) John got himself dry
vP
DP
John1
v′
v VP
v
got
PredP
IdentNP
λx.x(John)
=John
DP
t1
Φ-features
⇑
him
IdentN
λx.x
-self
Pred′
Pred pi
dry
The main observation to draw from this syntactic tree and keep
in mind is that the anaphor is split into two components, one lexi-
calised as self, and the other as the antecedent which subsequently
moves to the Spec vP position, leaving a trace behind lexicalised as
an agreeing pronoun. The analysis, in particular the fact that the
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antecedent is base generated low down, borrows heavily from the
analyses of Kayne (2002) and Zwart (2002). Therefore, before we
set about looking for evidence to justify (38), we will take a brief
look at both of these analyses as well as one other theory of pro-
nouns, namely Kratzer (2009), the shortcomings of which support
the analysis to be developed thereafter.
4.3.2 Pronominal binding
In the context of pronouns and their antecedents, Kayne (2002)
proposes an alternative analysis for reflexive interpretations. The
central idea is that the pronoun is base-generated with its antecedent
in a ‘doubling’ constituent, such as [DP John he], from which the
antecedent subsequently moves, for thematic (and case) reasons, to
the subject position.
(39) thinks [John he] is smart → Johni thinks [ti he] is smart
One immediate consequence of this proposal is that accidental coref-
erence is effectively ruled out. A pronoun and its antecedent core-
fer precisely because they start out together, forming a constituent
of their own. Where no coreference is intended, no doubling con-
stituent enters the derivation. However, to stop over-generation
(for example, of a sentence such as (40)), certain conditions must
be stated. These conditions follow from general restrictions in the
Minimalist Program and are the following:
Condition1 (Kayne 2002, p.137, ex.11): Extraction of a phrase
from within a doubling constituent like [John he] is limited
to extraction of the Spec. (Based on Chomsky’s Phase Im-
penetrability Condition(2001) and previous prohibition of non-
maximal phrase movement).
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Condition2 (Kayne 2002, p.145): Unstressed pronouns must in-
variably move. (Based on Icelandic object shift and the oblig-
atory movement of Romance clitics.)
So, to prevent the theory from potentially generating the un-
grammatical (40), in which the pronoun, and not its antecedent,
has moved to subject position, Kayne claims that John is in (or
moved to from within the DP) the Spec position of the DP, and
appeals to condition 1.
(40) *Hei thinks [John ti] is smart
More needs to be said, however, to capture the general restriction
in generating the reflexive readings of the examples in (41), which
are, on the story so far, derivable in a similar fashion to (39):
(41) a. cleans [John him] → *Johni cleans [ti him]
b. considers [John him] intelligent →*Johni considers [ti
him] intelligent
c. thinks highly of [John him] → *Johni thinks highly of
[ti him]
To resolve this problem, Kayne appeals to Condition 2. Effectively,
in the current context, this supposition forces the pronoun, and
therefore, the whole doubling constituent (given that the pronoun
is the head of the relevant phrase) to move. Where to exactly is
not tackled beyond a stipulation that it be ‘above’ the subject θ-
licensing position. This does the trick of counting out the examples
in (41) while still counting in (39); the doubling constituent in the
latter need only move as far as outside the embedded VP (e.g. to
the Spec position of the embedded TP) from where John can still
move up to the subject θ-position of the matrix predicate and be
θ-marked. Crucially, however, in the case of the examples in (41)
there is no embedded clause, and the doubling constituent therefore
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finds itself, after movement, too ‘high’ in the structure for John to
subsequently move (‘downwards’5) into the subject θ-position (with
the result that John remains without a θ-role, the subject θ-role is
left unassigned and the derivation crashes).
The derivation, then, for John thinks he is smart looks as follows:
(42) John2 thinks [TP [t2 he]1 [V P t1 is smart]]
The examples in (41) can be rescued with the addition of -self :
(43) a. John cleans himself
b. John considers himself intelligent
c. John thinks highly of himself
What is it then about self which allows these sentences to gener-
ate successfully? Kayne (op. cit) posits that the presence of -self
permits a possessive-style DP structure in which the doubling con-
stituent may move to a higher Spec position within the DP itself,
fulfilling the requirement of the pronoun to move, while maintain-
ing the necessity (for the sake of convergence) of the antecedent to
remain ‘lower’ than the subject θ-position, (44):
(44) John cleans himself
vP
John2 v
′
v VP
cleans DP
[t2 him]1 D
′
D PossP
t1 ∅POSS -self
5A general restriction on rightward movement to a non-c-commanding position is assumed.
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Kayne’s proposal, then, reduces both condition B and condition
C effects to movement, eliminating said conditions as two of the
fundamental elements of UG. It ceases to be relevant to express
either that pronouns must be free in their local domain, or, that R-
expressions must be free in general, if, where coreference is desired
in a given interpretation, the pronoun/anaphor is merged with its
antecedent, receiving coreference in that way, subsequently obliga-
torily moving under the constraints stated above.
4.3.3 Anaphoric binding
Following on from Kayne (2002), Zwart (2002) proposes a less strong
version of the same phenomena, in which doubling constituents are
responsible for locally bound anaphors only, with all other cases of
coreference accidental (e.g. long distance binding).
A syntactic relation existing between one element and another is
generally thought to be possible under one of two structural con-
ditions, namely sisterhood and c-command, represented in Zwart
(2002) as below:
(45) a. Sisterhood: α merges directly with β
[α,β]
b. C-command: α merges with a constituent γ containing β
[α[γ[...β...]]]
Zwart’s (following Kayne 2002’s) proposal is that coreference is one
type of syntactic relationship built on the stronger version, sister-
hood. The doubling constituent is a representation of direct merger
(sisterhood) of a (pronominal) variable referential element (hence-
forth PRONOUN) with an R-expression (its antecedent), resulting
in a ‘special’ feature being acquired by the pronoun marking it as
coreferential with the antecedent. It is strictly under these condi-
tions only that coreferentiality may occur.
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(46) A PRONOUN α is coreferential with β iff α is merged with
β
(Zwart 2002, p.274 ex.18)
As Zwart shows, even when we apply Kayne’s original proposal only
to local anaphoric binding, we can account for condition B and
condition C effects (as well as seven other properties of anaphor
binding including (i), the restriction of binding to A-positions, (ii),
the fact that antecedents are limited to a unique argument - i.e.,
there are no cases of split anaphoric relations, and (iii), the fact
that anaphors are obligatorily bound). In the case of condition C,
the merger of two R-expressions together will still not result in the
two corefering, as neither is a variable referential element, and thus
a sentence like (47) is ruled out:
(47) *Johni likes Johni
In the case of condition B, examples such as those in (48) will also
never occur. Recall that what is merged with its antecedent is a vari-
able referential element, pronominal in nature but not a pronoun.
When this kind of merge takes place, the PRONOUN is marked as
being coreferential with its antecedent, and the system returns the
anaphor himself at spell out.
(48) *Johni loves himi
A natural question to ask at this point is why Zwart only wants
to include anaphoric binding? Why does he stop short of including
pronoun binding as Kayne (2002) does in his proposal? By ‘stop-
ping short’ in this way, Zwart loses an important result of Kayne’s
proposal, namely the elimination of accidental binding. However,
as Zwart shows, Kayne’s analysis cannot explain examples such as
John thinks that he is a genius. The problem here is that, for the an-
tecedent to reach the subject position, which is an A-position, it has
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to pass through an A¯-position, the Spec of CP. A¯-to-A movement is
disallowed (improper).
(49) [TP John2 thinks [CP t2 that [TP [t2 he]1 [V P t1 is a genius]]]]
As such, Zwart (2002) loses the elimination of accidental coreference,
but avoids having to explain cases of illegitimate movement. Kratzer
(2009) manages to capture so-called accidental coreference data, but
as we will see, there are problems for the reflexive anaphor data
in particular, so I suggest a move back towards a Zwart (2002)
style analysis restricted to self anaphor examples only, motivated
by evidence for a complex view of these anaphors.
For Zwart, the term himself is simply a spell out of some pronominal-
like variable referential element when that element’s coreferentiality
feature is satisfied by an antecedent merged as its sister. There is
nothing complex about the anaphor, and nothing special about its
self part. In what follows I will take a closer look at the anaphor in
particular, analysing it as a complex element consisting of two com-
ponents, a referential pronoun-type part (my, him, her etc), and a
nominal self part. Furthermore, I will look at the roles both com-
ponents play and in doing so, I will shift the focus of the analysis
of anaphors towards an analysis of self, showing that anaphors are
realised as a result of conditions on the use of self in English.
4.3.4 Binding through feature transmission
First and second person pronouns in the main case carry an indexical
(referential) interpretation, but in certain constructions they permit
of a bound variable reading. Under these readings they are termed
“fake indexicals”.
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(50) a. Only I remember my first appointment
Bound interpretation: Only I am an x such that x
remembers x’s first appointment. (He doesn’t remem-
ber his)
Indexical interpretation: Only I am an x such that x
remembers my first appointment. (He doesn’t remem-
ber mine)
b. Only you remember your first appointment
Bound interpretation: Only you are an x such that x
remembers x’s first appointment. (He doesn’t remember
his)
Indexical interpretation: Only you are an x such that
x remembers your first appointment. (He doesn’t re-
member yours)
Traditionally, this has been problematic from a semantic point of
view as, unlike for third person pronouns, there is no obvious way
to assign both a variable and an indexical reading for 1st and 2nd
person pronouns.
(51) For all variable assignments g admissible in a context c:
a. JI5K
g,c = g( 5) if g(5) is the speaker in c, undefined oth-
erwise
b. Jyou5K
g,c = g(5) if g(5) is the addressee in c, undefined
otherwise
c. Jhe5K
g,c = g(5) if g(5) is a single male, undefined other-
wise
The assumption is that the utterance context c constrains the ad-
missible assignments of a given variable. For 3rd person pronouns
this does not present a problem under either an indexical or a bound
variable reading; c may either determine a fixed reference for 5, e.g.
John, and all occurrences of 5 will thereafter pick out John as their
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referent with the result that he5 will be a referential pronoun, or
alternatively, c may not determine any referent at all for 5 and a
bound variable interpretation will result.
For I and you, however, the problem is that in any given c there is
intuitively just one speaker and one addressee, so c will always pick
out those particular individuals (or plural individuals in the case of
a plural 1st or 2nd person pronoun) as the respective referents for
these pronouns. Crucially, this is what should never allow there to
be a variable option. In other words, within an utterance context
c, the participants (speakers and addressees) are pre-determined by
their 1st and 2nd person roles in c and therefore referentially fixed.
At the same time, c may have various different individuals playing
the 3rd person role.
The fact that we do see instances of bound 1st and 2nd per-
son pronouns has pushed some semanticists towards the idea that
pronouns must be able to acquire the features that determine their
surface forms either before (for referential pronouns) or after (for
bound variable pronouns) semantic interpretation has taken place.
It is this intuition that ultimately drives the minimal pronoun ap-
proach of Kratzer 2009 (K2009) (following on from Kratzer 1998).
A minimal pronoun (MP) enters a derivation with just an index
feature (giving it the semantic type <e>) which is interpreted at
the semantic interface as a variable. In the PF branch of the deriva-
tion (beyond the ‘reach’ of the semantics module) MPs pick up Φ-
features, that will ultimately determine how they are pronounced,
through a process of Feature Transmission under Binding (to be de-
fined). In contrast, a referential pronoun enters a derivation with
all of its features already present and thus interpretable at the point
of semantic interpretation. Referential and bound pronouns sound
the same because the same features are involved in their make-up.
Furthermore, each possible combination of features (constrained by
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the particular semantics of each feature - see table (60)) triggers a
vocabulary insertion rule (table (59)). Many times more than one
combination can trigger the same insertion rule leading to systems
in which homonyms may be commonplace, e.g. English they which
spells out either [female], [male] or [thing] in the absence of [singular]
(features are considered privative in K2009).
Traditionally, the antecedent DP has been invoked as the binder
to an MP in need of Φ-features, but in K2009, it is assumed that
little v is responsible for binding. This is because in data like the
following from German, (52) and (53), we find the same nominal
antecedents in both but only the former permits a bound variable
reading (indicated by the smiley symbol ⌣. The frowning symbol
⌢ indicates that no bound variable reading is possible:
(52) Wir
1PL
sind
be.1/3PL
die
the.PL
einzigen,
only.ones
die t
who.PL
unseren
1 PL.POSS.ACC
Sohn
son
versorg-en
take.care.of- 1 /3PL
‘We are the only ones who are taking care of our son’ ⌣
(53) Wir
1PL
sind
be.1/3PL
die
the.PL
einzigen,
only.ones
die
who.PL
unser
1 PL.POSS.NOM
Sohn t
son
versorg-t
take.care.of- 3 SG
‘We are the only ones who our son is taking care of’ ⌢
Binding from v has the desired effect of correctly ruling out the
bound variable reading in the latter example, while correctly ruling
in the bound variable reading in the former, because only in the
former does the embedded v agree with the first person possessive
(compare the boxed features). Binding from a nominal antecedent
would incorrectly predict both (52) and (53) to be able to convey a
bound variable reading - in both examples, unser(en) has an appro-
priate DP antecedent in the form of wir.
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Feature transmission under binding is defined in K2009 as the
following:
Feature transmission under Binding: The Φ-feature set of a lo-
cally bound pronoun unifies with the Φ-feature set of the head
that hosts its binder
“Unifies” means that the feature sets of the two objects in the
transmission “chain” will merge, both objects acquiring any addi-
tional features found on the other. Thus, we have the following kind
of Feature Transmission operations under Binding:
(54) The locally bound minimal pronoun (LBMP) has feature set
A1. Head X, which hosts the LBMP’s binder, has feature
set A2
XP
Xλ[n]
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
YP
... LBMP[n] ...
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
←−transmission−→
Feature Transmission under Binding is an operation that must
occur after semantic interpretation. At least some of the features
that the LBMP acquires from the head hosting its binder are in-
terpretable at the semantics interface, but crucially, they must not
be interpreted there or a kind of referential interpretation would be
expected (given an appropriate index feature and assignment func-
tion). Thus, at the semantics interface the pronoun is still of a
minimal form and interpreted as a variable bound by v.
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When v hosts a binder, it acquires its features through Predica-
tion, a kind of spec-head agreement operation defined as follows:
Predication (spec-head agreement under Binding): When a
DP occupies the specifier position of a head that carries a λ-
operator, their Φ-feature sets unify
Thus, Predication produces the following kind of feature trans-
mission operation:
(55) DP has feature set A1. Head X has feature set A2
XP
DP
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
Xλ[n]
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
←−Predication−→
YP
.... LBMP[n] ....
Feature acquisition for functional heads not hosting binders is
also required (e.g. between T and a DP in T’s c-command domain)
and is assumed to use the same kind of feature unification, namely
transmission:
Agree: The Φ-feature set of an unindexed head α that is in need of
Φ-features (the probe) unifies with that of an item β (the goal)
if β is the closest element in α’s c-command domain that has
the needed features
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(56) Y, the goal, has feature set A1. Head X, the probe, has
feature set A2.
XP
Xprobe
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
... Ygoal ...
∪ {A1,A2}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
←−Agree−→
How, then, does the analysis work in practice? For self -anaphors,
the story goes as follows. The head v hosts a λ operator which binds
a minimal pronoun in a local configuration. When the specifier DP
is merged, v acquires the features of that specifier via Predication,
an operation that occurs before semantic interpretation:
(57) Nina respects herself before semantic interpretation
vP
Nina
[def]
[female]
[sg]
v′
vλ[n]
[def]
[female]
[sg]
←Predication→
VP
V
respects
DP
MP[n]
The pronoun, being minimal, is bound and will thus acquire the
features of the head hosting its binder via Feature Transmission
under Binding, in this case, the features of v.
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(58) Nina respects herself after semantic interpretation
vP
Nina
[def]
[female]
[sg]
v′
vλ[n]
[def]
[female]
[sg]
VP
V
respects
DP
herself [n]
[def]
[female]
[sg]
←transmission→
A nice consequence of this analysis is that there is no need to
rule out sentences such as *Nina respects myself as there is no way
to build them in the first place. Given the ‘chain’ of feature unifica-
tion posited, the only way to get a 1st person pronoun into object
position is to start with a 1st person pronoun in the specifier of vP.
The exact shape of a pronoun will depend on two factors: firstly,
on the features it possesses (e.g. he vs she for {[def],[male],[singular]}
vs {[def],[female],[singular]} respectively, etc), and secondly, on its
final position in the syntactic structure (e.g. {[def],[male],[singular]}
is spelled out as he in subject position, him as a locally free object
or a non-local object, himself as a locally bound object or his as a
possessor subject).
The vocabulary insertion rules posited in K2009 for English per-
sonal pronouns are as follows:
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(59) English personal pronoun insertion rules
[1st] [singular] −→ I
[2nd] −→ you
[female] [singular] −→ she
[male] [singular] −→ he
[thing] [singular] −→ it
[1st] ([2nd]) −→ we
elsewhere −→ they
And the compositional feature semantics are as shown below:
(60) Pronominal feature semantics (K2009)
Pronominal features Example Semantic Type
Index Feature Numerals (2, 5, 7, etc.) <e>
Descriptive feature [male] = λx.x is ≥ one male <e,t>
Definiteness feature [def] = λP.σx P(x) <<e,t>,<e>>
Participant feature [1st] = The speaker(s) in c <e>
Number feature [Singular]=λx:x is an atom.x <e,e>
Group feature [group] = λx. x’s group for c <e,e>
Sum feature [sum] = λxλy. x ⊕ y <<e>,<e,e>>
Other assumptions are that number and definiteness features
have their own projections in the syntax (and are therefore always
interpreted by the semantic component) and that during spellout,
Halle’s (1997) subset principle applies, i.e., “a vocabulary item can
be inserted into a position if the item matches at least a subset of the
features present in that position and there is no other vocabulary
item that is a better match” (K2009, pp. 203-04)
Leaving out all but one further complication, these are the basic
nuts and bolts of the analysis in K2009. The further complication
I would like to highlight is one pointed out in Rullmann 2004. For
examples such as the one in (61-a), which has a bound variable
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reading of the form ‘you are the only person who has the property
λx [x remembers the first appointment of x and me]’, the pronoun
our has no way of picking up its 1st person feature - the antecedent
you has a 2nd person feature but no 1st person feature. The same
problem but in reverse is true of (61-a) where I lacks a 2nd person
feature to transmit to our (via v).
(61) a. Only you{[2nd]}remember our{[1st][sum][2nd]} first appoint-
ment
b. Only I{[1st]} remember our{[1st][sum][2nd]} first appoint-
ment
To solve this, Kratzer has to allow for the possibility that mini-
mal pronouns may be born with more than just an index feature,
namely that they may be born with a [sum] feature and a partici-
pant feature. For example (61-a), the pronoun our will be ‘built’ as
follows. It must enter the derivation as [N{[sum][1st][n]}] and grow
into [Num[D[N{[sum][1st][n]}]]] before semantic interpretation
6. Dur-
ing spellout, the head of the Num projection acquires a [2nd] feature
via Feature Transmission under Binding from its binder v, and the
whole pronoun will look as follows: [Num [2nd] [D[N{[sum][1st][n]}]]].
By the subset principle, the resultant pronoun is expected to be our.
The analysis in K2009 provides a way round the necessity for
a syntactic binding theory. There is no longer a need to rule out
ungrammatical anaphoric configurations as they are predicted never
to be built in the first place.
This is a welcome consequence of the system, but one which may
have its problems. For example, if the shape of a pronoun is (partly)
determined by its final position in the syntactic structure, then self -
anaphors should appear only and whenever a pronoun is in object
6Recall that features are privative so the lack of a [singular] feature heading the number
projection implies plurality. There is no [def] feature as participant features are directly
referential.
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position and locally bound by v. What, then, is to stop us forming
the ungrammatical (62) using K2009’s solution to the problem posed
by Rullmann (2004)?
(62) *Only you mentioned ourselves = You are the only person
with the property λx [x mentioned x and myself]
As before, the minimal pronoun in object position could be born
with both a [sum] and a [1st] feature in addition to its index feature,
and “grow” into a pronoun of the form [Num [2nd] [D[N{[sum][1st][n]}]]]
when it inherits a [2nd] feature from its binder. Given its position
as object in the structure, its expected pronunciation would be our-
selves. It seems, then, that some kind of additional operation is
necessary to rule (62) out.
It is, in fact, possible to get the bound reading shown in (62),
but only if we (a), use the pronoun us, and (b), interpret us as
a paraphrase of ‘our relationship’. For example, if Tiger Woods
were to talk to the only one of his mistresses who had explicitly
mentioned their relationship together during press conferences held
for each woman, he might say (63) to her:
(63) Only you mentioned us
This looks to be an idiomatic use of the pronoun and thus, ex-
ceptional in that judgements tally with what we would expect for
possessor pronouns. In any other context, us in this syntactic envi-
ronment can only be referential.
From a syntactic point of view, the judgements here are to be
expected7. Partial binding is out for self -anaphors because they
7The judgements in (62) and (63) are to be expected on the proviso that we slightly
strengthen the binding theory to require that anaphors be interpreted as exactly coreferen-
tial with some c-commanding phrase in their local domain, and that pronouns be interpreted
as entirely referentially disjoint with every c-commanding phrase in their local domain.
For a DP to be ‘exactly coreferential’ with another DP means that it is not enough for the
former to be coreferential with just some sub-part of the latter, and for a DP to be ‘en-
tirely referentially disjoint’ with another DP means that it is not enough for the former to be
referentially disjoint with just some sub-part of the latter.
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require exact coreference with their closest c-commanding DP, but
it is also out for pronouns in this position because they are never
allowed to corefer (even partially) with their closest c-commanding
DP. In other words, there is still something to be said for conditions
A and B of the binding theory (at least within the context of a local
domain).
A further problem related to self -anaphors involves K2009’s spell-
out rules for English personal pronouns (see table (59)). The rel-
evant generalisation is that, whether singular or plural, [2nd] is
spelled-out homomorphically. This is correct for all syntactic en-
vironments except one, namely for locally bound objects, i.e., for
self -anaphors, where plurality is inflected on the self morpheme,
yourselvespl vs yourself sg. We will consider this fact as the first
piece of evidence that self anaphors should be considered as complex
units.
Given these problems, the analysis in K2009 no longer appears
tenable in a local binding context. Ideally, we would like to maintain
K2009’s analysis for long-distance binding, so we will work towards
a novel theory of reflexivisation that will not only resolve the two
problems noted above, but also allow us to factor in an explanation
for the proxy reading data and partially unite occurrences of self
across several of its distributions. We will begin by looking for more
of this kind of evidence.
4.3.5 Back to proxy readings
As a brief reminder of the proxy data, consider the following exam-
ples8:
(64) Context: Ringo sees a wax-work model of himself
Ringo saw himself [Xproxy]
8# signifies that the sentence is grammatical, but not on the intended reading, the intended
reading here being a proxy reading.
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Wash is an example of a so-called inherent reflexive which means
that we can drop the self -anaphor and still maintain a reflexive
reading. (65-a) and (65-b) are normally considered interpretation-
ally identical, but from a proxy perspective, this is not so:
(65) Context: Ringo washes a wax-work model of himself
a. Ringo washed himself [Xproxy]
b.#Ringo washed [*proxy]
A first approximation of a generalisation to explain this might say:
Proxy Generalisation (version 1): Proxy readings are unavail-
able in a reflexive sentence without the presence of the self -
anaphor
However, assuming a semantic unification of the occurrences of
self in (66) and (67), there is evidence that this first version of the
generalisation is incorrect. Consider the following examples:
(66) Context: Ringo mutilates a wax-work model of himself
a. Ringo mutilated himself [Xproxy]
b.#Ringo self-mutilated [*proxy]
c.#Ringo is a self-mutilating troublemaker [*proxy]
d.#Ringo practises self-mutilation [*proxy]
(67) #John’s very self was in danger [*proxy]
In (66-b) to (66-d) respectively, self is attached to a verb, an ad-
jective and a noun, while (67) demonstrates an occurrence of bare
self. In each case no proxy reading is available. The most relevant
example is (66-b), which is reflexive in meaning but will not admit
of a proxy reading. We might therefore hypothesize the following
amendment (in boldface):
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Proxy Generalisation (version 2): Proxy readings are unavail-
able in a reflexive sentence without the presence of the pronom-
inal part of the self -anaphor
Additional support comes from use of the impersonal pronoun
one:
(68) Context: TV game show competition in which each contes-
tant must dress an identical statue copy of himself or herself.
A member of the audience explains to his friend:
a. You have to dress yourself in as many clothes as possible
in just 5 minutes! [Xproxy]
b. One has to dress himself in as many clothes as possible
in just 5 minutes! [Xproxy]
c.#You have to dress in as many clothes as possible in
just 5 minutes! [*proxy]
d.#One has to dress oneself in as many clothes as possible
in just 5 minutes! [??proxy]
(69) Context: Several people are carrying exact model replicas
of themselves
a. If you slipped on this icy path, you could break yourself
into pieces [Xproxy]
b.#If one slipped on this icy path, one could break oneself
into pieces [??proxy]
c.#If one slipped on this icy path, he could break himself
into pieces [Xproxy]
Use of oneself to refer to each person’s wax-work equivalent is very
degraded. However the term one works with respect to referential-
ity in these kinds of contexts, the important point is that this is
good evidence for the view that the anaphor is complex, each part
bringing to the table its own bit(s) of semantics.
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If accurate, version 2 of the Proxy Generalisation, and the ev-
idence used to motivate it, assumes two things, firstly, that a self
anaphor is complex, consisting of a nominal self element attached
to a pronominal element, and secondly, that the self we see in (66-b)
(and (66-c), (66-d) and (67)) is the same as the self we see in (66-a).
-Evidence for the assumption that self anaphors are complex:
Language internally, elsewhere in the grammar both of the proposed
components occur independently of one another:
(70) a. Mary likes him
b. Mary likes my dog
c. John’s very self was in danger
d. Too much self-admiration is not an admirable quality
In reflexive sentences, plural agreement is marked on both the pronom-
inal element and the nominal self component, which would be un-
expected if self -anaphors were one lexical unit:
(71) a. We are dressing our-selves
b. *We are dressing our-self
c. *We are dressing my-selves
Related to the above, 2nd person plural forms are identical to 2nd
person singular forms across all other pronoun types (we have al-
ready seen that this fact causes problems for K2009’s analysis):
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(72) Differences are boxed:
Pronoun Type Singular Plural
Subject you you
Object you you
Possessive your your
Reflexive yourself yoursel ves
Cross-linguistically, Postma (1997) shows that in many languages,
anaphors are formed of a possessed inalienable noun and a possessive
pronoun:
(73) saf-t
saw-1
ra:s-i:
head-my
fe-l-mra:ya
in-the-mirror
‘I saw myself in the mirror’
(Postma 1997, p.295 ex.1b) (Morrocan Arabic)
English self -anaphors are plausibly similar in that, etymologically
speaking, self is feasibly composed of the incorporation of a posses-
sive morpheme se into the Germanic stem ‘body’, li:f, which then
attaches to, in the main case (not true in the 3rd person), a posses-
sive pronoun (Postma 1997) - e.g. my-self.
(74) Possible etymology of self (Postma 1997):
self
se
(possessive morpheme)
li:f
Germanic stem for ‘body’
(possessed inalienable noun)
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-Evidence supporting the semantic unification of self across (at least
some of) its various distributions:
Based on speaker judgments, the occurrences of self exemplified
below have identical reflexivisation properties (they both reflexivise
the verb by picking out the external argument as their value and
fulfilling the internal argument role of the event described by the
verb) and thus, availability of proxy readings aside, (75-a) and (75-b)
mean the same thing, (76):
(75) a. John mutilated himself
b. John self-mutilated
(76) John λx.[x mutilated x]
A plausible analysis for (75), which follows from this unification
assumption, would be that the self part of the anaphor in (75-a)
raises and attaches to the verb to derive (75-b). Evidence from the
nominal domain supports this. As Grimshaw (1990) shows, nouns
vary as to whether they are able to take arguments or not. There
are therefore two noun types, those that can and those that cannot.
She calls the former complex event nominals (CENs), and the latter,
result nominals (RNs). CENs are obligatorily argument taking, (77),
while some nominals are ambiguous between being CENs, in which
case they must take an argument, and being RNs, in which case
they may not take an argument, (78). Others are unambiguously
RNs so are obligatorily non-argument taking, (79). An example of
each follows with a table summarising this:
(77) Complex event nominal (argument taking)
a. *The mutilating
b. The mutilating of the patients
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(78) Ambiguous
a. The mutilation [RN]
b. The mutiltion of the patients took a long time [CEN]
(79) Result nominal (non-argument taking)
a. The mutant
b. *The mutant of the patients is otherwise charming
(80) Noun type summary (Grimshaw 1990):
Noun Type Event-denoting Argument-taking
CEN X Obligatory
RN × Prohibited
If a given noun is both a count noun and in its singular form, mod-
ifiers like constant and frequent are able to force an event reading,
an interpretation only available with CENs. In (81-a), mutilation is
used as an RN. (81-b) demonstrates that, when used as an RN, no
event reading is possible. The sentence can be ‘rescued’, however,
if we add an argument - equivalent to using the CEN variant of
mutilation, (81-c).
(81) a. The mutilation is terrible! [RN]
b. *The constant mutilation is terrible! [RN]
c. This constant mutilation of the patients is terrible![CEN]
Crucially, we may also, ‘rescue’ (81-b) if we combine self with the
nominal:
(82) This constant self-mutilation is terrible!
(83) This constant mutilation of himself is terrible!
In (82), it appears that no argument is taken by the nominal yet
an event reading is possible. This parallels nicely with the verbal
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example in (75) and shows that, in principle, the proposed raising
style analysis is worth pursuing.
The kind of raising being sanctioned here is atypical. Standardly,
an argument moves for case and/or thematic reasons, and moves to
an unoccupied argument position (A-position), (84-a). However, in
the case of self, the target position is the occupied head of a VP, an
A¯-position, (84-b).
(84) a. Unaccusative - [The ice]i melted ti
b. Reflexive - John selfi-mutilated ti
This kind of movement therefore looks more like Noun Incorporation
(NI).
Noun Incorporation (Baker et al. 2004): is “the phenomenon
in which a nominal [...] is expressed not as an independent noun
phrase, but as a morphological root that is integrated into the
inflected verb to form a kind of composite form” [p.138 - my
bold typeface]
The notion that the incorporated noun be a ‘root’ is important
as it supports the following data:
(85) a. John and Peter mutilate themselves
b. John and Peter self-mutilate
c. *John and Peter selves-mutilate
What is incorporated is the uninflected root self, and not the in-
flected noun selves. Although not a general feature of English, in-
corporation of self into the verb looks like a genuine case of NI, as
opposed to other potential cases such as noun-incorporate or mind-
read, because it disallows an argument in object position.
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(86) a. John did not noun-incorporate the word “noun” into the
word “incorporate”
b. Derren Brown mind-read the volunteer
c. *John self-mutilted Peter/himself
If this is true, then we need to explain why self can incorporate, and
what happens, when it does, to the pronominal bit of the anaphor?
Speculatively, I suggest that self comes with a requirement to be
morphologically bound (m-bound).
Self Generalisation: Self must be morphologically bound (m-
bound).
Examples like the following support the idea that self is an affixal
morpheme:
(87) a. John mutilated the cats/a cat
b. *John mutilated the selves/a self
(88) a. Cats are killing the dogs
b. *Selves are killing the dogs
(89) a. Himself
b. Self-admiration
c. To self-mutilate
There are then two separate strategies for spellout. It can either
be m-bound in-situ by a pronominal element whose only purpose is
to provide an element for self to affix to (proxy readings become
accessible as a side-effect) or, less-commonly, incorporate into the
predicate in which case no pronominal is needed. Both these strate-
gies are in evidence in (66), repeated here:
(90) [(66)]Context: Ringo mutilates a wax-work model of himself
a. Ringo mutilated himself
b. Ringo self-mutilated
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Notice that this leaves a problem for morphologically free (m-free)
occurrences of self (see (67), repeated below, (92) and (93)), namely
that they violate the self generalisation:
(91) [(67)]John’s very self was in danger
(92) a. John’s very self was in jeopardy
b. The frequent mutilation of one’s self is deplorable
c. The self
(93) a. So, he sat your good self down, and then what hap-
pened?
b. I called out to your good self earlier, but you didn’t hear
me
The examples in (93) show m-free self possessed and in object po-
sition. Note that without modification of self by the adjective, the
object looks like the anaphor yourself and, as expected, disjoint
reference (i.e., where the subject and the object refer to different
entities) rules both examples out as ungrammatical, (94).
(94) a. *So, he sat yourself down, and then what happened?
b. *I called out to yourself earlier, but you didn’t hear me
Example (92-a) shows m-free self in subject position, with an r-
expression as the possessor. As the complement of a complex event
nominal (in the sense of Grimshaw 1990), (92-b), we see the same
phenomenom of possession, and (92-c) is often used as a technical
term in psychological and philosophical literature to refer to the
concept of one’s identity in the relevant sense. Leaving to one side
the latter as a special case (for now - we will say something more
about this use of self in section 4.6 below), we may generalise that
when self is to be used unaffixed, it must be possessed and modified.
There is something grammatically odd about the string “possessor ’s
possessee” when possessee = self, that is not odd for, say, “possessor
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’s possessee” when possessee = inalienable body-part or alienable
concrete object:
(95) [(67)]*John’s self was in danger
(96) John’s foot was in danger
(97) John’s table was smashed to pieces
I will return to a solution to this problem in section 4.6 once I have
laid out in more detail the analysis I would like to propose.
In all other cases, self must be m-bound (examples (87) to (89)).
Crucially, there is one more insight we can take from the exam-
ples in (87) to (98), namely that self must always corefer with an
antecedent. While in English we are not too concerned about the
‘owner’ of a particular body-part like an arm or a hand, it is impor-
tant to establish who a particular self is.
(98) a. John mutilated the arms
b. The hands are waving at me
In the cases of morphologically free self, it is with the possessor that
self corefers. For those cases where self is obligatorily affixed, it is
the subject which corefers with self.
In summary, there are essentially five problems here that are
in need of an explanation. First, how can we explain the proxy
generalisation? Second, if reflexive anaphors are complex, what are
they made-up of? Third, what kind of mechanism is the language
using to ensure that self always corefers with some antecedent?
Fourth, why is m-free self obligatorily modified? Finally fifth, why
is self obligatorily possessed when not affixed, and morphologically
bound elsewhere?
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Self Role
Morphologically Free → Possessed
Morphologically Bound → Anaphoric and elsewhere
In the next section I will set out the analysis and show that with
it, we are able to resolve all five of these problems.
4.4 The analysis
4.4.1 Identity - reflexivisation without binding
I will claim that self is the phonological spellout of an NP projection
headed by a ‘special’ kind of N which I will call IdentN. IdentN is
born with a small set of unvalued Φ-features - a number feature and
an index feature - each needing to be locally valued under an agree
relationship. IdentN, I will claim, is the identity function λx.x, (99),
so by its very semantics, requires a DP sister to saturate its open
argument. This DP sister also serves as an appropriate goal for
IdentN’s features to probe and gain a value, (100)9.
(99) [[IdentN]] = -self = λx.x
9We will assume that at spellout, after moving to morphologically bind with the pronoun,
the complex [pronoun-self] will need to move again to Num where in the presence of a plural
feature it will lexicalise as pronoun-selves, and pronoun-self otherwise. The whole complex is
of type <e> so we will assume it is definite.
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(100) Self
NumP
[num: ] IdentNP
DP
x
X
probe→
IdentN
λx.x
-self
[index: ]
←probe
(101) If Spec IdentNP is filled with XDP , then [[IdentNP]] = [[X]].
Example (101) states that in an IdentN Phrase, the semantic value
of IdentNP is the same as the semantic value of the element in its
specifier. In other words, merging for example, John with IdentN re-
turns John as the value of IdentNP. In English, then, IdentN (self ),
and not the whole complex ‘pronoun’-self, is the reflexive element,
and it is locally ‘bound’ syntactically through an Agree relationship
and semantically through an identity relationship. It is important
that the features inherited by self are inherited under an Agree rela-
tionship, rather than through feature transmission (FT) via a local
v head as proposed in Kratzer (2009), because self always agrees
with its antecedent in person, a fact not necessarily true for binding
under FT:
(102) Only I mentioned my/our audiovisual capabilities
(103) Only I mentioned myself /*ourselves
The DP merged with IdentN will subsequently move to a higher
position in the sentential structure passing through the spec of vP
where it picks up its Agent θ-role, and reflexivity is born; IdentN
provides a way for the grammar to mark coreference between two
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elements across a single clause with intervening verbal structure,
avoiding condition B effects10.
In summary, IdentN enters the derivation highly underspecified,
gaining index and number under a sisterhood relationship with what
will become its antecedent in the linguistic discourse. The lack of
a valued number feature is important as self is marked for number
depending on the number of its discourse antecedent. Valuation of
the index feature by its sister syntactically marks it as referential to
the same individual(s) as its valuer. The fact that self enters the
derivation with an unvalued index feature makes self a bit like a
bound variable pronoun in that it starts as a kind of minimal nom-
inal element. It does, however, carry certain semantic encyclopedic
knowledge that marks it out as non-pronominal.
Given what we have so far, we can immediately explain why a se-
quence such as X-self (e.g. Johnself, where John has been merged
with IdentN) is not attested. Firstly, if the reason, R, that the
grammar contains a morpheme such as self is to provide coref-
erence between it and its antecedent across intervening structure,
then R is self-defeating whenever the antecedent remains in-situ.
Secondly, assuming, as we are, that self is the spellout of IdentN,
then the value of self is identical to the value of its antecedent, and
a sequence such as Johnself is semantically equivalent to referring
to John twice, an unnecessary and uneconomic strategy, except in
those cases where reference to the same entity in different argument
positions is desired. In other words, John would be preferred to
Johnself in all cases where no intervening structure is involved.
To demonstrate how the analysis works, in the following section I
will go through a derivation for a simple anaphoric utterance, before
taking a look back at problems 1 - 5 to see how, and to what extent,
10As we will see, under this analysis, Binding Theory is actually obviated - sentences that
violate Conditions B and C are not generable, and Condition A is no longer required as a
stipulation. In truth, then, IdentN does not avoid condition B, but rather, its existence cancels
the need for a Binding Theory in general.
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they are resolved by the analysis. Following that, I will show to
what extent the analysis may be extended to cases of possessed,
m-free self, and finally how it plays out in a get construction.
4.4.2 Anaphoric self - e.g. John saw himself
IdentN enters the derivation looking for an antecedent of type <e>
to saturate its argument position, and value its features (104).
(104) IdentN enters the derivation
NumP
[num: ] IdentNP
IdentN
λx.x
-self
[index: ]
The relevant DP merges with IdentN, saturating its open argu-
ment, semantically valuing IdentNP, (105). In the syntax, IdentN
probes the DP goal and an agree relationship is established between
the two elements. Coreference holds between the spellout of IdentN
(self ) and the argument in its specifier.
(105) Merger of IdentN with its antecedent John
NumP
[λx.x](John) = John
λx.x
[num:sg]
IdentNP
[λx.x](John) = John
DP
John
[def]
[male]
[sg],[1]
probe→
IdentN
λx.x
-self
[index:1]
←probe
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Subsequently, V, v and T are merged in the normal way and
the antecedent is attracted up to the spec TP position via Spec vP
where it picks up its agentive role in the sentence, (106) (T has been
omitted below for space reasons). Move of the antecedent is required
because -self, which remains low down (only maximally moving as
far as Num), takes the verb-internal θ-role and accusative Case both
assigned by see. The result is the valuation of the item that both self
and John refer to (i.e., John) as having two roles in the sentence,
one as Theme (Undergoer, Patient) and the other as Agent.
(106) Antecedent moves to sentential subject position. John saw
(him)self
vP
DP
John
v′
v VP
V
saw
NumP
[sg] IdentNP
ti
[def]
[male]
[sg],[1]
⇑
(him)
IdentN
-self
[1]
On the story so far the pronominal element of the anaphor is still
missing. How therefore can we analyse the presence of the pronoun?
Its role appears to be two-fold. Firstly, it functions as an affixee for
self, and secondly, as we saw above in the passage on proxy read-
ings, it can have semantic import, namely that its presence allows
access to those particular readings. However, when no proxy read-
ing is intended, the pronoun has no real semantic relevance. Given
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the classic Y-model of grammar, in which only the syntactic com-
ponent (and crucially, not the phonological component) may feed
the semantics, we must assume that the pronoun is generated in the
syntax when a proxy interpretation is intended, but not necessarily
so elsewhere. In other words, elsewhere the pronoun may be just the
result of some dumb phonological process there to provide self with
something to affix to. This is what is represented in the above tree
structure. Assuming that the copy of John ‘left behind’ remains
featurally contentful, we may posit that the requirement for self to
affix to something forces spellout of those features with an appro-
priate vocabulary item, namely in this case, the [male], [singular]
pronoun.
Analysed like this, reflexivisation is strictly dependent on the
presence of IdentN in the derivation and achieved through Move
and Agree, not binding 11. English self obviates the need for a bind-
ing theory as formulated in Chomsky (1981) and Chomsky (1986).
coreferentiality is, crucially, dependent on the merger of a DP an-
tecedent with IdentN in a sisterhood relationship, and so the se-
quences Johni saw himi (condition B violation) and Johni saw Johni
(condition C violation) are not generable - neither contain IdentN.
Condition A is redundant as it no longer needs to be stipulated.
The empirical data falls out naturally from the system - it is not the
case that anaphors are obligatorily bound in their c-commanding
domain, but rather, that IdentN needs an antecedent in order to
acquire a semantic value at the phrase level and have its features
valued in an agree relationship. This antecedent moves up through
the structure to the matrix subject position, acquiring an agentive
role on the way. It is merge (as the sister of IdentN) followed by
movement that gives the impression of binding.
11However, some kind of binding is still required for cases of cross clausal coreference such
as Johni said that hei saw himselfi in the mirror
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‘Accidental’ coreference, as found in (107) where he refers to the
same entity as John, is explained through the Kratzerian theory of
FT under binding (Kratzer 2009), briefly reported on earlier.
(107) Johni said that hei saw himselfi in the mirror
A syntactosemantic analysis will be needed for those times when a
proxy interpretation is intended because in these cases the pronom-
inal part of the anaphor contributes to the overall semantics. The
difficulty is that under a proxy interpretation, the referential sta-
tus of the anaphor as a whole becomes less clear. Anaphors, unlike
pronouns, are “referentially defective nominal elements” (Reuland
2010, p.15), and it follows that they only have bound variable inter-
pretations (Bu¨ring 2005). However, in the proxy cases being looked
at here, the referent of (at least the pronominal part of) the self
anaphor is disjoint from the referent of the antecedent, the former
being a proxy of the latter. This gives proxy interpretations linked
to reflexive pronouns a strange position in the grammar in that the
anaphoric element is both coreferential with the antecedent, and ref-
erential to some other salient individual (with the restriction that
that other salient individual be a close copy of the antecedent). On
some level, then, the anaphor must gain referentiality of its own
while maintaining a certain joint reference with its antecedent so as
to felicitously license the use of self in the first place. This much is
clear or else we would just as well expect to get the intended proxy
reading out from (108):
(108) Johni saw himi
Remembering that it is, strictly speaking, the presence of the pro-
noun, and not self, that is important for accessing these types of
meanings, one possible way to implement a syntactosemantic anal-
ysis is to assume a functional projection, call it Proxy, of type
<e,<e,e>>, a kind of transitive functional element which relates
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an individual x to an individual y, returning x as a value just in
case x is a suitable proxy for y, (109). Then the pronominal part
of the anaphor can be born fully referential, referring directly to
the proxy of the subject, and also provide a suitable affixee for self.
Structurally we have the following:
(109) Proxy = λx.λy.[x:x is a suitable proxy for y]
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(110) John saw himselfpxy
him
8>><
>>:
vP
NumPi
[sg] DefP
[def] N
John
[1],[male]
v′
v VP
V
saw
ProxyP
[him:HIM is a
suitable proxy
for JOHN]
NumP
[sg] IdentNP
ti
[def]
[male]
[sg],[1]
probe→
IdentN
-self
[1]
←probe
Proxy′
λy.[him:HIM
is a suitable
proxy for y]
Proxy
λx.λy.[x:x
is a suitable
proxy for y]
NumP
[sg] DP
[def] N
[2],[male]
An analysis along these lines is certainly not problem free. Specif-
ically, one difficulty is that the number of arguments needing case
and a θ-role increases by one, with no apparent matching increase
in case or θ-role assigners. The θ-role issue may not be too diffi-
cult to resolve if we assume (more or less as we do in (109)) that
the function of Proxy is to denote a thematic relation that holds
between the argument y in its specifier and the argument x in its
complement just in case x is a suitable proxy for y (however that is
determined). We might therefore abbreviate (109) as (111):
(111) Proxy = λx.λy.[x: proxy(y,x)]
205
The Case assignment problem remains, however, with no necessar-
ily straightforward solution. One potential option available is that
the verb assign Case in the normal way to ProxyP (which is, after
all, of type <e>, the type of individuals), but this would require a
theory of how Case can filter down into lower structure to mark two
separate objects without marking the antecedent, which would in all
likeliness end up being quite stipulatory. A second option could be
to assume that Proxy can assign case. Again, however, this is pure
stipulation. In a third option, we might posit that the movement of
him to -self may allow the case feature to be shared between the
two. However, probably the best option to pursue would involve ap-
peal to possessive structure as this provides a natural way to sneak
in an extra Case assigner. A different syntactic formulation would
of course be needed. We will pursue this no more as it is not strictly
crucial within the context of this thesis.
The requirement for self to be morphologically bound may some-
times be resolved in another way, namely when self moves to the
verb, as in the utterance John2 [t2 self ]1-mutilates t1:
(112) John self-mutilates
vP
John2 v
′
v VP
V
self- mutilates
NumP1
[sg] IdentNP
t2 IdentN
t1
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John is both mutilating and being mutilated, so starts low in the
structure to value IdentN. No pronoun need be overtly realised as
self is able to move and affix to V (or v) to fulfill its requirement
to be morphologically bound. The antecedent moves to the matrix
subject position again passing through spec vP where it picks up an
agentive role in the sentence.
Although self nominalisations are quite common, this option is,
admittedly, quite rare. It is, however, quite revealing that we are
all able to intuitively guess what self -V might mean even if the
particular self -V we are considering is not in general use.
(113) a. Self-admiration
b. John admires himself
c. *John self-admires
(114) a. John kicked himself
b. *John self-kicked
There is more to be said here, particularly about IdentN with dom-
inating possessive structure, but for now, as an intermediate sum-
mary, I would like to revisit what we labelled problems 1 to 3 above,
to show how they have been resolved.
4.5 Intermediate summary
It will be advantageous to look at these problems outside of their
numerical order, so we will begin with problem 2, and then look at
problem 3 before finally considering problem 1.
4.5.1 Problem 2 concerning the make-up of a self anaphor
Having gathered relevant evidence to demonstrate that it is, at least
in principle, plausible to analyse a self anaphor as complex, we for-
mally split it in two. The two components are a self part, which
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enters the derivation as an identity function looking for an individual
to both value its index and number features and semantically iden-
tify with, and a pronominal part, which spells out the Φ features of
the moved antecedent in the best way it can, presumably as a non-
referential item to which self can attach to satisfy its requirement
to be m-bound.
4.5.2 Problem 3 concerning self and coreferentiality
Problem 3 asked what kind of mechanism the language uses to en-
sure that the reflexive anaphor corefers to some object also picked
out by its antecedent. The solution was to posit that -self merges
with its antecedent, which thereby formally identifies with self, valu-
ing its features (including an index feature), which ensures that both
the antecedent and self refer to the same individual no matter where
in the structure they are spelled-out.
4.5.3 Problem 1 concerning the Proxy Generalisation
Problem 1 was simply, how does the analysis resolve the Proxy Gen-
eralisation?
Proxy Generalisation (version 2): Proxy readings are unavail-
able in a reflexive sentence without the presence of the pronom-
inal part of the self -anaphor.
Where proxy interpretations are intended, the analysis deals with
the fact that the pronominal part of the anaphor is semantically
referential to an individual other than the antecedent of self. As this
will need to feed into the semantic component, we tentatively posited
a possible syntactosemantic solution in which the verb takes a 2-
place functional projection I called Proxy. This takes in a referential
pronoun x and an individual y, and returns x iff x is a suitable proxy
for y. x can then move to m-bind self. As pointed out, a potential
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sticking point revolves around the assignment of the verb’s case and
θ-role. The former was resolved by positing that the function of
Proxy is to assign a Proxy θ-role to its complement. We suggested
that one way out for the Case problem might be to claim that Proxy
can assign a kind of Proxy case to its complement, and another
might be that movement of the referential pronoun to self allowed it
to share Case with self. A third solution was to posit that as ProxyP
is of type <e>, the type of individuals, perhaps structural Case may
be assigned directly to it. However, this lead to the problem that
without some theory of how, and under what conditions, Case and
thematic roles may percolate down into lower structure to value
self and the referential pronoun, without valuing the antecedent,
the feasibility of such a solution is indeterminable. The most likely
solution was reasoned to involve an appeal to possessive structure
but it was not fleshed out in any detail. In summary the main
benefit we gain from consideration of proxy readings is the support
it lends to the complex anaphor hypothesis.
We will now return to the analysis in order to extend it to cases
of possessed m-free self and provide answers to problems 4 and 5.
4.6 IdentN and Possession
Problem 4 asks why m-free self must be obligatorily modified. Ac-
cepting that self is the spellout of an identity function, we might
wonder what the significance of the modificational adjective is? My
intuition is that the adjective is necessary in order to break the iden-
tity relationship that otherwise holds between self, as the embodi-
ment of IdentNP, and its antecedent, by doing what it is precisely
invoked to do, that is, modify the NP. In set-theoretic terms, before
modification, John and IdentN refer to the same set of objects. Af-
ter modification, the set of objects denoted by IdentN is reduced to
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those which are also in the denotation of the adjective. Once identity
is broken, self is coerced into something like a body-part reading.
Body-parts share a part-whole relationship with their owner, the
body-part being an inalienable sub-part of the whole represented by
the owner. Self, being the identity function, shares a kind of ‘whole-
hood’ relationship with its antecedent. John cannot own or possess
his self as he would his arm, but rather, John is his self in a way
that he is not, say, his arm. Thus, *John’s self is ungrammatical.
However, with the string John’s ‘modified’ self, self, being modified,
now no longer shares its identity with John, and the string is gram-
matical. Self is re-analysed as a kind of body-part, the maximal
body-part, and the requirement for m-binding is relaxed.
This reanalysis of self is supported in the following paradigm. In
subject position, even when possessed by a pronoun in the second
person singular, morphologically free self forces third person singu-
lar agreement morphology on the verb, (115-a) - (115-c), just as a
possessed body-part would, (115-d):
(115) a. How are you today?
b. *How are your good self today?
c. How is your good self today?
d. How is your arm today?
Furthermore, self is now, like other referential items, free to take on
a proxy interpretation (Reuland and Winter 2009), (116).
(116) a. Possessed body-parts
Johni washed hisi hands [
XProxy]
(John washed the hands of a statue of himself)
b. R-expressions
John broke Mary in half [XProxy]
(John dropped a statue of Mary which broke in half)
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c. Concrete nouns
Look at the clouds [XProxy]
(Looking at clouds in a painting)
d. Possessed maximal body-part?
John is speaking to his good self [XProxy]
(John has a split personality and is currently conversing
with his good side)
This just leaves problem five, namely why is self obligatorily
possessed when not affixed, and morphologically bound elsewhere?
As already highlighted earlier, it seems important in English that a
particular self be identified with an antecedent in a way not always
so strictly important to any other category of nominal, including
body-part nouns. The analysis here is sensitive to this distinction,
enshrining it, as it were, in the semantics of self. This obligatory
identification with another entity, added to the m-binding require-
ments of self, is reminiscent of obligatory possession data.
The World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS12.) categorises
43 languages in its 244 strong language sample (almost one in ev-
ery six) as demonstrating obligatory possession (OP). English is, of
course, not one of them. However, the phenomenon of identity we
have suggested as applicable to self demonstrates something at least
similar to OP.
According to WALS, OP nouns are found “only in languages
where possession is head-marked in the form of affixal morphol-
ogy”, and their defining characteristic is that they cannot stand
alone, i.e., without the affixal morphology . In present terminology,
they are obligatorily m-bound and never occur m-free. It continues,
“other languages have derivational processes that turn obligatorily
possessed nouns (or some of them) into nouns that need not be
possessed, which we will call optionally possessed nouns. [...] Com-
12Found online at http://wals.info/.
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monly for derivationally produced optional possessibility [...] the
secondary free noun can then itself be inflected for possession, pro-
ducing a semantic difference that is sometimes described in the lit-
erature as an opposition of “alienable” to “inalienable” possession.”
Additionally, OP nouns are most commonly found to be body-part
nouns. Some of the available WALS data is shown in table (117) for
Acoma, a language spoken in the US state of New Mexico and one
of two members of the Keresen family of languages:
(117) Acoma data (Miller 1965)
Bound stem -jaz.a ‘horn’
Possessed za´c.a ‘his horn’
(e.g. a stag’s own horn)
Derived ha´c.ani ‘horn’, ‘a horn’
m-free noun
Possessed k’aha´c.ani ‘his horn’
m-free noun (e.g. a horn belonging to a person)
My proposal, therefore, is that English self is an example of
an OP noun albeit with a few differences to account for the im-
poverished inflectional nature of English. Self is conceptualised as
forming a kind of ‘wholehood’ relationship with its identifier. It is
therefore not an inalienable possessee as such, but more like an in-
alienable identifiee. English does not formally mark identification,
but like possession of the possessed noun stems in Acoma, identifi-
cation forces -self to have an m-binding requirement to be m-bound,
producingmyself or self-mutilate. Derived m-free self is what we see
being used in psychological and philosophical literature to refer to
the conception of one’s identity in the relevant sense. Possibly, it is
derived in the sense that it surfaces as the fully fledged r-expression
the self. Finally, possessed m-free self is found in constructions
such as John’s very self (an analysis of which we will turn to next)
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in which a modifier must be employed, as discussed, to break the
inalienable identity relationship (presumably, in an analogous fash-
ion, one of the functions of the inflectional morphology in Acoma
must be to, in some way, break the inalienable possession relation
that otherwise holds). The crucial difference here between English
and the Acoma example is that the breaking of identity results in
inalienable possession, not alienable possession. The parallels are
summarised in table (118).
(118) ‘-self’
Bound stem -self
Identified pronoun-self (myself)
or self-V (self-mutilate)
Derived m-free noun the self
Possessed m-free noun X’s modifier self
(e.g. John’s very self)
In Acoma, the m-free noun is derived from the m-bound stem
and can then itself be inflected for possession again:
(119) m-bound stem → m-free noun → possessed m-free noun
In our analysis of possessed m-free self, we will diverge from this
theory of how the Acoma nouns derive from one another instead
positing the following order:
(120) m-bound stem → possessed m-free noun
The analysis developed above for IdentN, works well for morpholog-
ically free self too. We will look at two types of examples, those in
which the whole possessive DP is found in subject position John’s
very self is in danger, and those in which only the antecedent ap-
pears in subject position John sat his good self down.
213
4.6.1 Possessed self in subject position - e.g. John’s very
self (is in danger)
The derivation for an utterance like John’s very self begins, as be-
fore, with anaphoric self. IdentN enters the derivation subsequently
merging with an antecedent which must later move up to a higher
position in the structure (recall that IdentN is present only to pro-
vide coreference across intervening structure).
(121) John merges with IdentN13
IdentNP
Spec
John
IdentN
-self
At this point there exists an identity relationship between self
and the antecedent John which must be broken before possessive
structure can be merged. This is achieved through adjectival modi-
fication of IdentNP:
(122) Adjectival modifier merged
IdentNP ( 6= John)
AP
very
IdentNP (= John)
John IdentN
self
In the next stage of the derivation, possessive structure is merged
in the form of a Possessive DP and the antecedent is attracted to
its specifier position yielding the sequence John’s very self :
13We will ignore NumP from now on and assume its presence. Nothing beyond valuation
of the feature [num] hinges on this.
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(123) Possessive structure is merged and the antecedent moves
to the Spec PossDP position
PossDP
Johni PossD
′
PossD
’s
IdentNP ( 6= John)
AP
very
IdentNP (= John)
ti IdentN
self
With the identity relation effectively broken, self functions as
a kind of inalienably possessed body-part and no longer requires
morphological binding. Thus, no pronoun is licensed and IdentNP
is instead dominated by Possessive DP structure.
The complete structure for the whole sentence John’s very self
was in danger looks as follows, with the subject moving from Spec
vP to Spec TP:
(124)
TP
PossDPk
Johni PossD
′
PossD
’s
IdentNP
AP
very
IdentNP
ti IdentN
self
T′
T vP
tk v
′
was in danger
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4.6.2 Possesed self in object position - e.g. John sat his
good self down
Recall that for these types of constructions there is no coreference
constraint holding between the matrix subject and IdentN.
(125) Disjoint reference allowed in possessive contexts:
a. So, he sat your good self down, and then what hap-
pened?
b. I called out to your good self earlier, but you didn’t
hear me
In John sat his good self down, the constraint holds only, and as
expected, between his and self. Therefore, we will assume that one
or other of the binding strategies outlined in K2009 is able to deal
with the binding that must occur between the subject John and
the possessor/possessee denoted by the object. A derivation along
the lines of what we see above for John’s very self gets us as far as
the object his good self which we can embed in the verbal object
position.
(126) his good self sat down
VP
PossDP
he PossD′
PossD
’s
IdentNP
AP
good
IdentNP
ti IdentN
self
V′
sat down
The rest of the functional structure can then be merged in the
normal way:
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(127) John sat his good self down
TP
Johnj T
′
T vP
tj v
′
v
satk
VP
PossDP
hei PossD
′
PossD
’s
IdentNP
AP
good
IdentNP
ti IdentN
self
V′
tk down
4.7 Returning to get
We began section 4.3 with a tree structure representing the proposed
analysis of a get construction like John got himself dry. The tree
structure is repeated below:
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(38) John got himself dry
vP
DP
John1
v′
v VP
v
got
PredP
IdentNP
λx.x(John)
=John
DP
t1
Φ-features
⇑
him
IdentN
λx.x
-self
Pred′
Pred pi
dry
We are now in a position to explain this analysis. The prop-
erty of being dry is predicated of an eventuality of which IdentNP
is a Holder. IdentN receives a semantic value under identification
through merge with its sister antecedent, the r-expression John.
John syntactically values self ’s number and index feature through
an Agree relationship mediated by Probe-Goal theory before raising
to Spec vP where it is θ-marked as the Agent before it moves on
again to the sentential subject position for nominative Case mark-
ing. The m-binding requirement of self triggers spellout of the Φ-
features of the copy ‘left behind’ by the antecedent in whatever way
possible, in this case, as the pronoun him.
It was shown that these get constructions meet the conditions
governing the licensing of anaphoric drop (section 4.2.2). Thus, we
will assume that IdentN may be realised as a null element no longer
forcing spell out of the m-binding pronoun at PF.
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(128) John got dry [Agentive]
vP
DP
John1
v′
v VP
v
got
PredP
IdentNP
λx.x(John)
=John
DP
t1
IdentN
λx.x
∅
Pred′
Pred pi
dry
As will be seen, this analysis will play an important role in the
next chapter where it will be shown that for passive get construc-
tions, one and the same nominal argument can need θ-marking up
to three times.
4.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter we considered agentive A-type get constructions as
variants of reflexive B-type get constructions but with their anaphor
phonologically dropped, although still syntactically and semanti-
cally present. A description of the conditions under which anaphoric
drop is possible was provided in section 4.2.2 to cover all construc-
tions, including get constructions, that demonstrate this property.
It was then noted that (i), a proxy interpretation for the referent
of the anaphor is only possible when the anaphor is not dropped,
and that (ii), it is possible to demonstrate that this proxy reading
is dependent only on the presence of the pronominal element of a
reflexive anaphor. These insights inspired an analysis of reflexive
anaphors in the style of Kayne’s and Zwart’s 2002 papers which
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advocate a movement based approach to pronoun-antecedent rela-
tions, differing from these contributions in that the anaphor is to
be seen as complex, not simplex, consisting of two semantically and
syntactically separable components, namely a pronominal part, e.g.
him, my etc., and a self part.
This novel analysis, as well as being able to unify many uses of
self across the grammar of English, and therefore explain data sug-
gestive of a split into two components of this kind, has the advantage
of not being susceptible to some of the problems faced by Kratzer’s
(2009) analysis of binding strategies when applied specifically in lo-
cal configurations. Furthermore, it maintains some of the important
results gained by Kayne’s and Zwart’s 2002 papers, such as, the con-
sequence that much of Chomsky’s binding theory no longer needs
to be stipulated, but rather, follows naturally once the grammatical
relationship between the pronoun and its antecedent is established
under a sister-hood relationship.
In the final section, the analysis was applied to a get construction.
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Chapter 5
Get and passive
complementation
5.1 Introduction to passive get
We will begin this chapter with an introduction to the data that
will be covered herein. The basic aim is to provide an analysis for
constructions like those in (1) of a comparable form to the analyses
for adjectival and prepositional get constructions already discussed.
(1) a. John got arrested
b. John got (himself) arrested
c. Mary got John arrested
With respect to the verb be, passives come in two basic varieties,
namely the eventive passive and the adjectival passive:
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(2) a. Eventive passive
The ship was sunk
(i.e., someone sank it)
b. Adjectival passive
The ship is sunk
(i.e., it is in a state of having become sunk but no Agent
of the sinking event is implied)
By framing the eventive example in the past tense, and the adjectival
example in the present tense, salience of the desired interpretations
is facilitated. This is because in English, a standard eventive reading
is disallowed in the present tense, while a stative reading is less
preferred over an eventive reading (where both are possible) in the
past tense. However, both readings are still possible if the tenses
are swapped, ((3) and (4)), in which case, the eventive passive takes
on an obligatory habitual reading (where John is deemed to be the
regular opener of the door), while modification of the adjectival
passive is helpful in order to express the stative reading without
interference from the eventive one:
(3) Eventive passive
The door is opened (by John)
(4) Adjectival passive
The door was more/very/so opened (*by John)
More, very and so can modify adjectives but not events, (5), so help
to clarify that the intended use of a passive is adjectival. More cre-
ates a comparative scenario, while very and so intensify the meaning
of the adjective.
(5) a. *Mary more/very/so kicked John
b. *John was more/very/so kicked by Mary
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Despite the identical forms of the predicate (sunkadj vs sunkverb,
openedadj vs openedverb), in the verbal passive there is an expressed
diagnosable event and an understood Agent of that event, the so-
called implicit Agent. On the other hand, for adjectival passives
there is no implication of an Agent. There is, however, a diagnosable
implication of an event that forms part of our knowledge about how
the state denoted by the adjective came about. For example, the
state of the door being open, denoted by (4), came about through
an opening event, and the ship in (2-b) is deemed to be in a sunken
state having necessarily been through a sinking event. Importantly,
it is not relevant who initiated the sinking or opening events. These
facts are reflected in the bracketed information included under the
examples in (2).
Thus, we can say that the verbal passive denotes an event proper
and licenses an Agent-naming by phrase, while the adjectival passive
denotes a kind of result state and cannot license a by phrase. Tests
for eventivity vs stativity that we have used before help to bring
this out:
(6) Event-denoting
What happened was that the ship was sunk by John.
(7) State-denoting
Look! The ship is sunk (*by John)
Note that there is a third type of construction which uses the (purely)
stative form sunken. We have already seen an analysis for these con-
structions in chapter 2 where adjectives like sunken were shown to
be i-level and therefore incompatible with get :
(8) Stative adjective
The ship is/was sunken
(9) *The ship got sunken
223
These stative adjectives are purely stative in that they do not imply
the result state of an event. They can therefore be interpretatively
distinguished from their resultative counterparts using manner ad-
verbials (Embick 2004)1.
(10) a. The apple remained rotten→ *The apple remained quickly
rotten
b. The apple remained rotted→ The apple remained quickly
rotted
A description of the manner in which the rotting event took place
may be appropriately added by a manner adverbial in the case of
resultative adjectives, but as no event is implied with a purely stative
adjective, the adverb is infelicitous.
Embick (2004) also provides another way to tell the two adjective
types apart. In the complement of a creation verb, such as create
or build, resultative adjectives should be ruled out as contradictory,
as they denote the result of an event not described by the creation
verb. Pure statives are unproblematic:
(11) a. The ship was built sunken (for the aquarium’s underwa-
ter display)
b. *The ship was built sunk
For sink, open and rot, then, there are two forms across the three
constructions (Kratzer 2001 and Embick 2004). The first, (sunken,
open, rotten) is adjectival and stative. The second, (sunk, opened,
rotted) is also adjectival and stative, but is result-denoting too - it
denotes the result of an implied event. These two forms are morpho-
logically differentiated but the third form, the passive participle, is
identical to the resultative adjective. On the other hand, it is verbal
and non-stative. This is summarised in (12):
1Remained and not be is used to force a stative reading over an eventive one, i.e., to block
the passive participle.
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(12)
Stative Resultative Passive
Adjective Adjective Participle
sunken sunk sunk
Form open opened opened
rotten rotted rotted
Stative/Eventive stative stative eventive
(implied event)
Agentive No No Yes
(implied)
The resultative adjective and the passive participle are always
identical in form, but much of the time so is the stative. This is the
case for, for example, both closed and twisted :
(13) Closed and twisted as passive participles
a. The statue was twisted by the sculptor
b. The door was closed by John
(14) Closed and twisted as resultative adjectives
a. The statue remained quickly twisted
b. The door remained quickly closed
(15) Closed and twisted as stative adjectives
a. The statue was carved twisted
b. The door was built closed
Stative Resultative Passive
Adjective Adjective Participle
Form closed closed closed
twisted twisted twisted
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Returning to our examples with get, with respect to compatibility
with the resultative adjective and the passive participle, it is often
argued that it may only combine with one or the other, effectively di-
viding previous analyses into two types. Fox and Grodzinsky (1998),
Taranto (2004) and Alexiadou (2005) argue for an analysis with re-
sultative adjectival complementation, while Haegeman (1985) and
Butler and Tsoulas (2006) argue in favour of verbal complementa-
tion. The nature of the analysis proposed in this study means that
if both can be viewed as properties that may be related to an even-
tuality, then there is no a priori reason why both should not be
compatible with get. Based on diagnostic evidence, I believe that
both types of complement may be used in the complement of get,
and so I will provide an analysis for both. Reflecting the terms gen-
erally used with equivalent be constructions, in what follows, a get
construction with a resultative adjective in its complement will be
called the ‘adjectival get passive’, while one with a passive participle
in its complement will be called the ‘plain get passive’. The expres-
sion ‘passive get (constructions)’ will be used as a cover term for
both types, and the resultative adjective, like the passive participle,
will often be referred to as a participle.
As we have already covered purely stative adjectives in the com-
plement of get (chapter 2) they will not feature in the discussion
here. Instead, we will provide an analysis first for the plain get
passive, sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.5, and then one for the adjectival get
passive, sections 5.4.6 to 5.4.8. We will begin, however, with an in-
troductory look at the shape the analyses will take, before demon-
strating that for these constructions too, get may be realised without
an Agent.
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5.2 Looking ahead
Applied to passive get constructions, the analysis we have been de-
fending will have to take on the following form. The complement
of get will need to be the usual PredP headed by Pred of type
<π,<e,<s,t>>>. This in turn will force us into analysing the pas-
sive participle/adjective phrase as a property. I am not aware of
any other analysis for the passive that follows this line so something
novel will need to be said in this respect. The Holder argument
in the specifier of PredP will merge as normal2, raising, in cases of
true A-type constructions, to the sentential subject position, but
remaining in-situ for agentive cases of which there are two varieties,
the anaphoric variety (A) , and the bi-argumental variety (B). In
variety A, the Spec PredP argument is merged as IdentN with its
sister antecedent raising to be θ-marked as the Agent in the Spec
of vP. Effectively, this allows both a Holder and an Agent θ-role to
be interpreted on a single referent. In variety B, nothing special
need be said. The Holder argument is merged as per normal, and
likewise an Agent in Spec vP. Both are θ-marked in-situ and hold
disjoint reference. Assuming that this can all be shown in a homo-
geneous way to the procedures we adopted to do so for adjectival
and prepositional complementation (chapters 2 and 3, respectively),
there remains just one major problem to resolve, which we will in-
troduce next.
Consider, for now, just the true A-type passive constructions
(although the problem holds for all passive get and be constructions).
The issue revolves around the single (Holder) argument:
(16) a. John got arrested
b. John was arrested
2This is not strictly true, for reasons to be set out below, but we will assume it as fact for
now.
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On an intuitive level, just as in its be passive equivalent, the subject,
John, is interpreted as the Theme of the arresting event. This is
unproblematic on standard accounts of the passive in which, in one
way or another, the subject picks up its thematic role from the verb
before raising for Case reasons (A˚farli 1989, Baker, Johnson, and
Roberts 1989, Jaeggli 1986 among others3).
The traditional reasoning is that, somehow or other, the passive
morphology ‘absorbs’ accusative Case and the external θ-role.
Burzio’s Generalization (1986): All and only the verbs that can
assign a θ-role to the subject can assign accusative Case to an
object4.
Thus, although not overtly, the passive phrase is considered struc-
turally complex (the Theme object is merged internally), and the
passive construction a raising structure.
The property style analysis outlined above, however, assigns a
Holder θ-role to the nominal in Spec PredP position. This has so far
been of no issue (thematically speaking) as of the two types of com-
plementation we have considered thus far, adjectival and preposi-
tional, only the latter has been structurally complex with, crucially,
the internal argument (what we have referred to as the Ground),
remaining internal to the property phrase.
The situation for passive complementation is critically different
as the Theme argument needs a way not only to escape from the
property phrase, but also, to receive more than one θ-role, that of
both Theme and Holder.
Diagrammatically, a first approximation of the analyses we will
work towards for the two types of passive is represented in (17):
3See Collins 2004 for a different approach.
4By subject, Burzio means external subject (Agent).
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(17) John got arrested [True A-type]
VP
got PredP
Johni Pred
′
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
PassP
λ?.
[there is an
event e such that
arrest(e) & Theme(e,John)
& holds(e,?)
Pass
λf<s,t>.λ?.
[there is an
event e such that
f(e) & holds(e,?)]
-ed
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
DP
<Johni>
In words, the true A-type reading of John got arrested is equiva-
lent to saying something like ‘there was some cause such that John is
the Holder of an eventuality of which [arrested John] holds’, where
both Holder John and Theme John refer to the same individual.
Clearly, this is a conflation of two necessarily different analyses that
will have to be defended (one for the plain get passive and one for
the adjectival get passive). For a start, the issue of agentivity is
not addressed. I have also left a question mark for the property
type as I have yet to argue what kind of property is appropriate to
hold of the two respective predicates of events. However, one aspect
that has been committed to in this initial analysis is that both cases
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of complementation are predicates of events. The finer details of
the analyses, as well as a solution to the thematic problem outlined
above, will be presented in sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.8.
Before that, I will, in a similar vein to previous chapters, begin
by establishing that three particular characteristics hold of these get
constructions:
1. There is a causing event in the structure.
2. The matrix subject is not an external argument.
3. There is no implicit external argument.
Remember that the reason for this is to show that, contra Pylkka¨nen,
(2008), even when we can reliably demonstrate that get means
Cause, it may be realised with no Agent.
5.3 Three characteristics that demonstrate Cause
with no Voice
In 1.6 it was shown that in Japanese and Finnish, Cause may be
syntactically realised with no external argument but that in En-
glish, Cause and Voice must be syntactically realised together as a
‘bundle’ of two semantically distinct heads (Pylkka¨nen 2008). This
section runs contrary to these recent proposals by establishing that,
in the same way Pylkka¨nen does for Finnish and Japanese, one
member (passive get) of a set of constructions in English (the set of
get constructions), does show evidence of realising Cause and Voice
separately.
5.3.1 There is a causing event in the structure
To show conclusively that Cause really is a part of the structure
of passive get is not as straightforward as it was for adjectival and
prepositional get constructions. There is a principled reason for
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this, namely that the passive complement may be event denoting in
and of itself. Thus, the familiar tests for dividing up sentences into
eventive vs stative are rendered defunct as it can be argued that the
reason they pattern as any eventive verb does is because the tests
are picking up on the passivised event, not get. It is, of course, still
necessary to show that they do pattern as eventive sentences, so we
will briefly run through the familiar tests:
(18) Pseudoclefting
a. What happened was John got arrested
b. What happened was Mary got John arrested
(19) Progressive
a. John is getting arrested
b. Mary is getting John arrested
(20) True Present Tense
a. *Look! John gets arrested
b. *Look! Mary gets John arrested
However, there is at least one other way to single out the event de-
noted by get, which we have already seen in use in an earlier chapter
section (1.6), namely to explicitly refer to the cause it denotes:
(21) a. By selling drugs, John got arrested by the police
b. By deliberately leaving incriminating evidence at the
crime scene, burglar A got himself/burglar B arrested
by the police
The phrases by selling drugs and by deliberately leaving incriminat-
ing evidence at the crime scene are both licensed in a by phrase of
the kind that qualifies an event in some way. For a causative event
this effectively means that the by phrase will pick out and name
a suitable cause. These kinds of by phrases are therefore licensed
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under two conditions. First, there needs to be an event for it to
qualify, and second, the by phrase must qualify the event suitably.
Should either or both of these conditions not be met, the sentence
will crash (on a conceptual level):
(22) X Event. X By phrase suitability.
a. By giving him drugs, Mary made John an addict
b. By being careless, John broke the vase
c. By reading him his rights, the policeman officially ar-
rested John
(23) X Event. *By phrase suitability
By selling drugs, John was arrested by the police
(24) *Event. X By phrase suitability
By spending lots of time with her, John loved Mary
(25) *Event. *By phrase suitablility
By selling drugs, John loved Mary5
The by phrases used for the get constructions in (21-a) and (21-b)
are not suitable to qualify the arresting event, but they are suitable
to qualify the ‘getting’ event, and do so by naming an appropriate
cause; in the former example, the cause of John’s arrest was his
selling drugs, while in the latter, burglar A was the Agent of an
event of deliberately planting incriminating evidence which was the
cause of his/burglar B’s arrest.
Another argument has already been outlined in chapter 2, but
is worth briefly repeating here as it involves passive get construc-
tions in particular. The intransitive variants of causative/inchoative
alternation verbs are argued to be purely inchoative (Levin and Rap-
paport Hovav 1995 although see Chierchia 1989 for an alternative
5The cause is deemed unsuitable here only on the assumption that the act of drug dealing
is not attractive or appealing to John.
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view), and divide into two types, internal CoS verbs and external
CoS verbs. If get introduces a causative layer into the semantics of
a proposition, we would not expect it to be able to combine with the
internal CoS type as the Cause is inevitably destined to be external.
The prediction is borne out:
(26) a. External CoS
The ice got frozen
b. Internal CoS
*The seed got germinated
The causative layer added by get can be added irrespective of whether
its SC complement is already causative, in which case it adds an even
more external Cause into the eventuality, hence the interpretational
difference between (27-a) and (27-b):
(27) a. John broke the vase
b. The vase got broken by John
In the a. example, John causes the breaking event, but in the b.
example, some cause or other with no named Agent causes John to
cause the breaking event.
Finally, the familiar test with again also leads to the same con-
clusion, namely that get is Cause. Consider the get construction the
vase got broken. Under the analysis I have proposed, we are forced
into viewing this get construction as consisting of two eventualities,
the causing event, denoted by get, and the caused eventuality, de-
noted by get ’s complement the vase broken (before raising of the
vase). Again is able to modify either eventuality in the following
way:
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(28) The vase got broken again
a. Causing event is repeated: [Repetitive reading]
Something happened again, and as a result, the property
of being broken holds of an eventuality of which the vase
is a Holder.
b. Caused eventuality is repeated: [Restitutive reading]
Something happened and as a result, the property of
being broken that held of an eventuality of which the
vase was a Holder, was returned.
The evidence that get means Cause is fairly strong. Next we will
look at the role of the subject.
5.3.2 The matrix subject is not an external argument
The point of this section is to demonstrate that the subject of passive
get cannot always be considered an Agent.
As before, the lack of subject agentivity can only be posited for
A-type constructions, and is associated with just one of the two pos-
sible readings A-type constructions impart, (29-a), the other reading
being the agentive one, (29-b):
(29) Thematic relations for John in John got arrested
a. Either, John is both the Theme of the arresting event
and the Holder of the property of [John arrested],
b. or, John is the Theme of the arresting event, the Holder
of the property of [John arrested] and the Agent of the
Causing event denoted by get.
The easiest way to show that the two readings are present is to con-
struct a PC within an appropriate context and manipulate binding
facts to enforce an interpretation one way or the other.
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Context 1 Imagine a scenario in which John is an undercover po-
liceman working for the mafia. Imagine also that he has a rival
mafioso after him, wanting to kill him. At some point in time,
if the police do not intervene, the rival mafioso will kill him.
To avoid blowing his cover, the police decide to arrest him. In
this situation we might say (30)6:
(30) Johni got arrested (by the policej) PROj to prevent himi
from being killed
Due to conditions on binding, the pronoun him in the purpose clause
must be free and PRO must therefore be controlled by the implicit
Agent ‘the police’.
Context 2 Imagine now a second scenario in which John is a mafioso
and wanted for arrest by the police. Imagine again that he has
a rival mafioso after him wanting to kill him. At some point in
time, his only escape from being killed is if he gives himself up
to the police. He will suffer arrest but escape being killed. In
this situation we might say (31):
(31) Johni got arrested (by the policej) PROi to prevent himselfi
from being killed
In this example, we have used condition A to manipulate PRO into
having joint reference with the embedded anaphor himself. This, in
turn, forces an interpretation in which PRO must be controlled by
John.
A-type passive get constructions are felicitous in both scenarios,
and contrast strongly with the be passive which may only be used
to describe Context 1:
(32) Johni was arrested (by the policej) PROj to prevent himi
from being killed
6The indexes on both PRO and its controller are highlighted in boldface.
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(33) *Johni was arrested (by the policej) PROi to prevent himselfi
from being killed
Context 2, in which the binding conditions force an agentive reading,
is not describable with the be passive. This is expected under our
analysis as be’s only real function is to act as a hook for tense.
As discussed in the previous chapter, leaving proxy readings
aside, example (31), the agentive variant, may be paraphrased with
an overtly reflexive get construction. The non-agentive variant may
not:
(34) Johni got himselfi arrested (by the policej) PROi to prevent
himselfi from being killed
(35) *Johni got himselfi arrested (by the policej) PROj to prevent
himi from being killed
Thus, use of the anaphor in this position may serve as a test for agen-
tivity. Other tests for agentivity involve the use of Agent-oriented
adverbs and instrumental phrases, as demonstrated in section 2.2.2.
A further way to demonstrate that the non-agentive (true) read-
ing exists is to use a subject that cannot be considered an Agent
within the given context. This is very often possible to achieve with
inanimates which only ever plausibly demonstrate agentive traits in
contexts in which they may be deemed teleologically capable (Folli
and Harley 2007). We looked at examples of teleological capability
also in section 2.2.2 where it was reasoned that, while felicitous in
get constructions with non-resultative adjectival complementation,
they are infelicitous as an Agent of Cause in agentive get construc-
tions. As subjects of passive get constructions they are, however,
unproblematic. The examples here are borrowed from that section:
(36) a. *Only Ariel non-bio got the clothes cleaned properly
b. The clothes got cleaned properly only by Ariel non-bio
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(37) a. *The sun got the clothes dried to the bone in just 10
minutes
b. The clothes got dried to the bone in just 10 minutes by
the sun
I will discuss these examples no further except to point out that they
strongly indicate a general restriction on inanimates as the Agent
of a causative event which causes another agentive event. That is,
if an inanimate is deemed to be the Causer of an event, there can
be no intermediate Causer in the causal chain, which is the same
as saying that the causation must be direct. The examples in (38)
are reasoned to be non-agentive on the grounds of them having
an inanimate subject, and this can be shown to be the case when
subjected to agentivity testing:
(38) a. The car got totalled
b. The toast got burned
(39) Anaphor inclusion test
a. *The car got itself totalled
b. *The toast got itself burned
Intentionality cannot be proportioned to the inanimate object (the
grammatical reading assigns the intentionality to the implicit Agent
of the SC eventuality):
(40) Agent-oriented adverb test
a.#Intentionally, the car got totalled
b.#Deliberately, the toast got burned
The instrument cannot be wielded by the inanimate object (in the
grammatical reading, it is the implicit Agent of the SC eventuality
that wields the instrument):
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(41) Instrumental phrase test
a.#The car got totalled with a sledge hammer
b.#The toast got burned with a blowtorch
In the interests of completeness, I will briefly show that B-type pas-
sive get constructions are, in the majority of cases, strictly agentive.
(42) Mary got John fired
a. Mary intentionally got John fired
b. Mary got John fired with a sexual harassment claim
against him
Those cases that are not agentive were briefly considered in chap-
ter 2, but do not fall under the auspices of this thesis so were not
discussed in any great detail. They include sentences like those in
(43-a) and (43-c) and are distinguished from agentive passive get
constructions on at least two grounds. The first is that they must
contain a pronominal element co-indexed with the matrix subject,
and the second is that their matrix subject is deemed an Experi-
encer7. These distinguishing factors are represented below:
(43) a. Johni got hisi car stolen [Experiencer Subject]
b. John got the car stolen [Agent Subject]
c. Johni got the paint spilled on himi [Experiencer Subject]
d. John got the paint spilled [Agent Subject]
Finally, we turn to consideration of implicit Agent facts.
5.3.3 There is no implicit external argument
To show that no implicit argument is associated with get in a true
passive get construction is less straightforward then it was for the
adjectival and prepositional counterparts. This is mainly because
the SC actually can contain an implicit argument that is associated
7Experiencer B-type passive get constructions also have a standard agentive reading.
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with the Agent role of the embedded passive event, as is standard to
most be passives. A plausible implicit Agent is represented overtly
in the bracketed portion:
(44) John was arrested (by the police)
(45) John got arrested (by the police)
We can show that this implicit argument is not associated with get
because it is still available even when get has an overt Agent of its
own:
(46) Mary got John arrested (by the police)
The presence of this implicit Agent renders the PC test useless8.
Recall that the test is designed to point out that no implicit argu-
ment is around to control a PRO in a purpose clause, which works
well for cases of get with adjectival complementation:
(47) *The car got dirty PRO to settle the score
However, for passive get constructions, PRO simply picks up on the
embedded implicit Agent:
(48) The car got dirtied (by the thugsi) PROi to settle the score
For the other two tests that I have used elsewhere, there are subtle
fixes to this problem. The first of these tests has to do with en-
tailments. Implicit Agents, when around, are semantically entailed.
(49) is starred because there is an implicit Agent responsible for
doing the scratching whose existence cannot therefore be negated.
As was shown before, unaccusatives act as controls for this:
(49) Passive
*The car was scratched, but no-one scratched it
8This is not strictly true. If we can force the adjectival get passive reading, control into a PC
should be impossible. We will see arguments of this nature in section 5.4.6 when attempting
to show that an adjectival get passive is possible.
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(50) Unaccusative
The ice melted but no-one melted it
For the counterpart get construction, it is easy to make a false com-
parison with the sentence in (51). What is negated in (51) is the
existence of the ‘scratcher’, which, by (46), is expected to lead to
ungrammaticality.
(51) *The car got scratched but no-one scratched it
The correct comparison sentence is (52), which, because it asserts
the non-existence of any implicit Agent for the ‘getting’ event, it is
grammatical.
(52) The car got scratched but no-one got it scratched
Example (52) means something like: no-one actively did something
to get the car scratched by a third party, it was just something that
someone did spontaneously when the chance presented itself.
Finally, if we accept that by phrases are able to pick out implicit
Agents (as they are for passives), we would expect that if an implicit
Agent associated with get were present, we would also be able to
pick it out with a by phrase. For passive get this, unfortunately,
means doubling up on by phrases (to ensure that at least one of
them is not associated with the passive event) which may also lead
to parsing problems, but assuming not, the only explanation for the
ungrammaticality of (53) is that get is realised without an implicit
Agent.
(53) *The car got scratched by the thugs by the gang-leader
6= The car got scratched by the thugs and the gang-leader
did something that caused the scratching event performed
by the thugs to occur.
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We are now in a position to once again claim that get means Cause,
that it may project without an Agent, and that one may be added
when desired. We will turn next to the analyses.
5.4 The analyses
For both passive get and adjectival passive get, I will first show that
passive participles and resultative adjectives are indeed felicitous
in their respective complement structures, and then proceed step
by step through a derivation of a relevant example, as a way to
introduce and work through the two analyses. I will begin with the
plain get passive.
5.4.1 Evidence for the presence of a passive participle
As seen in section 5.1, there exist two main differences between resul-
tative adjectives and passive participles, namely that the former are
stative and non-agentive, while the latter are eventive and implic-
itly agentive. Given that, for both types of passive get construction
under consideration, the participles are embedded inside a causative
event, despite their difference in this respect (i.e., concerning their
stative/eventive status), it is difficult to argue for the presence, in
a given example, of one type over the other on the basis of this
distinction. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that
adjectival participles, despite being stative, imply an event. There-
fore, the majority of the arguments that will be used, will relate to
the other difference, namely agentivity. Crucially, however, it is im-
portant to be clear that, if demonstrated to be the case, the presence
of an Agent does not argue against the possible use of a resultative
adjective. It just means that, for the case in hand, a resultative
adjective is not present. The strategy, therefore, for demonstrating
that a resultative adjective may be used will be to force the use of an
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adjectival participle by employing modificational lexical items that
target adjectives. For robustness, the examples can then be submit-
ted to agentivity testing. If the result is ungrammatical, we can be
confident that the participle in use is adjectival. These arguments
will be presented in section 5.4.6.
Four tests for agentivity have already been used on various oc-
casions in this work. They are the instrumental phrase test, the
Agent-oriented adverb test, the purpose clause test and the pres-
ence of a by phrase test. To this we will add one more, namely
what we will call the adverb of intent test. This fifth test consists
of the addition of the phrase on purpose. A control example for all
five tests is given below with be passives (in the order listed above).
Erring on the side of caution, we will use an inanimate subject so
that when the test is performed on a get construction, we can be
sure that the Agent that is picked up on is not an Agent of the
‘getting’ event:
(54) a. The ship was sunk with an explosive device
b. The ship was intentionally sunk
c. The ship was sunk PRO to collect the insurance payout
d. The ship was sunk by the enemy captain
e. The ship was sunk on purpose
Replacing be with get has no effect on grammaticality, which I take
to mean that the participle complement in all of these cases are
verbal passives:
(55) a. The ship got sunk with an explosive device
b. The ship got intentionally sunk
c. The ship got sunk PRO to collect the insurance payout
d. The ship got sunk by the enemy captain
e. The ship got sunk on purpose
These tests and their interaction with adjectival participles will be
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returned to in section 5.4.6. Next, though, an analysis of the plain
get passive will be set out.
5.4.2 Motivating IdentN
We will begin by considering the θ-role problem specifically outlined
in section 5.2. Recall the initial representation of the analysis we
gave for a true A-type passive get construction in (17), repeated
below:
(17) John got arrested [True A-type]
VP
got PredP
Johni Pred
′
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
PassP
λ?.
[there is an
event e such that
arrest(e) & Theme(e,John)
& holds(e,?)
Pass
λf<s,t>.λ?.
[there is an
event e such that
f(e) & holds(e,?)]
-ed
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
DP
<Johni>
The structure in (17) was described as representational of the
meaning of John got arrested and asserts that there was some cause
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such that the property of [arrested John] holds of an eventuality
of which John is a Holder. One of the passive participle’s various
functions, then, is to turn its eventive complement into a property
of some sort which can then hold of eventuality. We will look at
what kind of property this might plausibly be in section 5.4.3.
One of the problems faced by this analysis is that, as it stands,
both positions in which John appear are θ-positions. In the lower of
the two positions the role of Theme is picked up, and in the higher,
the Holder role is picked up. Abstracting away from the particular
θ-roles that are involved, this is identical to the facts we find with
overt reflexive anaphors, i.e., two θ-roles for one argument. Given
this striking similarity, we will invoke a null IdentN as a solution to
the problem.
It is worth noting that there is a link here with the part of the the-
ory of Empty Categories, concerned, in particular, with anaphors,
proposed in the GB (Government and Binding) syntactic frame-
work. One of the central tenets of GB theory had to do with NP
types and binding. Chomsky (1981) and (1982) noticed that the
various sorts of null NPs aligned themselves with the various sorts
of overt NPs with respect to two features, namely anaphoricity and
pronominality. Anaphoricity (A) relates to an NP’s propensity to be
referentially dependent and locally bound, while pronominality (P)
has to do with an NP’s requirement to be free in its local domain
(the NP in question may or may not be referentially dependent). A
and P interpreted as binary features lead to the following typology:
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(56) Typology of Nominals
Lexical Empty
[+A, -P] Lexical anaphor NP-trace
[-A, +P] Pronoun pro
[+A ,+P] PRO
[-A, -P] R-expression wh-trace
Movement was hypothesised to leave a trace behind which would
share its θ-role and Case with the moved element via a chain, but
the empty category (the trace) was, ultimately, deemed to be of a
distinct nominal category with its own properties. For example, the
empty category in (58-a) is an anaphor while its antecedent is an
r-expression:
(57) Johni was arrested [NP e]i
The theory was later superseded by the copy theory of movement
which is considered superior partly because it gives us reconstruc-
tion, as it were, for free. In the copy theory, an NP is merged into
the structure at the appropriate level and then a copy is re-merged,
where necessary, to act as an antecedent. Both copies are avail-
able at the semantic interface but, at spellout, deletion rules allow
only one (the structurally ‘higher’ one, at least in English) to be
pronounced.
(58) a. Semantic Interface
Johni was arrested Johni
b. spellout
Johni was arrested Johni
That NP-traces and lexical anaphors appear at the same level in
the typology (table (56)) is, of course, no accident as they do share
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similar features. They are both anaphors in that they display the
same locality effects, and are therefore both subject to Condition
A. Under the copy theory of movement, this insight is effectively
lost. The nominal IdentN, however, recaptures this, building it di-
rectly into the semantics as a way of obviating the need to stipulate
Condition A.
Returning to the analysis, invoking IdentN in the complement of
the verbal projection gives us the following for the VP:
(59) [arrest [Johni ∅i]]
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
V
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
IdentNP
JOHN
DP
Johni
IdentN
λx.x
∅i
There exist two important differences between the two IdentNs
we have now posited. The first difference relates to the fact that one
is lexicalised by self, while the other is obligatorily phonologically
null. The second difference is that the overt IdentN is in a Case
position whereas, assuming Burzio’s generalisation, covert IdentN
cannot be. I will formally relate the two by claiming that the oblig-
atory lack of phonological content is a direct result of the position
not being Case marked. As such, the element IdentN is not ‘fussy’
about being Case-marked.
5.4.3 Merging the passive participle with an event
Recall that IdentN merges with a DP (the antecedent) and is for-
mally identified with that DP both semantically and syntactically,
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the latter via feature valuation, and is assigned a θ-role and Case
(when available). The antecedent DP is then free to raise and re-
ceive Case and θ-marking elsewhere in the structure. Given firstly,
that accusative Case is licensed by an Agent-selecting little v, and
that no accusative Case is licensed in passive structures, and sec-
ondly, that the Agent is implicit, we will assume that a defective
form of little v is projected, called Pass-v. It is defective in that
it can neither project a specifier in which to realise its Agent nor
assign accusative Case.
Although, there is no A-position available for it, the Agent role is
semantically accessible as a kind of implicit agentive argument that
can only be lexicalised as the argument of a by phrase (in whatever
way that works) when required by the speaker. Therefore, one of
the syntactic functions of the passive participle is to ‘absorb’ the
external argument, which we will assume takes place ‘internally’ by
saturating its own Agent argument with an implicit individual ximp
(see (60)).
The VP in the complement of Pass-v is a predicate of events of
type <s,t>. Recall that Pred’s function (as the next functional head
to be merged after Pass-v) is to turn a property of some sort (e.g.
in the car, dry etc.) into a predicate of eventualities to which an
individual may be related as the Holder argument of the relevant
eventuality. Thus, if the property is one of a state of being, e.g. ill,
Pred takes that property and relates it to an eventuality of which
an argument, e.g. John, may in turn be related as a Holder. This
gives us the interpretation that John is the Holder of an eventuality
of which a state of illness holds.
Given that we are dealing with (non-stative) events here, and
that events may be viewed as spatiotemporal objects, we will posit
that the main semantic role of Pass-v is to turn the VP event in
its complement into a property of space-time such that the event is
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true of a spatiotemporal interval ∆. Its semantic value is given in
(60), below, and integrated into the tree structure in (61):
(60) J-edPass-vK = λf<s,t>.λ∆pi.[there is an event e and an individual
ximp such that f(e) & holds(e,∆) & Agent(e,ximp)]
(61) [arrested [Johni ∅i]]
Pass-vP
λ∆.
[there is an
event e and an
individual ximp such
that arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)
& holds(e,∆)
& Agent(e,ximp)]
Pass-v
λf<s,t>.λ∆.
[there is an
event e and an
individual ximp such
that f(e) & holds(e,∆)
& Agent(e,ximp)]
-ed
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
V
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
IdentNP
JOHN
DP
Johni
IdentN
λx.x
∅
5.4.4 Merging Pred
Now that we have something of type π, that is also conceptually the
right kind of thing to predicate of an eventuality, we can merge Pred
with (61) and project a ‘landing’ site for the antecedent in which it
is marked as the Holder of that eventuality:
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(62) [Johni [arrested [ <Johni> ∅i]]]
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,John)]
Johni Pred
′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pass-vP
λ∆.
[there is an
event e and an
individual ximp such
that arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)
& holds(e,∆)
& Agent(e,ximp)]
= Π
Pass-v
λf<s,t>.λ∆.
[there is an
event e and an
individual ximp such
that f(e) & holds(e,∆)
& Agent(e,ximp)]
-ed
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
V
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
IdentNP
JOHN
DP
ti
IdentN
λx.x
∅
PredP says that a spatiotemporal interval ∆, in which the event
of John being arrested by an unspecified Agent of some sort took
place, holds of an eventuality of which John is the Holder.
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For the be passive this is all that really needs to be stated. The
rest of the functional heads in the sequence will merge into the
structure, one by one, up to TP. Be sits in T, and is inflected for
tense, and in the specifier of TP John re-merges and is Case marked.
5.4.5 Merging get
Merging get with no little v simply adds in a causative layer to the
syntax/semantics, but no Agent, and allows T to mark tense with-
out needing to invoke be. Again, the Holder argument will re-merge
in Spec TP for nominative Case marking. The more interesting
cases are those of agentive get constructions. Taking B-type con-
structions first, the external argument is introduced by little v, via
event identification, and accusative Case is licensed, case-marking
the Holder argument in-situ. The Agent is merged in Spec vP and
re-merged in Spec TP for nominative Case marking.
The agentive A-type construction mirrors a reflexive B-type con-
struction differing only in that the self anaphor is not phonologi-
cally spelled out. In both variants, IdentN will need to appear in
the Spec of PredP to continue the coreference that exists between
Theme, Holder and Agent through the structure. This necessitates
the use of IdentN in two places in the structure, both of which re-
quire the same antecedent DP. Movement of the antecedent DP from
the lower IdentNP to the higher IdentNP would violate Chomsky’s
Extension Condition (Chomsky 1993, 1995), so I will assume that
the higher one is initially merged as the antecedent specifier of the
lower IdentN before moving to Spec PredP:
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(63) IdentNP merges in Spec IdentNP
VP
λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
V
λx.λe.
[arrest(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
arrest
IdentNP
JOHN
IdentNP
JOHN
DP
Johni
IdentN
λx.x
∅i
IdentN
λx.x
∅i
This raises a potentially tricky look-ahead problem. How do we
know to merge two IdentNs into the structure at such an early stage
of the derivation? Certainly, a structure with three or more IdentNs
each successively merged inside the Spec of a dominating one, would
crash on a θ-assignment basis (after all, each IdentN, not to men-
tion the antecedent DP, needs θ-marking and as yet, I am unaware
of any sentential construction, other than get, which is complex
enough to license even 3 let alone 4 θ-roles to one referent). How-
ever, in the case of these particular constructions, no strong phase
boundary (CP) is crossed, so one possibility is that the issue is re-
solved at the phase level. Unfortunately, this opens the analysis up
to possible over-generation, and I would ideally like the theory to
be crash-proof. Adopting an alternative to the way that syntactic
structures are built may also resolve this issue. Within a top-down
view of syntax, in which sentences are built up from left to right
(Phillips 1996, Richards 1999), and in which the structure can be
incrementally interpreted (Steedman 1996, Kempson, Meyer-Viol,
and Gabbay 2001), the number of IdentNs needed and their posi-
tions in the sentence, is no longer problematic.
The structure for John got himself arrested up to the matrix vP
251
level is shown in (76), on the next page:
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(64) John got himself arrested
vP
λe.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,John)
& cause(e,e′)
& Agent(e,John)]
Johni v′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,John)
& cause(e,e′)
& Agent(e,x)]
v
λx.λe.
[Agent(e,x)]
VP
λe.∃e′.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,John)
& cause(e,e′)]
V
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e′.
[f(e′) &
cause(e,e′)]
got
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,John)]
IdentNPj
JOHN
ti
⇑
him
IdentN
λx.x
-self
Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pass-vP
λ∆.
[there is an
event e and an
individual ximp such
that arrest(e)
& Theme(e,John)
& holds(e,∆)
& Agent(e,ximp)]
= Π
arrest-ed tj
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Semantically, vP says that John is the Agent of a causing event
in which John is the Holder of an eventuality of which there holds a
spatiotemporal interval ∆, in which the event of John being arrested
by an unspecified Agent of some sort took place.
We will now turn our attention back to the adjectival get passive.
5.4.6 Evidence for the presence of an adjectival participle
As discussed earlier, adjectival passives in their simplest incarna-
tions look just like eventive passives. Both are formed with be and
both use the same form for the main predicate. However, one is
eventive and agentive where the other is stative and non-agentive.
(65) Eventive passive
The dress was ripped by John (John ripped the dress)
(66) Adjectival passive
The dress is ripped (*by John) (The dress is in a state of
having been ripped)
The bracketed description of the meaning of the adjectival passive is
accurate in as much as it reflects the perfective aspect of the phrase,
but it is inaccurate in that it incorrectly asserts that the adjectival
passive is no more than a perfect form of the verbal passive (Kratzer
2001). This however, can be shown to be incorrect, as the adjectival
passive (68) includes a reading not available with the verbal passive
(67). Verbal passives include an implicit Agent with disjoint refer-
ence to the Theme argument such that (67) can only be interpreted
as meaning that someone other than John has washed John, despite
the fact that the verb wash is otherwise inherently reflexive. On
the other hand, (68) is compatible with reflexive action. It appears
unimportant just who washed John. The important information is
that there was a washing event, now completed, the result of which
was John being in a washed state.
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(67) John has been washed
(68) John is washed
Therefore, if get is compatible with the adjectival passive, we would
predict that reflexive interpretations should be available. Certainly,
(69) is compatible with reflexive action, but it might be argued that
this is simply because there is a null anaphor in the Holder position
between get and washed. In fact, however, the possible presence of
the anaphor is irrelevant. What is important is not whether the
‘getting’ of John washed was done by John on himself, but whether
the washing was performed by John on himself, and this is certainly
one of the readings that (69) has.
(69) John got washed
The same is true for agentive get constructions. In both (70) and
(71), the Holder subjects may or may not be interpreted as washing
themselves:
(70) Mary got John washed (Mary did something such that John
is washed)
(71) Did you get the kids washed and ready for bed? (i.e., did you
do something such that the kids are washed and prepared
for bed?)
Other evidence in support of the claim that resultative adjectival
complementation is compatible with get can be found with respect
to the agentivity tests set out in section 5.4.1 in which it was claimed
that successful agentivity diagnosis supports the claim that the ver-
bal passive participle combines with get. These are the relevant
examples repeated:
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(55) a. The ship got sunk with an explosive device
b. The ship got intentionally sunk
c. The ship got sunk PRO to collect the insurance payout
d. The ship got sunk by the enemy captain
e. The ship got sunk on purpose
Recall also that more, very and so modify states but not events, (4)
and (5), so force the use of an adjectival participle:
(4) Adjectival passive
The door was more/very/so opened (*by John)
(5) a. *Mary more/very/so kicked John
b. *John was more/very/so kicked by Mary
Therefore, if passive get constructions allow this kind of modifica-
tion, we have good evidence that they accept resultative adjectives:
(72) a. The car got very damaged in the race (by continually
being pelted with stones)
b. The door got more opened as the day proceeded (by
continually being pushed further and further back)
c. The water reserve got so emptied that nearly all the
water was gone
All the above examples are grammatically sound, and furthermore,
they can include a cause-naming by phrase picking up on the cause
denoted by get. For concreteness, it is also worth demonstrating
that once modified in this way, it is no longer possible to detect an
implicit Agent:
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(73) a. *The ship was very sunk with an explosive device
b. *The ship was intentionally very sunk
c. *The ship was very sunk PRO to collect the insurance
payout
d. *The ship was very sunk by the enemy captain
e. *The ship was very sunk on purpose
The tests strongly support the claim so we will therefore move on
to an analysis of the construction.
5.4.7 Merging the adjectival participle with an event
Eventive passives were analysed as properties of spatiotemporal in-
tervals ∆. Here, however, we are dealing with states with a perfec-
tive aspect interpretation, that are also the result of an event. It
is therefore reasonable to posit that they are made up from events
but are properties of time, independent of space. Therefore, I will
follow Kratzer (2001) and analyse the adjectival passive as a prop-
erty of times that is true of all times t that occur after the event
in question has culminated. We will call the head that forms the
resultative adjective Res, and the interval of time during which the
event takes place T . The semantic value of Res is shown in (74), and
its integration into a syntactosemantic tree is shown in (75). Note
that although it merges with an event, no implicit Agent enters the
definition, and the participle cannot be considered as an instantia-
tion of little v. Indeed this would be the wrong way to theorise as
ResP is adjectival in nature.
(74) J-edResK = λf<s,t>.λtpi.[there is an event e such that holds(e,T )
& f(e) & T <t
(75) ResP for [washed John]
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ResP
λt.
[there is an
event e such
that holds(e,T )
& wash(e) & Theme(e,John)
& T <t]
Res
λf<s,t>.λt.
[there is an
event e such
that holds(e,T )
& f(e) & T <t]
-ed
VP
λe.
[wash(e)
& Theme(e,John)]
λx.λe.
[wash(e)
& Theme(e,x)]
wash
IdentNP
JOHN
DP
Johni
IdentN
λx.x
∅
The completed washing event of which John is the Theme is true
of any time t so long as t is preceded by T , the interval of time
during which the event ran its course. Again, IdentN is merged as
the complement of the event to allow the Theme object to ‘escape’
the ResP.
5.4.8 Merging PredP and get
The merging of PredP, and then of get, runs as before. The same
thematic relations are established along the way, but the interpre-
tation, of course, differs from before. For example, no Agent of the
small clause internal event is implied, which allows inherently reflex-
ive events, such as washing events, to be interpreted reflexively. The
tree provided is for the B-type sentence John got the kids washed,
with the interpretation, John was the Agent of some event which
caused a situation in which the kids are the Holder of an eventu-
ality of which a property of times holds such that for any time t
preceded by T , the running time of the washing event, the kids are
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washed.
(76) John got the kids washed
vP
λe.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,the kids)
& cause(e,e′)
& Agent(e,John)]
John v′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,the kids)
& cause(e,e′)
& Agent(e,x)]
v
λx.λe.
[Agent(e,x)]
VP
λe.∃e′.
[holds(Π,e′)
& Holder(e′,the kids)
& cause(e,e′)]
V
λf<s,t>.λe.∃e′.
[f(e′) &
cause(e,e′)]
got
PredP
λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,the kids)]
DP
the kidsj
Pred′
λx.λe.
[holds(Π,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
Pred
λpi.λx.λe.
[holds(pi,e)
& Holder(e,x)]
ResP
λt.
[there is an
event e such
that holds(e,T )
& wash(e) & Theme(e,the kids)
& T <t]
=Π
wash-ed tj
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While a participle such as arrested can be interpreted as an ad-
jective (77), in a get construction, the resultative interpretation is
likely to be less salient than the eventive passive interpretation for
several reasons. These include, the framing of the construction in
the past tense (to suit the eventivity of get), the fact that arrest-
ing events resist the kind of modification we have seen applied to
force adjectival readings, (78), and the fact that arresting events are
always carried out by a fairly salient Agent, i.e., a member of the
police force, even if that Agent is not directly or implicitly referred
to.
(77) Look! John is arrested (*by the police)
(78) *John got more/very/so arrested
We will now briefly look at some events that do not combine with
get before summarising the main points of the chapter.
5.5 Verbal i-level predicates
I would briefly like to look at some potentially problematic data that
in fact receives a natural explanation within the theory proposed.
Following Carlson (1977), three basic types of i-level predicates are
evidenced in the grammar of English:
I-level adjectives: intelligent, human, female etc
Stative Verbs: love, hate, know, owe etc
Predicative NPs: be a man, be a doctor etc
As we saw in chapter 2, i-level adjectives will not combine with
get. The reason given for this has to do with the kind of concepts
that these adjectives denote: they are all, in some way, permanent,
intransitory properties. Thus, if someone is female, their femaleness
is intrinsic to them as individuals. The same is true for humanness
260
and intelligence; at least that is how we generally perceive these
qualities. For other attributes, such as emotions like happiness and
anger, there is an intrinsically temporary, transitory nature attached
to the concept. People’s moods can alternate between different emo-
tional states on a regular basis.
I chose, following Adger and Ramchand (2003), to implement this
difference in the syntax and semantics of two distinct Pred heads,
one which relates a property directly to an individual, (79-a), and
another which relates a property to an eventuality of which an indi-
vidual may be a Holder, (79-b). On an intuitive level, the meaning of
get involves some kind of transition into a new state, or acquisition
of a new property, a fact that leads to a conceptual mis-match when
one tries to use an i-level adjective in get ’s complement. Positing
that get has the same semantic value as Pylkka¨nen’s (2008) Cause
head provided a natural way to account for the incompatibility of
‘intransitory’ concepts in get ’s complement structure. This intuitive
mis-match is reflected in the semantic type mis-match between get
and an ‘intransitory’ PredP. For type reasons it is only ‘transitory’
PredP with which get may merge: get is looking for something of
type <s,t>, and of the two PredPs, only ‘transitory’ PredP is of
this type.
(79) a. ‘Intransitory’ JPredK = λπ.λx.[holds(π,x)]
b. ‘Transitory’ JPredK = λπ.λx.λe.[holds(π,e) & Holder(e,x)]
With respect to the get constructions under investigation here, the
s/i-level distinction is once again shown to be important as it cor-
rectly predicts that stative verbs should not be compatible with get :
(80) Stative verbs and get
a. *John got loved/hated
b. *John got known
c. *John got the car owned
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The concepts denoted by stative verbs are the kinds of eventualities
that we naturally conceive of as intransitory. If we express that we
love someone, or know someone, even though, at least in the first
example, we can change our mind, the conceptual property is judged
as an intransitory characteristic of our individual identity, and when
the property is of this sort, it can be related directly to an individual
using the Pred head in (79-a).
There is also a question of what kind of construction the examples
in (80) are, eventive passive or adjectival passive? As stative verbs,
they never pattern as events, (81), and thus, we can only deduce
that the sentences are examples of the adjectival passive.
(81) a. *What happened was, John was loved
b. Look! John loves Mary
As adjectives, they can be counted out as complements of get on
the same grounds as adjectives like female, human and intelligent.
It is, however, interesting that they license a by phrase:
(82) John is/was loved by Mary
I will not be providing an analysis of this except to say that, in these
particular cases, the by phrase is not picking up on an Agent, and
indeed, the constructions fail all of the other tests for agentivity9:
(84) a. *John was loved with a shower of gifts
b. *John was intentionally loved
c. *John was loved PRO to prove a point
d. *John was loved on purpose
9I assume that the following examples can be explained as special idiomatic cases rather
than actual instrumental with phrases:
(83) John was loved with all of Mary’s heart/hated with all of Mary’s guts
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5.6 Chapter summary
I began this chapter by demonstrating that what looks like one con-
struction, the be passive, is actually ambiguous between two con-
structions, the verbal passive and the adjectival passive, where the
latter looks like a special, quasi-eventive form of the adjectival con-
structions analysed in chapter 2. For passive get constructions, it
was proposed, contra previous analyses, that under the general anal-
ysis being defended, there was no reason why both types of passive
should not be compatible with get. Diagnostic evidence in support
of this position was provided later, in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.6. Be-
fore that, however, one complication in particular was anticipated,
namely a thematic problem relating to the fact that sentences like
those in (85) would need to assign more than one thematic role to
one and the same argument.
(85) a. John got arrested
b. John got himself arrested
Before providing a solution to this, it was demonstrated for these
get constructions too, firstly that get means Cause, and secondly
that, despite this, we are able to project get without necessarily
projecting an Agent.
Analyses of both the plain get passive (PGP) and then the adjec-
tival get passive (AGP) formed the bulk of the rest of the chapter
in which it was reasoned that, as events, PGPs are properties of
spatiotemporal intervals ∆, and as states with perfective aspect,
AGPs are properties of times t and independent of a spatial dimen-
sion. The solution to the thematic assignment problem was resolved
with the ‘technology’ developed in Chapter 4, namely by invoking
IdentN in the object position of the two types of participle. There
was, however, one caveat, specifically, that on the occasions when a
given sentence assigns three θ-roles to a single argument, an IdentNP
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would need to be merged into the specifier of the IdentN in object
position (and then subsequently raised). This is potentially prob-
lematic from a look-ahead perspective, but it was suggested that
top-down syntax with incremental interpretation may resolve this.
In the final section, we briefly considered stative verbs and pro-
vided an explanation of their deviance in get constructions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
On the odd occasion that I have been asked what it is that I do with
get, I have happily launched myself into a virtual monologue about
all the things it can and cannot mean, about how it can take an
extra argument, about how it has ‘hidden’ meanings and so on. On
the even rarer occasion that I have not been cut off in my tracks,
I have found that it is impossible to talk about get without also
mentioning be. It takes an extra argument as opposed to be, which
cannot. It has hidden reflexive and causative meanings as opposed
to be, which does not. The reason for being able to only talk about
get with reference to be, I hope, has become clear, and is expressed in
the following sentence. Get is essentially a quasi-functional, quasi-
lexical linguistic tool that a speaker employs relatively freely to add
a causative layer into an otherwise copula construction. Some of
the consequences of such a statement have been discussed through
the course of this work, and have been shown to relate keenly to
the ways in which people think in theoretical linguistics about such
notions as causation, argument structure, predication, passivisation,
reflexivity and property-hood. Further consequences that impinge
on other such important notions will undoubtedly come to light in
future work on the topic, of which there are many potential avenues.
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For example, extension of the analysis into the domain of nominal
complementation is one such possible direction, that seems, on first
inspection, to have something to say about possession, definiteness
effects and double object constructions:
(1) a. John got the doctor 9 John BECOME a doctor
b. John got the present → John HAVE the present
(2) a. John got the car 6= John got a car
(3) John got the vet the dying animal =
a. John got the dying animal for the vet
b. John got the dying animal to the vet
On the other hand, extension into the domain of infinitival comple-
mentation seems to have something to say about PRO, if indeed the
following meaning patterns are related to the presence of PRO:
(4) Mary got John arrested by the police necessarily means
that John got arrested by the police
(5) Mary got John PRO to kill Peter does not necessarily
mean that John got PRO to kill Peter
There is also scope here for future investigation of property types.
Locations are seen as spatial properties that can be organised into
structured, directional, spatial properties in the form of paths with
intervals. Likewise, states of being are seen as properties of an indi-
vidual’s characteristics, and they too may be organised into struc-
tured properties of characteristics in the form of scales with inter-
vals. The same is also true for spatiotemporal intervals, which may
be seen as properties of space-time that can be organised into struc-
tured temporal properties (independent of space?) as was seen for
passives and adjectival passives.
Turning our attention back inwards, various problems were en-
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countered and resolved through the course of the thesis. I will briefly
revisit some of them here. In chapter 2, a distinction was drawn be-
tween stage level (SL) and individual level (IL) adjectival predicates,
which has implications for the feasibility of any particular analysis
of get. This is the case because get systematically ‘rejects’ IL but
‘accepts’ SL predicates in its complement. The solution to this was
found through appeal to an analysis of Scottish Gaelic copula con-
structions detailed in Adger and Ramchand 2003, and formed the
basis on which all the other constructions considered would then be
analysed.
In chapter 3, the problem of how to transfer prepositional as-
pect to a non-motion verb like get was encountered. The solution
revealed itself through due consideration of the entailments that
hold between path intervals and locations. These entailments filter
up through the meanings of directional prepositional phrases such
that suitability in the complement of get, as a change-of-state verb,
could be pinpointed to relate directly to the differing characteristics
that paths denote. Specifically, it was shown that in order to be
compatible with get, a path must be bounded, or non-cumulative,
or multiple stage-denoting, ‘three’ sides of the same metaphorical
coin.
In chapter 4, the problem of how to account for the availability
of proxy readings was considered, which inspired a new analysis of
reflexivisation based on previous work by Kayne (2002) and Zwart
(2002). However, my analysis differs in that it proposes both a
complex view of self anaphors, for which ample evidence was pro-
vided, and the notion of a ‘doubling’ constituent (Kayne 2002) from
a semantic viewpoint. The solution involves merging the antecedent
with an underspecified nominal I call IdentN (and pronounced as
self ), which forms a semantic identity relationship with its sister
constituent, and ‘steals’ the available Case and θ-role, forcing rais-
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ing of the antecedent.
Finally, in chapter 5, a thematic problem was noted, namely that
for passive constructions, the Theme argument would need to be
raised out of the internal make-up of the VP, in order to be consid-
ered as a Holder and in some cases an Agent too. As a solution, it
was shown that the reflexive analysis is also able to cope with this
problem, in the form of an IdentN which is obligatorily null because
of its failure to receive Case marking.
Casting an eye back over the main aim of this thesis, the analysis
is successful to the extent that the considered get constructions have
been unified under one analysis. This analysis captures, in a prin-
cipled fashion, not only the various characteristics of get, but also
the similarities and differences that exist between it and the copula.
However, it is also limited analysis in that it may only be classified
as counting ‘towards’ a unified characterisation of the syntax and
semantics of get in all of its environments.
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